OF
RICHARD BURTHOGGE
EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
BY
MARGARET W. LANDES
HALLOWELL FELLOW AT WELLESLKY COLLEGE, 1913-14
CHICAGO LONDON
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
1921
COPYRIGHT BY
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
1921
PRINTED IN AMERICA
PREFACE.
THIS book is published in the hope of securing for
Richard Burthogge the place which he deserves yet
has never held in the history of British thought. Its editors
wish to share with other students the rediscovery, which
they owe to Georges Lyon, of a seventeenth-century English
philosopher so free from the prepossessions of his Platonist
contemporaries that he "grounds notions" in sense and so
far advanced in the path which, a century later, Kant trod
that he says: "The immediate objects of humane cogitation
are all appearances, which are not properly in the things
themselves."
All the writings collected in this volume are reprints
from first editions in the. possession of the Harvard Uni
versity Library. All are printed entire save the Essay upon
Reason, of which the greater part and (it is believed) the
essential part is given including the chapter and section
headings of the omitted chapters. The old orthography of
English, Greek and Latin has, for the most part, been re
tained. Bracketed numbers are the page-numbers of the
original editions. The kindness of the Harvard Library, in
allowing the use of the texts, is gratefully acknowledged.
This volume is the third contribution to the study of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English philosophical
iv PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
texts by graduate students of Wellesley College.1 The im
mediate incentive to its study of Burthogge is Prof. A. O.
Lovejoy's reference to him in an essay on "Kant and the
English Platonists." The editors take this opportunity to
express their appreciation of Dr. Lovejoy's generous and
expert counsel in the preparation of the book. Warm
thanks are due also to Professor Rufus M. Jones of Haver-
ford College, and to Professors Charlotte F. Roberts and
Alice Robertson of Wellesley College, for Notes attributed
to them.
The editor of this volume illuminates the text of Bur
thogge by biographical and philosophical Notes and, in her
Introduction, calls attention to the anticipations both of
Locke and of Kant which give the writings of Richard
Burthogge, though hitherto all but unknown, their genuine
historical significance. Miss Landes compares Burthogge's
doctrine with that of his contemporaries and successors
and, in an Outline, summarizes and combines the teachings,
not always consistent with each other, of his different meta
physical works.
To her philosophical comments may be prefixed a brief
remark about Burthogge's literary style. Readers of the
Organum and the Essay will find those works marked at
many points by a directness and a simplicity and by an occa
sional touch of humor which strongly distinguish them from
most of the philosophical treatises by Burthogge's contem
poraries. His predilection for plain language and for log
ical statement is indicated by his attitude of kindly scorn
toward discourses "wherein Words are sensible but not the
Propositions and yet are taken by those that make them for
High Sence."
It is hardly to be hoped that the reader of this book will
"make sense" of all that Burthogge says. The attentive
1 Earlier volumes are : an edition of Arthur Collier's Clavis Uni-
versalis, with Introduction and Notes by Ethel Bowman (Open Court
Publishing Co., 1909) ; and a study of The Philosophy of John Norris,
by Flora I. MacKinnon (Psychological Review Publications, 1910).
PREFACE. V
reader cannot, however, fail to profit both by his keen and
sympathetic comment on his immediate predecessors and
contemporaries and by his first-hand introspection, sound
argument and independent thinking.
MARY WHITON CALKINS.
WELLESLEY COLLEGE.
November, 1920.
CONTENTS.
PACI
INTRODUCTION i*
A. The Life of Richard Burthogge xi
B. Burthogge's Place in the History of Philosophy xiii
1. Burthogge's Relation to the Cambridge Platonists . . . xiii
2. Burthogge's Relation to Locke and Kant xv
THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE
Organum Vetus et Novum, or A Discourse of Reason and Truth,
1678. (Complete) 3
An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits, 1694. (With
omissions) 53
Of Human Reason. The First Part 55
Chap. I. Of Reason in General 55
Chap. II. Of Apprehension 65
Chap. III. Of Notion, the Immediate Object of Apprehension 70
Chap. IV. Of the Distribution of Notions in the Restrained
Sense of the Word 89
Chap. V. Of Substance 96
Chap. IV [VI]. Of Mind in Matter 118
Chap. VII. Animals are Either Invisible or Visible 132
Chap. VIII. Another Essay About the Nature of Animals and
Spirits 134
Chap. IX. Of Substance in the Scholastical Consideration
of It 136
Of the Soul of the World and of Particular Souls, 1699 139
OUTLINE OF BURTHOGGE'S PHILOSOPHY 179
NOTES 185
BIBLIOGRAPHY 225
I. Complete List of the Works of Burthogge 227
II. Other Works to which Reference is Made 230
INDEX . 233
INTRODUCTION.
A. THE LIFE OF RICHARD BURTHOGGE.
THERE are not many sources for the life of Richard
Burthogge. The meager accounts by his biographers
are based for the most part on the short sketch of his life
quoted anonymously by Anthony Wood in the Athenae
Oxonienses.
Burthogge was born in Plymouth. England.1 The dates
of his life are not definitely known, but are usually given
as 1638-94.2 As Georges Lyon3 points out, however, the
date of his death must have been later than 1694. It might
be inferred from the fact that Christianity a Revealed Mys
tery was not published until 1702, that the date has been
placed too early. This work, however, may have been
posthumous. But the fact that Of the Soul of the World,
a letter to Locke, is dated 1698, shows conclusively that
the date of Burthogge's death must have been at least four
years later than that given by his biographers.
Of Burthogge's parents we are told only that his father
was a gunner.4 And of his early life nothing is recorded
but the fact that he received his early education at the Ex
eter Grammar School.2 In 1654 he "became either a serv-
1 Anthony a Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, Vol. IV, p. 581. Georges
Lyon, L'idealisme en Angle terre au XVIII. siecle, p. 72.
2 Leslie Stephen, Dictionary of National Biography. Georges Lyon,
loc. cit. Ueberweg, History of Philosophy from Thales to the Pres
ent Time, Vol. II, p. 365.
3 Loc. cit.
4 Anthony a Wood, loc. cit. Cf. Georges Lyon, loc. cit.
xii PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
itor or chorister of All-s. coll." He "took one degree in arts
4 years after, completed it by determination as a mem
ber of Line, coll." He then studied medicine at the Uni
versity of Leyden and in 1662 "was doctorated in physic."
On his return to "his native country, [he] married, buried
his wife, took to him a second wife who was a widow of
the parish of Totness in Devonshire, on whose joynture he
lives in Bowden near to that place, as he hath done above
20 years, practises physic, and by that and wiving he hath
obtained a pretty foul estate. This person, who always
kept pace with the fanatics, temporiz'd with the papists in
the reign of King James II and therefore was made a justice
of peace for Devonshire, which office he kept under Will.
Ill as being a favourer of fanatics. He is look'd upon as
a person of considerable learning, and of no less pride and
ambition." The biographer is here quite evidently not free
from personal feeling in sketching the facts of Burthogge's
life. It is possible that he speaks with just scorn of Bur-
thogge as one who diplomatically "kept pace with the fa
natics," and at the same time "temporiz'd with the papists."
Since, however, he furnishes no evidence, it is more reason
able to suppose that what he looked upon as diplomacy in
Burthogge was only evidence of more advanced religious
views.6 Religion in England in the seventeenth century was
still dominated by tradition and dogma, and men of liberal
religious views were rare.
In the years following his course at Leyden Burthogge
was apparently finding time, aside from his professional
duties, for philosophic reading and writing. Between the
years 1671 and 1702 he published some eight or nine reli
gious essays and three philosophical works. Of his philo
sophical writings the Organum Fetus & Novum appeared
in 1678, the Essay upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits in
1694, and Of the Soul of the World in 1699.
6 Cf., however, Organum, Sect. 41, p. 35.
INTRODUCTION. Xlll
B. BURTHOGGE'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOS
OPHY.8
Burthogge is one of those individuals, appearing now
and again in history, whose merit is unrecognized in his
own day not only because his teaching is premature, but
also because it is so pervaded by the dominating thought
of the time that its element of originality is lost. As a
philosopher Burthogge cannot be placed either with the
idealists of his own time or with those of the following
century. He holds a unique place between the two. All his
writings bear in some measure the stamp of the Platonic
idealism of the seventeenth century. His most significant
teaching, however, is more closely allied to the idealistic
philosophy of the eighteenth century. But for its Lockian
strain of sensationalism his theory of knowledge is essen
tially that of Kant.
1. Burthogge 's Relation to the Cambridge Platonists.
The influence of the Cambridge Platonists is obtrusively
evident in Burthogge's writings. His method, except in the
Organum and in the Essay, is the same uncritical method of
the Platonists. His theological works are full of the elo
quent exhortations,7 and long quotations from the Bible8 and
the classics9 which make the writings of Cudworth,10 More19
and Culverwel10 the most tedious of reading. And again,
• Ueberweg alone, of the writers of the history of philosophy, makes
mention of Burthogge in a single short paragraph.
7 See Christianity a Revealed Mystery and A Brief Discourse con~
cerning Perseverance in Grace.
8 Of the Soul of the World, pp. 21-24; Christianity a Revealed
Mystery, pp. 26ff ; Causa Dei, p. 43. The page references, throughout,
are to the original editions. The writer is indebted to the Harvard
University library for the use of its Burthogge texts.
•O/ the Soul of the World, pp. 11, 18, 24ff; TAFA0ON; Causa
Dei, pp. 250f, 256, 395, et al.
10 See Cudworth, True Intellectual System ; More, Antidote against
Atheism; Culverwel, Discourse of the Light of Nature.
xiv PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
with the exception of the two works mentioned above, Bur-
thogge's writings like those of the Platonists, are drenched
with the theological views of the time.11 And even the
Organum and the Essay do not escape the religious bias of
the seventeenth century.12 But more specifically, Burthogge
holds in common with the Cambridge Platonists at least
two of their important tenets. His doctrine of the superior
ity of mind over matter is, with unimportant differences,
the same as that taught by More and by Cudworth. And
one of his doctrines of truth is in agreement with that of
the Platonists, although he has a second teaching about truth
which contradicts his own first doctrine as well as that of
the Cambridge Platonists.
More and Cudworth, basing their teaching on Plato's
Timaeus, held that not man alone, but nature as well, is
dominated by a soul. They did not identify the soul of
the world with God himself, but conceived it as an instru
ment in God's hands, made and used by him to manifest
himself in the world.13 Burthogge, on the other hand,
seems to identify the "Mosaical Spirit" with the Spirit of
God14 diffused throughout the world, although he holds at
the same time, that God is "Pure Mind," independent of
all matter.14 Burthogge's teaching also about the nature
of the human soul is essentially that of the Platonists.
More and Cudworth held that particular souls, i. e., souls
of men and animals and even of plants, are "sprigs of the
common Soul of the world," not "that very Soul it self,"15
though it is unreasonable, Cudworth adds, to suppose that
every plant and blade of grass has "a Particular Plastick
11 See Causa Dei; TAFAGON; Christianity a Revealed Mystery.
12 Organum, Sect. 41 ; Essay, Ch. VII.
13 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, edition of 1678, p. 150;
More, Antidote against Atheism, Bk. II, Ch. II, Sects. 4ff.
"Essay, Ch. IV [VI], Sect. 1, pp. 124ff. Cf. Ch. V, Sect. 2, pp.
15 More, Antidote against Atheism, Appendix. Ch. XI, Sect. 9;
cf. Immortality of the Soul, Bk. III. Ch. XVI, and Cudworth, op
cit., p. 171.
INTRODUCTION. XV
Life." Similarly Burthogge calls the soul "a certain De
terminate Vital Energy .... a certain Portion of the Spirit
of the Universe, Vested in a Body. . . . "16
Again, in teaching that by intuition truth is attained,
Burthogge is in agreement with the thought of his time
To the Platonists truth always meant religious truth, which
is known, they believed, by intuition. The more completely
a man can get away from "meer speculation" and enter the
realm of "spiritual sensation," the more certain is he of at
taining a knowledge of truth.17 And Burthogge likewise
teaches that apart from all sensuous experience we know the
form of truth, which enables us to distinguish truth from
error just as immediately as we distinguish sense-qualities.18
Burthogge, however, holds an empirical theory of truth
which contradicts this view. The criterion of truth, accord
ing to this second theory is based not on intuition, but
rather on the objective harmony of things among themselves.
Truth is not necessarily that which we "clearly and dis
tinctly" apprehend,19 nor that which is in accord with our
faculties,20 but that which fits in with the whole objective
scheme of things.21
2. Burthogge' s Relation to Locke and Kant.
In spite of the abundant evidence in all Burthogge's
writings of the influence of seventeenth-century thought, it
is true that his theory of knowledge, his most important
18 Essay, Ch. IV, Sect. 3, p. 150. Cf. Of the Soul of the World.
p. 6: ....particular Souls are Portions of that Spirit [Mosaical
bpint] acting in the several particular Bodies in which they are."
1T Smith, Discourse concerning Divine Knowledge, Sect. 1.
Culverwel, Discourse of the Light of Nature, especially Chaps. IX
and XI.
18 Organum, Sects. 63, 69.
19 Ibid., Sects. 18, 68, 69.
20 Ibid., Sects. 7, 72.
21 Ibid.. Sects. 75, 78. Cf. Sect. 17.
XVI PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
philosophical teaching, remains singularly free from Pla-
tonist influence. It will be noted that in the Organum
there are scattered passages22 in which Burthogge closely
resembles his Platonist contemporaries in his estimate of
sense, reason, and revelation. But these occasional pas
sages, inconsistent as they are with his usual teaching,
form no integral part of Burthogge's doctrine of knowl
edge, which stands, untouched by Platonist influence, as a
remarkable anticipation of Kant.
Far from holding that sense is a hindrance to knowl
edge, Burthogge teaches, like Kant, that it is one of the
only two sources of knowledge. The essentials of Kant's
epistemology are found in the well-known words : "Thoughts
without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are
blind.... The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot
think. By their union alone can knowledge be produced."23
And this is exactly Burthogge's teaching: "The Under
standing converses not with things ordinarily but by the
Intervention of the sense."24
Sensation, according to both Burthogge and Kant, is
the passively received in knowledge, that which is given in
experience :2B " . . . . the impressions of things without upon
the Sensories, produce or occasion in them the Cogitations
which we call Sentiments, as Colours, Sounds, Sapours &c."26
And as objects can be perceived only through sensation, so,
Burthogge teaches like Kant, they can be thought only
through concepts or "notions." The mind knows nothing,
he says, apart from its particular "manner of conceiving
things." "The Understanding conceives not anything but
under the Notion of an Entity, and this either a Substance
or an Accident ; under that of a whole or a part : or of a
22 Sects. 30, 32, 34, 35, SO.
28 Critique of Pure Reason, A (1st ed.), p. 51 ; B, p. 75.
2« Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 60.
25 Critique of Pure Reason, A 51 ; B 75.
»• Organum, Sect. 24. Cf . Sect. 74.
INTRODUCTION. XV11
Cause, or of an Effect or the like."27 And again Burthogge
is in agreement with Kant in his most important teaching
that in order to have knowledge of the object the percept
and the concept must unite. Neither alone is sufficient to
give complete knowledge.28
The parallelism between Burthogge and Kant may be
carried further. Burthogge holds not only that the object
of knowledge involves both the sensational and the notional
factor, but, like Kant, he teaches that it has no existence
independent of thought.29 Both teach that the object of
knowledge is phenomenal, not real. That the sensuous con
tent of knowledge has no objective existence was not an ab
solutely new doctrine even in Burthogge's time. Locke,
like Descartes, had already taught the ideality of the "sec
ondary" sense-qualities. But that the mind itself, indepen
dent of sense-experience, actively contributes to the make-up
of its own object is a doctrine which, according to the usual
view, was promulgated for the first time by Kant. Yet in
the light of the teaching of the Organum and the Essay it
is clear that Kant's own "Copernican revolution" had an
instigator at least a century older than Kant.
To hold, however, as Professor Lovejoy holds,30 that
Kant's theory was the common property of the Cambridge
Platonists seems hardly justifiable even in the light of the
quotations given in support of this belief. What these quo
tations from Cudworth and More show is rather the tena
cious belief in the superiority of mind over matter, and thus
in the superiority of thought (in which matter is subservient
to mind) over sensation (in which the mind is affected by
matter). Nothing was more abhorrent to the Platonists
27 Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 57. Cf. Organum, Sects. 14-15.
28 Organum, Sects. 9-10. Cf. Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 59; Cri
tique, A 50, 100, 109, 116; B 74, 145.
29 Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1 ; Organum, Sects. 8-13.
80 Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of Win. James
pp. 272-78.
xviii PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
than the idea that matter could in any way assist mind. The
passage quoted from Cudworth31 is, by his own confession,
simply an outburst against the "atheistic argument" that
since matter exists in its own right without need of any
creative mind, our knowledge of things depends merely upon
"passive receptivity." This teaching was an outrage to the
Platonists merely because it belittled the mind, making it
appear of so much less importance than matter, and not be
cause it ignored the necessary conceptual element in knowl
edge as taught by Kant and Burthogge. "But sensible things
themselves ....," says Cudworth,32 "are not known and
understood either by the passion or the fancy of sense, nor by
anything merely foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible
ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something
native and domestic to it." These words of the quotation,
italicized by Professor Love joy33 to emphasize their agree
ment with the Kantian teaching, seem rather to show plainly
that Cudworth is simply falling back on the familiar "innate
ideas" theory in order to prove to the atheist that the mind
is quite capable of getting on without any assistance from
matter ; that it would, in fact, fare much better could it be
rid of sensuous perception altogether.
Burthogge, like Kant, falls short of idealism. He could
not escape the influence of the traditional dualism of the
seventeenth century any more than Kant could shake off the
influence of Wolff's dualistic teaching.34 Neither Burthogge
nor Kant ever denied the existence of reality external to
mind. But since they find that the object of knowledge has
no independent existence, they are forced to hold that reality,
conceived as the thing independent of consciousness, is un
known. This teaching about the unknown thing is empha-
31 Ibid., pp. 272-74.
32 True Intellectual System, op. cit., p. 731.
"Essays in Honor of Wm. James, pp. 273 f.
84 See M. W. Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p.
INTRODUCTION. XIX
sized by Burthogge in both the Organum35 and the Essay
upon Reason.36 And Kant not only includes it in "Paralog
isms" and "Antinomies"37 of the "Dialectic," but anticipates
it in all the other divisions of the Critique ;38 in the chapter
on "Phenomena and Noumena"39 of the "Analytic," and in
the "^Esthetic."40
Burthogge's teaching about the nature of the thing is
essentially the same as that of Kant. The "thing" is, in
the first place, unlike the "object," non-mental and wholly
independent of thought.41 In the second place, the thing
really exists. The object, Burthogge teaches with Kant, is
only appearance or phenomenon, without reality.41 And
finally the thing, for Burthogge as well as for Kant, is un
known.41 Thus does Burthogge, like Kant, unquestioningly
and tenaciously hold to an external reality, a reality robbed,
however, of all positive character save that of existence.
There is in Burthogge no explicit proof for the exist
ence of the thing. That there exists independent reality was
not questioned in the seventeenth century. And Burthogge,
like his contemporaries, takes the "thing" for granted though
he suggests the argument, later used by Kant, for the exist
ence of it. Our sensations, he says, must have a cause ; we
know that we ourselves do not cause them ; they must there
fore have an external cause.42 Kant several times in the
Critique implies this causal relation between the phenom
enon and the thing.43 "The understanding," he says, ". . . .
forms the thought of an object by itself, but as transcenden-
36 Sect. 9.
38 Ch. Ill, Sect. 2, pp. 71, 73.
37 A 357, 359, 361, 368, 378, 477ff ; B SOSff.
38 See M. W. Calkins, op. cit., p. 237, footnote.
30 A 250, 253, 258 ; B 300, 303.
40 A 26ff, 42, 44f, 49; B 42ff, 59, 61f, 67.
41 Organum, Sects. 9-10.
42 Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 2, p. 73, cf. pp. 74f.
** A 252, 288 ; B 344.
XX PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
tal only, which is cause of phenomena."44 This doctrine is
formulated even more explicitly in the Prolegomena : "I grant
.... that there are bodies without us, that is, things which,
though quite unknown to us as to what they are in them
selves, we yet know by the representations which their in
fluence on our sensibility procures us."45 That the thing or
reality is unknown seems, however, to Burthogge to require
no proof. On the basis (1) of his view that external reality
unquestionably exists, and (2) of his previous teaching
that the object of knowledge has no independent existence,
it follows inevitably that the external reality is unknown. If
what is known is not external and if such external reality
nevertheless exists, it follows that this reality must be un
known.46
The agreement of Burthogge's teaching with that of
Kant is not complete. Marked as the likeness is between
the two. Burthogge's epistemology seems to diverge from
the Kantian at one important point. Along with his teach
ing that the mind independent of all external impression
actively contributes part of its own object, Burthogge at
the same time holds a sensationalistic doctrine. While agree
ing with Kant- in teaching that the notional factor is sub
jective in source, Burthogge seems to deny to the notion
any a priori validity by holding, like Locke, that sense-
impressions enter the mind directly, independent of a priori
subjective conditions. "The senses," says Locke, "at first
let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet."47
And again : "Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas ; how comes
it to be furnished?. . . .To this I answer in one word, from
44 A 288, B 344.
46 Sect. 13, Remark II. Cf. M. W. Calkins, op. at., p. 240, foot
note.
48 For Kant's arguments in defense of the view that external reality
must be unknown, see Critique, A 128f, 244, 378.
47 Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, Ch. II, par. 15.
INTRODUCTION. XXI
experience."48 And there are passages in Burthogge which
give the same sensationalistic account of the origin of our
knowledge: "....the impressions of things without upon
the Sensories," he says, "produce or occasion in them the
Cogitations which we call Sentiments, as Colours, Sounds,
Sapours &c. And Sentiments (again) impressing. . . .the
Minde and Understanding, beget or occasion in it those
higher Cogitations which we call Notions, Apprehensions of
Reason or Ideas...."49 This agreement of Burthogge's
teaching with that of Locke, and the added fact that Bur
thogge's Essay upon Reason, dedicated50 "To the Learned
Mr. John Lock, Author of the Essay upon Humane Under
standing," appeared four years after Locke's Essay, would
suggest that Burthogge borrowed from Locke. A further
consideration, however, proves the suspicion unwarranted.
The Organum, in which Burthogge's complete doctrine of
knowledge is given, was published twelve years before
Locke's Essay. Moreover, it will be noted that of Bur
thogge's two works the later shows less evidence of agree
ment with Lockian teaching than the earlier. It is true that
Burthogge insists in the Essay51 as in the Organum,52 that
all knowledge comes through sense-experience. But the
point of emphasis has been shifted in the later work. In the
Organum Burthogge, like Locke, lays stress upon the fact
that sense is the fundamental source of knowledge from
which the notional is derived. In the Essay, on the other
hand, Burthogge seems no longer chiefly concerned in show
ing that all knowledge begins with sense-experience but
rather, like Kant.53 in emphasizing the fact that since all
48 Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. I, par. 2.
49 Organum, Sect. 24.
60 Preface, p. [1].
51 Ch. I, Sect. 1, pp. 3, 6f, 9ff; Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, pp. 58ff; Sect. 2.
pp. 67f, 70ff; Ch. IV, Sect. 1, p. 80; Ch. IV [VI], Sect. 2, p. 138,
Sect. 3, p. 152.
52 Sects. 9, 24, 26, 27, 32, 741, 92.
63 Critique, A 104. Cf. the section on Phenomena and Noumena.
XXli PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
knowledge comes through sense the object of knowledge
must be phenomenal, not real.54
But granting that Burthogge seems to combine incon
sistently a quasi-Kantian category doctrine with a Lockian
sensationalism, the apparent inconsistency is not impossible
of explanation. The explanation lies in two facts : in the
first place, Burthogge does not include in his teaching an
important part of the Kantian doctrine; and in the second
place, his sensationalism is not of the thoroughgoing Lock
ian type. Burthogge never attributes, as Kant does, a priori
validity to notions. While holding that notions are sub
jective and that they actively contribute to the make-up of
the object, he never positively admits the Kantian teaching
that these notions constitute the a priori condition under
which alone sense-experience is possible. And, on the other
hand, Burthogge does not hold with Locke, that sense-
impressions enter the "empty cabinet" unaccompanied. Bur-
thogge's teaching seems to be rather that, though sense-
impressions are the beginning of knowledge, they never
appear in the mind by themselves. Upon the occasion of
sense-experience there are inevitably aroused in the mind
certain notions. These notions are not derived from sense,
but, lying dormant in the mind, are made operative upon the
occasion of sense-experience. In other words, Burthogge
holds neither the Kantian view that notions are the neces
sary condition for sense-experience, nor the Lockian view
that they are merely an outgrowth from sense-experience.
He seems to hold rather, that they are the inevitable ac
companiment of sense-experience, giving to it meaning.
But this reconciliation between Burthogge's sensation
alism and his doctrine of subjective notions leaves still un
explained another apparent inconsistency in his teaching.
84 Cf. Burthogge on the advantage of knowing that the object of
knowledge is phenomenal (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 2, pp. 68-69) with
Kant (Critique, 2d ed., Pref., p. xxi) and Locke (Essay, Bk. I, Ch.
I, pars. 4-6).
INTRODUCTION. XX111
The form of apriorism against which Burthogge argues is
the same widespread "innate ideas" theory of the seven
teenth century, later attacked by Locke.55 In spite of this
denial of original ideas independent of sensation ("Con
natural and Ingrafted Notions; Principles designedly im
planted in the Minde, to be a rule to it. . . ."),58 Burthogge
apparently admits, in the Organum, the validity of intui
tion in judgments of truth and falsity. This teaching seems
to be directly opposed not only to his epistemological sen
sationalism, but also to his teaching that the criterion of
truth is empirical. Burthogge indeed asserts both that the
"form" or "notion" of truth must be known beforehand,67
i. e., independent of sense-experience, in order that it may
,be applied as the test of truth when the object is presented
sensuously, and (in apparent contradiction) that truth is
external harmony, something in the object58 which is per
ceived empirically only.
These two teachings about the criteria of truth certainly
seem to be diametrically opposed, and yet it is possible once
more to interpret Burthogge's meaning in such a way as
to reconcile his intuitionism with his empiricism. If the
account of Burthogge's epistemology as an intermediate form
between the Kantian category doctrine and the Lockian sen
sationalism is correct, we need only apply this interpretation
to his teaching about truth in order to explain the apparent
inconsistency. In other words, Burthogge's empirical criter
ion of truth can be reconciled with his intuitionism in much
the same way in which his sensationalism was reconciled
with his doctrine of subjective notions. Burthogge ap
parently means that the "form" or "notion" of truth, like
all other notions is an actual part of the object, but that it
86 Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I.
" Orgonum, Sect. 73.
" Ibid., Sects. 63, 64, 69, 74*.
" Ibid., Sects. 68, 69, 72, 74', 75, 78ff, 83, 84. Cf . Sect. 17.
XXIV PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
is a part contributed by the mind. According to this view,
although the mind alone contributes the notion of truth, it
does so only on the occasion of sense-experience. The mind
never even becomes aware of its possession of the "notion"
of truth, until the sensuous percept provides the opportunity
for the application of the notion.
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM.
Organum Vettts & Novum .
OR,
A DISCOURSE
REASON
AND
TRUTH.
WHEREIN
The Natural Logick common
toMankinde is briefly and plain
ly defcribed.
By RICHARD BURTHOGGEM.D.
In a Letter to the moft Honou
red Andrew TreviB Efij. of Etht
in the County of Cornwal.
Marc. Ant. i?&c <n>wlir, 1. 7. s. 12.
LONDON:
Printed for Sam. Crouch, at the Prin
ces Anns a Corner-lhop of Popes-
bead aOy in Cornhil. 1678.
URGANUM VETUS & NOVUM
OR
A DISCOURSE OF REASON AND TRUTH.
FOR THE MOST HONOURED ANDREW TREV1LL1* ESQ ;
AT ETHE IN THE COUNTY OF CORNWALL.
SIR,
That of making many Books is no End, was
truly said by the wisest man that ever was : Not in
this sense only, that multitudes of Books, begetting
in the mindes of those that read them infinite Dis
tractions, deprive them of the Benefits they might
receive from fewer; but in another, that there is a
Prolifickness in Books, that one produces another,
and this a third, and so on f2! without End; and
consequently that the labour men are at in making
them, is not only Useless, but Endless.
You will have reason to believe this second Sense
to be as just and true as the first, when you consider
that I, who lately wrote an Apology for the Deity,2
am obliged by the Reflexions made upon it, now to
write Another to defend it', and no question (but)
the Latter may be as obnoxious to Unjust Excep
tions as the Former: So that if Occasion given, be
* This index and those which follow refer to the Notes, pp. 185-224.
6 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
also taken, there will never be an End of writing,
but by what gives End to the Writer.
However, having received an Invitation to adde
something to the former Essay, I am (at last) re
solved, both in justice to myself and to my Book,
to comply with it, and to enter into thoughts of the
Causes that not irrationally may be presumed to have
had an Influence on the Objectors, and into most of
the Objections ; and then to offer to W them (by way
of Obviation) such Considerations as (it may be)
will not prove unuseful to Rectifie Mistakes in other
Matters, as well as in this.
And the Main Causes I intend to touch on (not
to mention Envy, &c.} are Three: Proud Ignorance,
Ignorant Zeal, and Impertinent Reasoning.
i. PROUD IGNORANCE consists in a mans pre
sumption of his own Omniscience, (for the Sciolist
is ever most conceited) so that he presently and
peremptorily condemneth that for Errour, which
himself hath never learnt for Truth; as if there
were no growth in Knowledge, or that any Humane
Understanding were adequate to Verity: Whereas
Capacities of the largest size are yet but narrow;
and they that know most, do but the better know
how little it is they know, and how much they are
to seek. The most the Wisest know, is, that their
own and others Ignorance is W the surest Object
of Knowledge. True Knowledge is not conceited;
it is humble, and aspireth after more. If any man
think that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth noth
ing yet as he ought to know.
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 7
2. IGNORANT ZEAL, (a cause of very general
influence into many Mistakes, not onely in matters
of Religion, but also in points of Philosophy) what
is it but a Horse of high metal without eyes? In
deed, nothing is more commendable in Religion, or
administers a better Argument of Sincerity in its
Professors, than fervency of Zeal ; but then it must
be Zeal according to Knowledge, and managed with
discretion, or else it is but Rage and Fury, not Zeal.
Zeal regulated by the Holy Scriptures, that is, Zeal
according to Knowledge, and governed with Wis
dom, is Fire from the Altar: but then Irregular
Zeal, Zeal without Knowledge, Zeal without Wis
dom, is Wild-fire, which (as the corruption of the
best is tf] worst) hath nothing more pernicious than
it self to Church or State.
Zeal without Knowledge may be stiled Blinde
Zeal, and is that when men are passionately con
cerned for or against an Opinion and Practice, from
a strong, but groundless and unwarranted perswa-
sion, that what they do, and what they are for, is
highly to the honour and glory of God, and what
they oppose, is against it : as if they knew abstractly
of themselves, and by their own discoursings, what
is for God's Glory, or what is otherwise, further
than it hath pleased God himself in his Word to re
veal it. That onely is for God's Glory, which is
grounded on God's Word. The Word of God is
able to make the Man of God perfect. The Corin
thians had a Zeal for God, but not according to
Knowledge: and so had the Jews, who persecuted
8 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
and murtherd the Christians, but thought they did
God good service. I61 What manner of men they
were, who among them call'd themselves the Zeal
ous, Josephus3 hath left on Record. Yes, the Dis
ciples of Christ, in Zeal too, they would have Fire
from Heaven, and cite an Example; but our meek
and blessed Saviour tells them they knew not the
Spirit they were of. They took it to be a Spirit of
Zeal, but He knew it to be a Spirit of Passion. A
persecuting furious Spirit is none of Christ's; it is
Antichrist's. The Wrath of man worketh not the
Righteousness of God.
Zeal without Wisdom may be call'd Imprudent
Zeal, and is Zeal unseasonably and unfitly shewn
in circumstances of time, place, and persons that
will not bear it ; as when men shall take their Pearls.
their Reprehensions, Counsels, Instructions, or
whatever other instances a Zeal is shewn in, and
cast them before the Swine; and that though they
have a Prospect themselves, or an Advertisement
from Gathers, of the probable ill success, both that
the Pearls shall be trodden under foot, and they
themselves be rented ; This is not to employ and use
Zeal, but to lose it. There is a time for every Pur
pose, and every thing is beautiful onely in that time.
Pearls so cast, are cast away.
3. IMPERTINENT REASONING, (the third Cause
I mention'd, and a Cause of all others of most gen
eral influence into Errours and Mistakes) I call not
onely that which of the Logicians is named Jiagd-
elc: aMo yevog, a passing and arguing from
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 9
one thing to another, when yet there's no Agree
ment, no Connexion between them; but that also
which is bottomed on single Mediums, and runs on
in a long, but simple line and train of Consequences,
from thing to thing ; or else is founded but on second
Notions, and inlaid with them: which way of Rea
soning must be shewed to be Impertinent, and that
by shewing a better, pertinent one. ^
Thus, Sir, I am arriv'd to what I principally de-
sign'd ; and I crave your pardon if, for my Readers
satisfaction as well as for mine own, I now enlarge,
and take the boldness to let him understand my ap
prehensions of Reason, both as to its nature, and
the interest it hath in Religion, and how (I think)
it must be circumstanced and condition'd, to assure
us of Truth. By which Performance if I gain no
more, I shall this; that as well the persons that
approve my former Essay,2 as those that cavil it,
will know the Rule and Method I proceeded by (in
framing it;) which, to the former will afford a
greater Confirmation, if it be Right; and to the
latter, a fairer rise of assaulting (me) if it be not.
1. Before I can proceed to shew what Reason
is, I am first to shew the many sences the Word is
taken in; which, not done by most, is one occasion
of the great Confusion in their talks about it. And*'
Rea^son (to omit some other sences not so neces
sary here) is in ordinary Language taken either
largely, or strictly, or appropriately and most
strictly.
2. Reason largely taken, is the same with Minde
TO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
or Understanding, and so is commonly affirmed to
exert it self in three Acts; the Apprehension of
simple Terms, the Composition of those Terms by
way of Affirmation and Negation, and Discourse,
or illation of one thing from another. Reason
strictly taken, is the Understanding as it issues out
in its third Act, not in the Apprehension of simple
Terms, nor in the Composition of them, but in Dis
course and Illation; and so Reason is the Under
standing as it argues, discourses, infers. But Rea
son is appropriately taken, or most strictly, as it is
oppos'd to Faith and Revelation, of which hereafter.
3. Reason taken for the MINDE or Understand
ing, is that Faculty whereby a man is said to be
Reasont10lable, Intelligent, Understanding ; as Sight
is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to be
Seeing: or 'tis that Faculty whereby a man is said
to Elicite Acts of Reason, or to Understand; as
Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said
to See. I so define it by the Act, for that the
Act is better known than the Faculty. To Under
stand (as well as to see) is a first Notion, and he
must be very simple that understands not what is
meant by it : nor are there any Notions more intelli
gible, whereby to mark Faculties, than those ot
their Acts. Acts we see, being conscious of them
when we exert them; but Faculties we see not, we
know not but by their Acts.
4. The Acts of Reason in this large sence (as
the same with Minde or Understanding) to speak
of them as they offer and present themselves to
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. II
mine (without confining of my self to Notions of
the Schools, or common Logicians) are Two^1^
Apprehension and Judgement.
5. APPREHENSION is that Act of Understanding
whereby it is said to See or Perceive things, and is
the same in relation to the Minde, that Seeing is in
relation to the Eye.
6. Apprehension is Conversant with things either
as in themselves, or as they are noted ; and they are
noted either by simple words, or else by Proposi
tions, which are words joyned by way of Affirma
tion or Negation; both which the Minde sees or
apprehends but as it hath the Sense of them. Sence
or Meaning is the Motive and immediate Object of
Apprehension, as Colour is of Seeing. The Eye
sees nothing but under Colour; the Minde appre
hends nothing but under Sense.
7. I know well that Truth is usually affirmed the
proper, adequate, immediate, formal Object of the
Intellect; but (it) is not so. Not Truth, but Sence
or Meaning is the proper, adequate, immediate Ob
ject of the Minde, as to its first Act t12! [that of
Apprehension;] Truth is onely the proper, adequate,
immediate Object of it as to another, which is called
Assent, and is a kind of Judgement. I understand
and apprehend a Proposition which is false, that is,
I have a Sence and Meaning of it, though when I
Understand or Apprehend it, I refuse my Assent.
So that it is not Verity that is the Motive and im
mediate Object of Understanding in its Acts of
Apprehension, but Sence or Meaning.
12 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
8. Sence or Meaning is that Conception or No
tion that is formed in the Minde, on a proposal to it
of an Object, a Word, or Proposition ; as Colour is
that Sentiment begotten, and caused in the Eye,
upon the impression of its Object on it.
9. To understand this, we are to consider, That
to us men, things are nothing but as they stand in
our Analogic; that is, are nothing to us but as they
are known by us; and I13J they are not known by us
but as they are in the Sense, Imagination, or Minde ;
in a word, as they are in our Faculties; and they
are in our Faculties not in their Realities as they
be without them, no nor so much as by Picture and
proper Representation, but onely by certain Appear
ances and Phaenomena, which their impressions on
the Faculties do either cause or occasion in them.
10. Every Faculty hath a hand, though not the
sole hand, in making its immediate Object; as the
Eye makes the Colours it is said to see, the Ear
the Sounds, the Fancy the Idols, and so the Under
standing4 the Conceptions or Notions under which
it apprehends and sees things. So that all the im
mediate Objects of Humane Cogitation (to use the
word in its largest sence) are Entia Cogitationis,
All Appearances; which are not properly and (may
I use a School-term) formally6 in the things them
selves conceived under them, and consequently con-
ceiv'd as if H4] they had them, but so onely in the
cogitative Faculties. No such thing as Colour but
in the Eye, nor as Sound but in the Ear, nor as
Notion, Sense, or Meaning, but in the Minde. These.
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 13
though they seem in the Objects, and without the
cogitative Powers, yet are no more in them than
the Image that seemeth in the Glass is there indeed.
1 1. So that all immediately cogitable beings (that
is, all immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation)
are either Entities of Sense, as the immediate Ob
jects of Sense, Colour, Sound, &c. or of Imagina
tion, as the Images therein, the Idols it frames; or
of Reason and Understanding, Mental Entities, the
Meanings or Notions under which the Understand
ing apprehends its Objects ; which (Notions) though
they seem to the Understanding to be without it,
and to be in the things understood, yet (as I said
before) are no more without it or in the things
themselves, than Colours are (151 without the Eye,
or Sounds without the Ear, or Sapours without the
Tongue, although they seem so to Sense.
12. Faculties and Powers, Good, Evil, Virtue,
Vice, Verity, Falsity, Relations, Order, Similitude,
Whole, Part, Cause, Effect, &c. are Notions; as
Whiteness, Blackness, Bitterness, Sweetness, &c.
are Sentiments : and the former own no other kind
of Existence than the latter, namely, an Objective*
(one.) A Notion that will free the Minde of much
Intanglement in framing Notions. We generally
conceive Faculties, Good, Evil, and other Notions
(under which the Minde apprehends things) to be
Realities, and to have an Existence of their own
without the Minde, and though there were no Minde
to think of them, when indeed they are but Noemata,
Conceptions, and all the formal being any of them
14 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
have, is onely in it. And no wonder if he that takes
Noemata to be Realities t16^ findes himself con
founded by that mistake, in forming his Conceptions
about them. Notions therefore are very aptly,
though somewhat barbarously, stiled by the School
men, Conceptus Objective; Notions of the Minde,
but yet seeming to be in the Object. He that looks
for Notions in Things, looks behinde the Glass for
the Image he sees in it.
13. Such Cogitable Beings as have no founda
tion, no ground in Realities, that is, in things with
out the Cogitative Faculties, but are mere effects of
the Faculties, are call'd Chimerical (Entities;) and
in the Imagination are Fictions, in the Understand
ing mere Notions; as in the former a Golden Tree,
in the latter a Philosophical Romance, or Ground
less Hypothesis. But such as have Foundation in
Realities, are called Real, [Real Notions] not that
in their own nature they are in Realities themselves,
but that they have their Grounds in those that are ;
H7] they are real (as a School-man would express
it) not formally,6 but fundamentally; they are in-
choately and occasionally in the things, but not con
summately and formally but in the Faculties; not
in the things, but as the things relate to our Facul
ties; that is, not in the things as they are Things,
but as they are Objects.
14. Those Words or Propositions any one hath
a sence of, those things to which the Words or Prop
ositions relate, he hath a Notion of. Sence is No
tion; onely it is called Sence as it relates to the
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 15
Words or Propositions, and Notion as it relates
to the Things; but indeed Sence is Notion, and to
have the sence of a Word or Proposition, is to frame
a Notion of it, or of the things signified by it.
15. Tis as impossible to apprehend a Word or
Proposition one hath no notion, no sence of, as to
see an Object that maketh no impression of Colour
on the Eye; for flg] what Colour is to the Eye, that
Sence, Meaning, or Notion is to the Minde.
1 6. Sence, Meaning, or Notion arises from a
Congruity in the Object to the Faculty; so that to
enquire why one cannot understand or apprehend
a Non-sensical Proposition or Word, is to enquire
why he cannot see or hear Tastes, or taste and smell
Sounds, or taste, hear, and smell Colours, or see an
Object hath none.
17. That Congruity in the Object to the Faculty,
whereby it either actually moves it, or is capable to
move it to frame a Notion or Sence, ought to be dis
tinguished from that Congruity which is in the Ob
ject within it self, or with other Objects : The former
(for distinction sake) I call a Congruity to the Fac
ility, the latter a Congruity in Things. The har
mony of Objects to their Faculties, and that of them
within themselves, or one to another, are distinct
Harmonies. I H9] can make sence of a Proposition
that is not true, so that 'tis Congruous to the Fac
ulty, it moves that; when yet (it being false) the
Parts of it are Incongruous one with another.
1 8. To understand and apprehend a Proposition
or Discourse, it sufficeth not to have a Perception
1 6 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
of the sence and meaning of the words ; those words
as in Conjunction, and ty'd together, ought to make
such an impression on the Minde, as moveth it to
make a Notion of them in that Relation. One may
have a sence of the words in a Discourse, when yet
he cannot make any of the Discourse it self, because
he cannot frame a Conception, a Notion of them in
the Composition that is given them in it. He cannot
see how they are joyn'd.
19. There are a thousand Instances of Discourses
of this kinde in Jacob Behmen* but I need not go
so far as Germany to seek some; I might have many
neerer home with I20! in the compass of our own time
and observation; but I decline them as Invidious;
I will onely point to one in Dr. Fludd,1 a person that
could speak as good Sence (if he listed) as another,
but I could never make any of many Passages I
finde in him, and of one particularly, namely, that
in his Mosaick Philosophy, Book ?. Sect. i. Chap. 4.
20. Those Discourses in which nor Words nor
Propositions are sensible, or wherein the Words are
sensible but not the Propositions, and yet are taken
by those that make them for High Sence, may be
called Enthusiasm. Of the former sort I apprehend
the Wrhims of Basilides, of Valentmus, and the
Gnosticks? and of the latter, those of the Familists.9
and of others of late.
21. Enthusiasm10 either may proceed from a
Spirit, or from Complexion and a certain temper
of Minde; the former I call Demoniacal, the latter
Complexional; and not unlikely but in most Enthu-
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. \J
siasts 121J it comes from both: whereof an Upstart
Sect11 among us, in its first appearing, afforded
strong Evincements.
22. That there are Philosophical Enthusiasts, is
as certain as that there are Theological ; Enthusiasts
in matters of Philosophy, as well as Enthusiasts in
Matters of Divinity. Paracelsus,12 Helmont™ and
many other Chymists, are Examples of the first sort ;
as H. Nicolls9 the Father of the Familists, and
others, are of the second: Jacob Behmen9 and Dr.
Fludd1 may pass for Examples of both.
23. When Enthusiasts think they understand V
one another, (as they All pretend to do, and that
seriously, and therefore must have some impression
to justifie that Pretension, whereas yet no sober
man can understand Any of them;) I conceive it
not to be by Apprehension, but Sympathy; not In
tellectually, by Apprehending, that is, by framing
just, steady, distinct Notions of f22! what is said;
but Sympathetically, by having excited in their
minde on such Expressions, Motions, conformable
to theirs that use them; for they all being of the
same frame and temper of Minde or of Imagination,
whatever touches One agreeably, also moves the
Rest; as in Unison-Lutes, or other Instruments
fitly tuned, but to strike One, is (at once) to move
All.
24. Notions of the Minde are bottomed on Senti
ments of Sense; so that as Realities are Grounds
to Sentiments, so Sentiments are Grounds to No
tions: the impressions of things without upon the
1 8 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTIIOGGE.
Sensories, produce or occasion in them the Cogita
tions which we call Sentiments, as Colours, Sounds,
Sapours, &c. And Sentiments (again) impressing
of the Fancy, and so the Minde and Understanding,
beget or occasion in it those higher Cogitations
which we call Notions: Apprehensions of Reason,
or Ideas. Idols or Fantoms are in the Fancy, Ideas
in the Minde. t23J
25. The neerer our Sensories are unto the Ob
jects impressing them, (if not too neer) the clearer
and distincter is the Sensation made by them; as we
more cleerly and distinctly see an Object at a neerer
than a remoter distance: so the nearer the Minde
and Understanding is to Sentiments, the more cleer,
distinct, and evident its Perceptions are; I mean,
the more sensible Notions are, and the neerer to
their Grounds, the more effective, more impressive
and consequently clearer and more evident they be.
26. Hence Knowledge and Apprehension of
things is better both acquired and conceived by
first Notions, which are next to Sentiments, than
by second which are more remote : The Knowledge
which is had of things by first Notions, is more real,
evident, cleer, distinct, than that which is by the
second. First Notions are founded immediately on
things ; Second Notions are Notions concerning No
tions : t24] These are not so impressive and effective
as the first. By first and Second Notions, I both
understand Terms or Words, and the Notions sig
nified by them.
27. So much for the OBJECT of Apprehension,
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 19
which is Sense and Notion ; and for the Grounds of
that Object, which is Sentiment: Now for the AF
FECTIONS of Apprehension (if a good one) and they
are two, namely, Cleerness and Distinctness.
28. Cleerness of Apprehension, which is in the
Minde the same that Cleerness of Seeing is in the
Eye, is opposed to Obscurity and Darkness, and
presupposes Light.
29. Light is that which manifests, and conse
quently Intellectual Light is that means whereby
the Understanding comes to See and Apprehend its
Objects; or that which manifests them to it: and is
either Light of Revelation, which is also called Light
of Faith; or Light of Nature, which is also called
Light of Reason ;14 where Reason is Appro^25^priately
taken, and most strictly.
30. The Light of Revelation is that Discovery or
Manifestation God himself is pleased to make of
things by his Spirit, and is chiefly in the Holy
Scriptures. The Light of Nature1* is All other
Light whatever but that of Revelation, whereby we
See and Apprehend things, and is that we have by
Sense and Discourse.
31. Some things there are that may be seen in
both Lights, in that of Nature, and that of Revela
tion, though more cleerly in the latter than in the
former; as that God is Good, and that he is the
Maker and Conserver, and supreme Director of All
things: Other things are onely to be seen in the
Light of Revelation, being of a nature not to be
discovered but in and by it; as the Mysteries of
2O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Christian Religion, the Doctrine of the Trinity, the
Incarnation of God, &c.
32. The Lights of Faith and Nature, of Revela
tion and Reason, f26^ though they be not the same,
yet are not contrary ; I mean, that what is shewn or
seen to be true in one Light, can never be shewn
or seen to be false in the other: What is Appre
hended by Sense rightly circumstanced and condi-
tion'd, to be This or to be That, or else by Reason
rightly acting to be so, or so, it is never contradicted
by Revelation. Things are nothing to a man but as
they stand in his Analogic : for him to believe against
his Faculties, is to believe a Contradiction. If in the
Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the Elements
first and last are Bread and Wine to Sense, and to
Reason judging according to Sense, I cannot hold
my self obliged by (any) Revelation to believe them
Flesh and Blood, but in a Notion consistent with
the judgment Sense and Reason make of them ; that
is, not flesh and blood substantially, but sacramen-
tally ; not flesh and blood really, but only by signifi
cation. Else Truth might t27! be Incongruity, In
consistency. Transubstantiation is to me a Mystery ;
I am so far from making truth of it, that I cannot
make any sense of it; I might as well believe that
two and two make not four, or three and three six.
as that it is not Bread, or Wine, which to my Eye.
my Taste, my Touch, in a word, which being an
Object of Sense, to all Examinations ot my bense
is so. What is against Sense, is against Knowledge.
33. An Object onely to be seen by the Light of
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 21
Faith, may be said to be seen by Reason above Rea
son, by Reason assisted with the light of Revelation,
above Reason not so assisted, but acting onely by
the Aids of Nature; but still it is Reason sees in
both: As I can see an Object with a Tube, that
with my naked and unarmed Eye I cannot: or see
in the Sun-light an Object that I cannot by Moon
light; but still it is the Eye that sees in both; the
Organ is the same, although the t28! Lights be not
It is the same Reason and Understanding, the same
Faculty that sees in the Light of Revelation, as it
is that sees by the Light of Nature; and the same
that Argues and Discourses in the one, as by the
other.
34. The great Designs of God in all the Doc
trines, and even in the highest and most sublime
Mysteries of our Religion, is to affect the hearts
of men: and therefore as (i.)He represents and
reveals them in first Notions; so (2.) He also doth
it in sensible and comparative ones; and usually
(3.) He representeth one thing by many Notions,
(i.) To make it more Affective; and withal (2.) to
signifie, that no one Notion he represents the thing
in, is adequate and just to it. Thus he represents
the great Mystery of our Union unto Christ, and
our Communion with him, by that between the Vine
and Branches, between the Husband and Wife, be
tween the Head and Members : As t29! also the great
work of Conversion that passes upon Men in the
change he makes on them, from their Darkness into
his most marvellous Light, He compares it to Gen-
22 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
eration, to Adoption, to Creation: In fine, the New
Covenant is not only stiled a Covenant, but also a
Testament, and a Promise. All which resembling
and comparative expressions wory and ought to be
employed and used for the apprehending of the
things they are designed to signifie, and the making
of them more affective; but neither of them so (to
be insisted on) as if it were adequate, or just.
35. The Light of Faith and Revelation, must not
be confounded with that of Reason and Nature; I
mean, we ought not to consider points of mere Reve
lation in the light of mere natural Reason : Spiritual
things cannot be discern'd but spiritually, and there
fore must not be compared but with Spirituals. In
Points of (mere) Revelation, we t3°l ought entirely
to confine our selves to the Notions, Comparisons,
Similitudes and Representations God himself hath
made of them, without pretending to be wise above
what is written, and to say or understand just how
in themselves the things are, abstractly from the
Dresses Revelation puts them in.
36. He that pretends to understand the Mys
teries of Christian Religion, or any Point of meer
Revelation stript of those Notions, Resemblances,
and Comparisons, when they be not revealed or dis
covered but in them; as he looketh not on these
things in the Light of Faith and Revelation, but in
that of Reason or Nature; so not looking on them
in their own Genuine and Proper Light, no wonder
if he either erre or trifle about them.
37. Justly liable to this Reproof I judge them
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 23
that are not content to think and speak of God (the
proper Object as well as Author of Revelation) in
that manner that he t31! speaks of himself; who
Reveals himself to us men in Analogous and Com
parative Notions, not in such as adequate and ad
just him, but such as do proportion and suit with
us; as if he had an Understanding, Will, and Affec
tions; and did purpose Ends, and elected Means to
compass them; did consult and decree, and weire
touched with the Affections of Joy, Grief, Love,
Hatred, Anger, Revenge, &c.
38. They that tell us that he is not angry, that
Revenge is an Imperfection not to be imputed to
him, and pretend to tell us just what's meant by it,
they might as well tell us that he doth not love nor
hate ; that he doth not propose Ends to himself, nor
designe Means ; that he doth not consult nor decree ;
that he hath no Providence, no Foresight, there
being Imperfection in all those Notions; and yet
without them, and the like, you can nor Think, nor
Speak of God. Abstract the Deity from these and
other Compa Curative Notions, Notions of Him,
which are not in Him, and yet wherein He pleases
to Reveal Himself, and you wrill soon make Him
such an one as Epicurus™ fanci'd, an Infinite Ex
cellency, but unknown, not concerned, nor concern
ing of Himself with things below Him.
39. It seems to me, that he that would abstract
God, or any matter of Religion, from the Notions
or Comparisons which He or That is represented
in, would do like one that world consider the World
24 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
onely in its Realities of Matter, Figure, Texture,
and Motion, abstractly from those Phaenomena and
Appearances occasioned by them in our Senses and
Mindes: And if the latter may be thought to have
but an Empty, Dry, and Barren Notion of the World,
the former would not have a much better of God
(whom now we cannot know as He is) or of any
Subject of Revelation, that should so consider it.
40. Whoever well attends, will f33J finde that all
the Notions under which we apprehend God, are
Notions of Him, like those we have of the World,
not as He is in Himself (for so we know him not ;)18
but as He stands in our Analogy, and in that of the
World; which Notions are very fitly stiled Attri
butes, not Accidents, as not speaking things In
herent Really in Him, but things ascribed by the
Minde, or attributed to Him; as Colours, which
but in the Eye, are yet ascribed to the Object; and
Sounds, that indeed exist but in the Ear, are attrib
uted to the Air : For we regarding God in that Re
lation that He bears to the world, and to our selves,
and so considering Him, have excited in us such
Notions by the impressions the things we look on,
and God himself as interested in them, make upon
us. The Attributes of God are but (as) so many
Aspects. Much Obscurity and many Errours in
forming Notions about God and his Attributes, are
owing to an Unacquaintance with this Truth, t34!
41. Having spoken of Clearness of Apprehen
sion, and of the Lights that make it, I will onely
adde a Consideration, which though obvious enough.
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 25
is not reflected on as it should; namely, that the
Lights are gradual; [even that of Revelation] and
that all things are not equally clear (in them:) so
that we ought to put a difference, as between Philo
sophical and Theological Points, and Points unre-
vealed and revealed ; so in those revealed between
Fundamental Points (which are but few and plain)
and Superstructures upon them; between what is
in Scripture in express Terms, and what is there
but by Consequence; and in Consequences, between
those that are immediate and next to Principles,
and those that are remote and further off. As there
are weighty Points of the Law, so there are Tythe-
mint, Anise, and Cummin ; he that makes no differ
ence, takes not his measures by Jesus Christ's. As
it is inept and foolish, so it is inhumane f35! and
bloudy, not to distinguish Errours from Heresies.
Heresie in Religion, is as Treason in the Law, a
subversion of Fundamentals ; and it must be plainly
and directly so, and not by Consequences and far-
fetcht Deductions: For Heresie, it must be eradi
cated; but as for Errours, he that is exempt from
them, let him throw the first stone at the guilty. But
this is not intended as a Plea for Errour, God for
bid ! but for Humanity.
42. I proceed to the second Affection of Appre
hension, which is Distinctness. And to apprehend
a thing distinctly, is to form such a Notion and Con
ception of it, and to have such a sence as doth dis
tinguish it from all things else.
43. Distinctness of Apprehension is acquir'd by
26 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Distinction, and by Definition. Distinction, as 1
take it, is of Words ; Definition of Things. To make
a Distinction is, when a Word hath many Signifi
cations, to determine, fix, or define t36^ the Sence it
is taken or us'd in, and by certain Marks and Tokens
to distinguish it and circumscribe it from all the
others (it hath.) Definitions of things are prop
erly Descriptions. To describe, is to notifie, mark,
and represent a thing in and by its Attributes, that
is, according to the impressions that it makes upon
our Faculties, and Conceptions it occasions in them.
Essential Definitions are Non-sence. Things are not
Explicable, but as they are to us in our Faculties.
44. The more particularly any thing is marked,
the more distinct is the knowledge we have of that
thing.
45. Most Errours in Divinity as well as in Phi
losophy, owe their being to confused Apprehensions,
and confused Apprehensions their's to the Ambi-
v guity of words, and the uncertainty of their Signi
fication. He that uses words of many Significations
without distinctly marking them, and without par
ticularly nesting what Sence he takes the word
in when he uses it, may easily be apprehended to
take it sometimes in one Sence, sometimes in an
other, that is, to take one Sence for another; and
he that takes one Sence of a word for another, mis
takes, and confounds things. To confound things,
is to take one for another. Confusion of things
comes from Ambiguity of words. A Word in one
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 27
of its Sences may belong to a thing, when in all it
cannot.
46. Caution. Take heed of being abused with
the Agreement of Words, into a belief of answer
able Agreement in Things.
47. Direction. To avoid confusion of Appre
hension, the best way is to look beyond the words
we hear or read, or have in our mindes, unto their
Sences and Meanings : for Words may be uncertain
and equivocal, whereas Sence and Notion is not so,
but certain and fixt.
48. Having treated of Apprehension in the gen
eral, of its Object, and f38^ of its two Affections,
Clearness and Distinctness, it remaineth to speak
of those CONDITIONS which are requisite to the
forming of a clear and distinct Apprehension; and
thev are four : a Due Illumination or Illustration of
tf
the Object; a Right Disposition of the Faculty; a
Due Distance from the Object; and a Due Atten
tion to it. The same Conditions in Apprehension
as in Vision.
49. A Due Illumination of the Object ; by which
I mean here but Perspicuity of Expression : a Rep
resentation of things unto the Minde in plain, apt,
and significant Words, and in a plain and instruc
tive order and method. Plainness of Expression
and Method is the Light of a Discourse ; he that uses
it is Didactical, [apt to teach,] but he that will
clearly and methodically express his Thoughts to
others, must first conceive them so himself: so that
here I might say over again what I have already
28 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
about Clearness and 1391 Distinctness of Apprehen
sion.
50. A Right Disposition of the Faculty ; a Right
Temper of Mind, [Rectitude of Minde] consists in
a full and perfect Exemption of it from all the
prejudices that either Education, Custom, Passion,
or false Reasoning have imbibed it with. Preju
dices are erroneous (or false) Anticipations, and
are in the Minde as Tinctures in the Eye, which
falsifie its Vision. Other Diseases of the Minde
there are besides Prejudice, as Levity, Curiosity,
Scepticism, &c. in an Exemption, from which also
Sanity of Minde consists; but the principal is Preju
dice. And besides Sanity of Minde, there is (for
the apprehending of some particular Objects) neces
sary also a Sanctity of Minde. The pure in heart
[onely] see God.
51. A Due Distance from the Object; not to look
too neer, nor at too Remote a Distance.
52. Not too near. Too near looking is a cause
of much entanglement t40] and errour, both in form
ing of Philosophical and Theological Notions; he
that looks too near, doth either see nothing at all,
or but confusedly: he looks too near to things, that
not contented with common Notions of them,
wherein all the world agrees, will have more exact
ones; or that not contented with the knowledge of
things according to appearances, as he may see
them, is always attempting to know them in their
Realities, in which he cannot; As in Quantity the
common Notion of it, how evident is it ! Tis evident
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 2Q
to all men, and none but knows what is meant by
it; and he that looks on Quantity but so, observes
a due distance; but whosoever looks nearer, looks
too near, and is confounded with the composition of
the Continuum17 [and well he may that takes a
Phaenomenon, a Spectrum, an Appearance for a
Reality.]
53. Not at too remote a distance. He considers
Objects at too remote (41J a distance, that looks on
them but in second Notions, or contents himself
with general ones, which at best are but confused
and uncertain; and being so, no wonder if they
cause mistakes : the more particular and distinct, the
surer the knowledge is : we are often deceived with
appearances, and take one thing and person for an
other, when we only see them afar off.
54. Due attention is a fixed and steady beholding
of the Object, in order to a framing clear and
distinct conceptions about it; and 'tis opposed to
Inadvertency, or a precipitate and hasty skipping
from thing to thing, without a due considering of
any: A Distemper of Minde, to which Youth and
warm Complexions are subject, which though they
may be more ingenious and witty, and more prompt
and ready, are yet for that reason seldom so judi
cious, prudent and weighty, as those of cooler Tem
pers and of more Age. f42!
55. So much for Apprehension, the first Act of
Understanding ; I now pass on to the second, which
is Judgement.
56. Judgement is that Act of the Understanding
3O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
whereby it having compared and considered things
(presented to it, and apprehended by it,) comes in
the end and upshot, either to Assent, or Dissent.
So that Judgement is a compounded Act, and (as it
were) made up of two ; one of which is Mediate and
Inchoate, the other Ultimate & Compleat; the first
is Comparing and Considering; the second, Resolv
ing and Decreeing: That the Premisses; this, the
Conclusion. The former properly is Reasoning ; the
later, Resolving according to Reason.
57. Reasoning is (a) producing or shewing of
(a) Reason. (A) Reason is the Ground of Intel
lectual Judgement; or the Cause why the Under
standing either assents, or dissents. Assent is the
Approving Judgement of the Understanding; t43!
Dissent is the Disproving Judgement of the Under
standing. To shew Reason for a thing, is to prove
it : to shew Reason against a thing, is to disprove it.
Plain Reason is that which convinceth : Forced Rea
son is that which only confutes. To confute is, so
to entangle a person that he cannot answer : To con
vince is, so to shew him Reason, that he cannot deny
it to be so. A man is often confuted, when yet he
is not convinced.
58. Method of Reasoning is called Logick; and
is either Artificial or Natural. Artificial is the
Logick of Schools, of which the chiefest is Aris
totle's:™ and is useful many waies, but among
others, mainly (as a Whetstone) to acute and shar
pen the Wit; and to render it more sagacious, cir
cumspect and wary, both in making and admitting
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 3!
Deductions and Consequences. Natural Logick,
that of plain and illiterate men, of which I designe
to discourse, is the natural method f44! of Reason
ing; in relation whereunto the Scots are said to
have a Proverb, That an Ounce of Mother-wit is
worth a Pound of Clergy.
59. Natural Logick is universal, a Logick of
the whole kinde ; so that what in Natural Logick is
reason to one man, is so to all; for all having the
same Faculties, and using them in the same Method,
must needs come to the same issue, and by the same
Principles arrive to the same Conclusion.
60. As one naturally by often seeing and attend
ing to his own acts, acquires a method how to look
to see to the best advantage, as also Optical Rules
by which he judges of Objects; which Method and
which Rules are [to speak generally] the same
among all men : So may he by frequent reasoning,
and attending to his own and others reasonings,
easily and insensibly acquire a Method [which as
reasoning it self will for the general be the t45^ same
with all men] how to use his Reason to the best
advantage, to reason out things. This common
method of Reasoning, (which because common, and
in some measure acquired without assistance of Art,
I call natural) is natural Logick.
61. All Reasoning is either Speculative or Prac
tical. Speculative Reasoning is shewing a thing is
true or false: Practical Reasoning is shewing a
thing is to be done, or not to be done. (A) Specu
lative Reason is the ground of Speculative Judg-
32 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
ment. (A) Practical Reason, the ground of Prac
tical Judgment. Speculative Judgment is judg
ment that a thing is true or false: Judgment that
it is true, is Speculative Assent; that 'tis false.
Speculative Dissent. Practical Judgment is Judg
ment or Decree that a thing is to be done, or not to
be done. Judgment that a thing is to be done, is
Judgment for it, or practical Assent: Judgment
that a thing t46! is not to be done, is Judgment
against it, or practical Dissent.
62. SPECULATIVE REASONING is either Proving
or Disproving. To prove, is to shew a thing to be
true ; to disprove, is to shew a thing to be false. So
that in natural Logick, [as to speculative Reason
ing,] there are but two Topicks, or principal places
of Arguments, and those are Verity and Falsity:
The one affords us a medium of Proving, the other
a medium of Disproving: I prove what I say, by
shewing the Truth; I disprove what another says,
by shewing the Falsity of it.
63. Truth and Falsity are to the Minde, as white
and black to the Eye ; as these are kinds of Colours,
and so the objects of the Eye; so the former are
kinds of Sense, and consequently objects of the
Minde: And as the Eye rightly circumstanced and
condition'd sees white to be white, and black to be
black; so the Understanding sees Truth rightly
shewn to be Truth, and Falsity to be Falsity, t47!
64. Wherefore to prove a Truth to be one, is
but in a right method to shew it to the Minde, the
Understanding apprehending a thing to be true
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 32
when rightly shewed, as the Eye doth see the shew
to be white that is duely held before it. A Notion
may be true, yet not acknowledged to be so, because
not rightly apprehended, or seen; and it is not
rightly seen or apprehended, because not rightly
shewed: Then Truth is rightly shewed, or shewed
to be Truth, when 'tis shewed Systematically, or
Harmonically. The like is to be said of Falsity.
But to enlighten this Point, I am to shew at large
what Truth, and consequently, what Falsity is.
65. TRUTH, in the apprehensions of some of the
School-men and of others, is that conformity which
is in things to their original Ideas in the Divine
Intellect. All second Beings are but Copies of the
Minde of the first, in which they have their Exem
plars: and wherein doth t48! the verity, the truth
of Copies consist, but in a conformity to their Origi
nals?
66. But this notion of Truth (however true it
may be) is not pertinent to us: 'tis Metaphysical
Truth that it relates unto; a Truth of things as
standing in the Analogy of God ; but the Truth we
treat of, and whose notion we are enquiring after,
is Logical, a Truth of things as standing in our
Analogy, and which is the ground of Assent. Cer
tain it is, this notion that the Schools afford us, is
not (nor can it be to us) a Medium of Reasoning;
since we cannot say what is conformable or what is
not unto the divine Exemplars. He must see the
Original, and compare the Copy with it, that or
Knowledge will affirm this to be true.
34 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
67. Of late the old Catalepsis has seen the light
again, that comprehension discoursed of by Cicero
in his Lucullus.19 The meaning of which is, that
there is no other Criterium, t49! no other judicial
note of Truth, no other Rule, Mark, or Measure
whereby to know a thing to be true, than clear and
distinct Perception. And thus also the Cartesians.1*
68. But on the contrary, clear and distinct Per
ception is not the Cause and Ground of Assent, but
onely a Condition of causing; Truth is the onely
Adequate and effectual Motive or Reason of Assent ;
but to be so, it must be clearly and distinctly per
ceived. Truth (as whiteness) is something in the Ob
ject that invites Assent : clear and distinct Perception
is not in the Object, but of it; and consequently is
not Truth, but conversant about Truth. Sight is
not Colour, but of Colour ; so neither is Perception
Truth, but of Truth. Besides, that cannot be a
certain mark of Truth, which may be affirmed as
well of Errour as of Truth. I may as clearly and
distinctly perceive a thing to be false, as to be true.
A thing may be evidently t5°] false, as well as evi
dently true.
69. If any say (as doubtless some will) that by
clear and distinct Perception, they mean nothing
but a clear and evident apprehension of the truth
of things; I answer. That then either they know
what Truth is by its mark and definition, and by
the impression that it makes on the Minde, as well
as what Whiteness (is) by the impression made
thereby on the Eye ; or they do not. If they do not,
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 35
how can they say they clearly and distinctly perceive
a thing to be true, who know not Truth? They
might as well say, they clearly and distinctly see
a thing to be white, when they know not whiteness,
Or if they know what Truth is, then that Impres
sion, that Form, that Notion of Truth they have,
ought rather to be insisted on, and not the (bare)
Perception. They should say, The thing is true,
we see clearly the Form and Notion of Truth in it.
For indeed, nothing f51] makes a thing true, but the
Form and Notion of Truth therein: For did I ap
prehend a thing to be true never so clearly and dis
tinctly, yet if I did but apprehend it so (as I may,
and many do) and that the Notion and Form of
Truth were no wise in it, it were not true by vertue
of the Apprehension I had of it, but onely seemed
so. As I clearly and distinctly see an Image in the
Glass, when indeed it is not there ; or an Oar in the
Water bowed and crooked, when indeed it is not so.
It is an Errour (and a most dangerous one too) to
assert, that seeming or intellectual sense (for clear
and distinct Perception signifies no more) is the
measure of Truth : There are so many ways wherein
a thing may be seen clearly and distinctly, that is,
may seem true, and yet not be so. No convincing
Hereticks, or opinionate Philosophers, if Seeming
be the mark of Truth.
70. To this Opinion, I am now t52! to adde an
other much of kin to it; That of the truly-Noble
and Learned the late Lord Herbert,™ namely, That
Truth consisteth in the Analogy, Agreement, Har-
36 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
mony of things to our Faculties, inviting a most free
and full Assent : Or, in his own Terms ; Veritas est
Harmonia inter objecta& Facilitates, habens sensum
gratissimd & lubentissime sine ulla haesitatione Re-
spondentem.
71. All the difference between the Former and
the Latter Opinion is, that in the former Apprehen
sion clear and distinct, in the latter Assent Free
and Full, is made the Mark and Measure of Truth.
Of this (Latter) Opinion, as that eminent Person
(last mentioned) among the Moderns; so among
the Antients were a many noble Philosophers; in
Tully it is called cnr/xataO'eaK;, and as described by
him, it hath the same Foundation that his Lordship
builds on, namely the oixetofnc; of Truth. That Truth
is so Domestical and fS3l Congruous to the Faculty,
so Analogous and fit to it, that the Inclination of
the Minde thereto, in Nature and Necessity, resem
bles that of a Stone, or whatever or other heavy
Body you'll imagine, to the Center.
72. But ( i ) a bare Congruity between the Ob
ject and the Understanding is not the ground of
Truth, but of Sense or Intelligibility; and though
there be a Congruity in all Truth, because there is
a sense in it, and happily more Congruity because
a more agreeable Sense; Yet since that Congruity
is unobservable, unremarkable but by Assent, and
Assent (of it self) is no sufficient Fvincement of
Truth ; I lay it by as Illogical and useless. (2) Nor
doth the Understanding blindly incline to Truth,
and as it were by Sympathy, or a natural Motion
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 37
of Aggregation; its Assent is (an act of) Judge
ment: The Minde proceeds therein judicially upon
Allegations and Proof; judging a t543 thing to be
true, that is, assenting to it, onely because it sees
therein the Form, Notion, and Mark of Truth, as
it judges a thing to be white wherein the Eye as
sures it there is the form of Whiteness. And (3)
one may readily and chearfully assent to Falsities
and Errours, and mistake them for Truths; and
therefore free and full Assent is no sufficient evince-
ment of Truth. Not to urge that chearfulness of
Assent, that readiness and promptness we man)'
times observe in it, is oftner an effect of a Passion
bribing of the Understanding, than of a pure clear
impartial Reason.
73. Wherefore, others of the Antients, as well
as of the Moderns, abundantly convinced of the
insufficiency both of Perception clear and distinct,
and of Assent free and full to ascertain them of
Truth, and yet unwilling to have Nature (so liberal
in other matters) exposed to the reproach of De
ficiency in One so important as intellectual t55!
Judgement; They have conceited humane under
standing furnish'd by her with certain [jipoXrj^eig]
Anticipations, that is, with Connatural and In
grafted Notions; Principles designedly implanted in
the Minde, to be a rule to it to direct it.21 Thus in
the speculative Understanding they have set up a
habit, which they call Intelligence ; in the Practical
another which is called Synteresis; in both, a Con
stellation of Principles, shining with their own Light
38 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
and imparting it to others that want it; not much
unlike to what is affirmed of Dionysius22 in his
Celestial Hierarchy concerning Spirits, that those
of superiour Orders enlighten all beneath them in
the inferiour.
74. But were there really such a System of No
tions and first Principles ingrafted in the Minde by
Nature, in whose Light all others were to shine and
to be seen, it would follow that Contemplation of
our own mindes, acquainting us with the Chain.
Concatenation, and Sot56] rites of the Principles
therein, and Propositions deducible therefrom, would
more import to the rendring us Philosophers (not
to say Divines also) than observation of the World
and Experience; and so the greatest School-men
(those Metaphysical Alchymists) that insisted much
on this Method, and spun out all their notions of
their own Bowels, should have been the wisest and
most fruitful of men. Whereas we know the men,
and the manner of their Communication; all their
Discourses are indeed subtle and acute; but also
empty and barren, and no more agreeing with Real
ities (and in our Analogy) than Light with Dark
ness.
Again, the Soul in its state of Union and Con
junction with the Body, is so dependent on it in all
its Operations, that it exercises none without the
Aids of it. Ratiocination it self it is an Animal
act ; not an abstract Action of the Soul, but a ( Con
crete) act of the Animal; it t57! is the Man reasons."
And in the ordinary method of Nature, we receive
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 39
into our Mindes no Impressions, no Images, but
what are handed to them by our Senses. I am apt
to think that person who should never have seen,
nor heard, nor tasted, nor smelt, nor felt any thing,
would have his minde as little furnish'd with Idea's
or Notions, as his Memory with Images, and would
understand as little as he had sensed. Besides,
those very Principles themselves we call First ones,
or Anticipations shining with their own lustre and
light, Propositions which we cannot but assent to
as soon as we hear them, or minde them; It will
appear, if we reflect warily on what doth pass in
our Mindes, that even these are not assented to,
but on the Evidence they bring ; I mean not assented
to naturally, but (as other Propositions are) judi
cially. For instance, that the whole is greater than
the part, we assented not unto it on the first hearing,
but first t58! considering what was meant by Whole,
what by Part, what by Greater, what by Lesser;
and then having sensibly, either by Eye-sight, or by
Imagination, compared one unto the other, we evi
dently saw it to be so; that the Notion of Greater,
even to Sense, ever agreed to the whole; and that
of Less, to the Parts. The like that Two and Two
make Four. This is the way we first admitted to
belief the Propositions which are called Principles;
and it is no other than that wherein we admit all
others. Onely the Propositions (which are) call'd
Anticipations, or first Principles, are Propositions
of so easie, sensible, and plain an evidence, and so
obvious, that we early admitted them, so early, that
4O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
we cannot well remember when we first did so ; and
therefore they are stiled Anticipations, or proleptick
Notions: for being of so early an admission and
existence in our Mindes, they preceded all our
(after) knowledges, whose acquirement we well
remember, f59!
Further, Beings are not to be multiplied without
Necessity, and there is none of faigning such An
ticipations and Habits of Principles to direct the
Minde in inquisitions after Truth, since all acknowl
edge there are no such principles in the Eye, the
Ear, the Nose, the Tongue to direct them, and why
then in the Minde? Besides Reflection on our ordi
nary reasonings, evinces that in them we seldom
attend to such Principles, but to the Object dis
coursed of; nor need we to do otherwise, if it can
be evidenced that there is a certain Notion, Form,
Ground of Truth that runs through all things true ;
which Form or Notion of Truth, assoon as the
Understanding rightly circumstanced and condi
tioned, apprehends in an Object, it cannot but ac
knowledge it to be true, as it would another to be
white or black, wherein it is assured by the Eye
rightly circumstanced and conditioned, that there
is the Form of Whiteness or Black^ness. As for
Anticipations, they are too particular, and not of a
nature so large and comprehensive as to be the
Rules and Measures of Truth, which is infinite.
Let those Anticipations be reckoned, and then Ex
periment be made upon comparison with the im-
ORGAN UM VETUS ET NOVUM. 41
mense Latitude of Questions, and of Truth relating
to them.
75. Thus I have shewn the Indications, Marks,
and Notions of Truth that (in my judgement) are
not proper, adequate, or useful; it now remaineth
that I shew one (that) is. And Truth, as it is the
Ground, Motive, and Reason of Assent, is objective
Harmony, or the Harmony, Congruity, Even-lying,
Answerableness, Consistence, Proportion, and Co
herence of things each with other, in the Frame and
Scheme of them in our Mindes. Truth is universal
and exact Agreement or Harmony.
76. On the other hand. Falsity (as the ground,
motive, and reason C61] of Dissent) is Objective Dis
harmony, or the disharmony, incongruity, inequal
ity, unanswerableness, inconsistence, disproportion,
and incoherence of things, in the Frame and Scheme
of them in our Mindes. Any Disagreement or Dis
harmony is Falsity.
77. Probability or Likelihood of Truth, is an
appearance of Congruity. A thing is probable, when
it hath some consistence and agreement ; it Quad
rates and lies even with what we do know; but in
regard there are particulars relating to the same
Systemes and Frames of Thoughts which yet we
do not know, therefore we know not if it will lie
even and square with them. Improbability is appar
ent Incongruity.
78. That Truth is Harmony and Proportion, and
consequently that Probability is apparent Harmony,
apparent Proportion ; and Falsity, Disharmony, Dis-
42 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
proportion cannot be but very evident to him that
t62) shall consult with Nature and common sense.
79. In Nature it is plain: For Harmony, it is
the Reason of the World ; the World was made by
it, cannot be known but by it. The rule of Propor
tion is the King-Key, unlocking all the Mysteries
of Nature. The Great Creator framed all things
in the Universe in Number, Weight, and Measure :
Extremes in it are united by participating Middles ;
and in the whole System there is so admirable Uni
formity as ravishes every one that beholds it : every
thing in its place is aptly knit with what is next it ;
and all together into one most regular Frame of most
exact Proportions. Every thing we look on affords
Examples; and Galen24 in his Books of the use of
Parts, has a Thousand, to whom (if in so plain a
matter it be necessary) I remit the Learned Reader.
80. And 'tis a common sense, that what is con
gruous is true, and what f63^ is true is congruous;
so common, that none ever fancied any notion of
Truth but in Congruity: some School-men, in Con-
gruity to the Divine Intellect ; Others in Congruity
to our Faculties; and all men (though they speak
not out, and it may be minde not that they do so)
in Consistence and Congruity of things with one
another; all generally concluding that Narration
(for instance) to be probable, which seems consis
tent; and Probability being appearance of Truth,
if what seems consistent be probable, what is so is
true. But to give a Mechanical instance ; one that
would repair a broken C7wta-dish, or make up a
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 43
Watch or other Engine taken abroad, what Meas
ures doth he naturally take to do so? what Rule
proceeds he by? None verily, but by that of Con-
gruity ; he makes no question but that when he hath
found a place for every part wherein it lies consist
ently and aptly with others, so that in the whole I64!
there is exact Coherence and Congruity, no Flaw,
no Unanswerableness, it is truely set together, and
every part in its place. Truth is Harmony.
81. And seeing Truth is Harmony, and the Uni
verse it self, as it consists in our Analogy, is but
one System ; it follows that properly there is but one
Science (which some will call Pansophy) one Globe
of Knowledge, as there is of Things : As also that
the partition of Sciences, or rather the crumbling
of them into so many, hath been a great impediment
of Science; the dependency of Things, and their
Relations one to another, thereby becoming unob
served and unconsidered. And in fine, that the more
large, general, and comprehensive our Knowledge
is, the more assured and evident it is. It is in
Science as it is in Arch-work, the Parts uphold one
another, and mutually contribute strength and
beauty. The confinement of the Understanding f63!
to particular Knowledges, as also the limiting of it
in any unto certain Methods and Terms of Art, is
like too straight a swathing of the Childe, and spoils
its growth.
82. So much for the two Topicks of natural
speculative Reasoning, namely, Truth and Falsity.
It now lies on me more expressly to describe How
44 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Reasoning is performed in reference to them, and
so what the Nature of it is. And natural speculative
Reasoning is Systematical, and Harmonical ; it is
a shewing,- an evincing the Truth or Falsity of a
thing, by conferring and comparing thing with
thing ; it is a shewing a Notion to be true or not true,
by representing of it in a Frame, a Scheme of real
Notions, with all its Relations in it ; and so by Com
paring, Evidencing how it squares, agrees, and
harmonizes, or otherwise.
83. That Natural Reasoning is Harmonical, Sys
tematical, that it is conferring, comparing, is evident
f64] in the Natural Reasonings of Plain and Illit
erate, but Understanding men; who not having
other Logick but that of kinde, to verifie their Tales,
desire but to have them heard out from end to end ;
and who no otherwise confute their Adversaries,
than by telling over again in their own way the
whole Relation, that so both may be compared. Be
sides, the comparative method of Reasoning, used
by the Minde in intelligible Objects, is no other than
that we naturally use in those that are sensible:
«/
For, be it a visible Object we enquire25 into, and
examine the truth of, we turn it every way, and into
all postures, so to make a certain judgement of it;
and Circumspection, (which is Cicero's word for it)
or the Mindes comparing and conferring of things
is no other. And if Truth indeed be Harmony,
Proportion, Congruity, an Object cannot be evinced
true, but by being evinced Harmonical, Congruous,
Proportionable; and f65! it cannot be evinced Har-
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 45
monical, Congruous, Proportionable, but by being
conferred and compared, and upon collation and
comparison shewn to be so.
84. To prove Harmonically, is in a Scheme and
Frame of Notions bottomed on things, to shew the
thing to be proved, to quadrate, lie even, and to be
entirely congruous and answerable. To disprove a
thing Harmonically, is in a Frame and Scheme of
Notions bottomed on things, to shew it not to quad
rate, but to be incongruous, unanswerable, and un-
adequate.
85. The best way of Confuting Err our, is to do
it by shewing the Truth : There is so great a delicacy
in Proportions, that a Scheme of Thoughts may
seem congruous and agreeing by it self, which com
pared with another, is observed no longer so ; as two
pieces of fine Cloath looked on at a distance, and
not compared together, may be judged equally fine,
and one no better than f66^ the other ; whereas when
put together and felt, and so compared, the differ
ence is plain and discernible.
86. The Effect of Reasoning, (and as it were the
Conclusion) is Assent, or Dissent, according to
evidence. Evidence is the Assurance we have a
thing is true or false, and so is either of Truth or of
Falsity, and answerably bottomes either Assent or
Dissent.
87. Assent is the judgement of the Minde upon
evidence of Truth, that the thing is true. Dissent
is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of
Falsity, that the thing is false.
46 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
88. Evidence of Truth is either certain or prob
able. Certain Evidence is full Assurance. Prob
able Evidence is good Assurance, but not full.
Certain Evidence is evidence of certain Truth.
Probable Evidence is evidence of probability. Prob
able Evidence is now a-days termed a Motive of
Credibility, 1671
89. In Proportion, as the Evidence is, so is the
Assent. If the Evidence be certain, that is, indubi
table and unquestionable, [and that is to be under
stood to be so, of which there is no cause to doubt,
or make any Question] then the Assent is firm and
certain, and without doubting; (but) if the Evi
dence be but probable, the Assent then is infirm,
and with doubting more or less, as the Evidence
is lesser or greater. To Doubt, is to fear lest the
thing to which Assent is given should not be true.
90. Evidence of Certainty, is to the Minde (as
to its Assent) all as much as Evidence of Infalli
bility: For the Minde as firmly adheres to what it
hath all reason for, and no reason against; all
reason to believe it to be so or so, and no reason
to believe it to be otherwise, as to what it appre
hends impossible to be otherwise; seeing it were
unreasonable and contradictious for Reason any
wise to doubt, when it I68! hath no reason at all to do
so. I am as sure that once there were such persons
as William the Conquerour and Henry the Eight,
and that there are or lately were such Cities as
Rome and Constantinople, as I am that Two and
ORGAXUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 47
Two make Four, or that the \Yhole is greater than
the Parts.
91. Firm Assent in matters in themselves mutable
and of a contingent nature, may be called Confi
dence: but in matters of a necessary, firm, and im
mutable nature, it is Science. Infirm Assent, or
Assent with Dubitation, is called Opinion. Suspi-
tion is a beginning Assent, or an inclination to
believe a thing, and is short of Opinion. Suspition
on grounds is called just suspition. Suspition on
no grounds is mere suspition. Probability is ap
pearance of Truth : And ground of Suspition is Ap
pearance of Probability. Suspition is also called Pre
sumption.
92. Assent on Evidence by the t69^ testimony of our
own Senses rightly circumstanced and conditioned,
is as firm as firm can be. and is called Knowledge.
Assent to a thing upon anothers knowledge and
not our own, is called Belief. To Believe, is to take
a thing upon anothers word: and if that word be
divine, the belief is called Faith ; or if but humane.
it is called simply Belief or Credit. Belief is grounded
on the wisdom and veracity of the person believed:
for he that believes another, believes him to have
wisdom enough not to be imposed upon or deceived
himself ; and Veracity or Truth ( which among men is
called Honesty) enough not to impose upon or to de
ceive him. The Word of God therefore is the most
proper object of belief, God being so wise he cannot
be deceived, and so true he cannot deceive. Xotoreity
of a thing [of a fact] is the certainty of it on
48 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Common Knoivledge: It is not Presumption, nor
Probability, but Certainty. [7°1
93. Assent to Falsity under the notion of Truth,
if it be firm, is called Errour: If infirm, and with
dubitation, it is erroneous Opinion.
94. Ratiocination Speculative, is either Euretick
or Hermeneutick, Inventive or Interpretative; and
this latter again is either interpretative of the World,
the Book of Nature ; or of the Scriptures, the Book
of God. But of these perhaps, another time, as also
of the method of Reasoning which I called Practical,
and is either that of Prudence (i. Humane, or 2.
Christian) or of Conscience.
Now on the whole Matter, who seeth not the
share and interest (that) Reason hath in matters
of Religion? Men are reasonable Creatures, and
therefore their Religion must be reasonable : Every
Tree must bring forth Fruit in its kinde. Faith it
self it is a rational Act [If I have any reason to
believe Men, I have all reason to believe God] and
t71! Ratiocination is as much imploy'd in points of
Revelation, as in points of mere Reason. Truth is
the immediate reason of Assent in matters of Reve
lation as well as in others ; and there is an Analogic
of Faith as well as of Nature; the Mediums are
different; but Ratiocination is the same in both:
We are as well obliged to compare Spiritual things
with Spiritual in the one, as Natural things with
Natural in the other. Thus are the Bereans ap
plauded as persons of nobler and more generous
ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. 49
Mindes than those of Thessalonica, because they
took not all on trust as these did, but examined the
things were told them, and compared them with the
Scriptures.
It is easie also to infer, that if any person shall
give himself the trouble of disproving what in my
Apologie I presented to the World ; to do it to Con
viction, he must produce a frame and Scheme of
Thoughts more Congruous and Harmonical t72!
than mine, and must account for those Phaenom-
ena which I therein essay'd to solve, in a method
more perspicuous and natural, and with more agree-
ableness and uniformity of Notions than I have ; or
else he will not Confute, but confirm it.
I say this, to shew the fairer play to those that
undertake to answer me, if after I have said it any
shall resolve to do so; and I say no more, to shew
the Opinion I yet avow to be mine of all the Objec
tions whispered up and down, that in themselves
they have as little force and evidence, and as little
conviction, as those that make them have yet had
either Courage to own them to the world, or Can
dour to own them to me.
Thus, Sir, I have performed what I principally
designed. I have shew'd the nature of Reason: I
have shewed the true method of Reasoning; as also
the nature of Truth, and (up and down my Dis
course dispersedly) the causes of f73! Errour: and
I have shew'd the extent of Reason. In which per
formance, whatsoever other Incongruity or Errour
I may have been guilty of, sure I am I have com-
5O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
mitted none in dedicating it: For to whom could I
address a discourse of Reason and of Truth more
properly, than to a Person who is so great a Lover
and owner of both? and withal who is so perfectly
honoured as you are by all that have the happiness
to know you : But by none more than
Sir,
Your most humble
Servant and Son,
Richard Burthogge.
Bowdon, Aug. 14. 1677.
AN ESSAY UPON REASON.
AN
ESSAY
UPON
AND THE
Nature of Spirits.
By Richard Burthogge, M. D.
LONDON:
Printed for 3|0ljtt J^lttttOtt at the Raven
in the Poultrey. 1694.
OF HUMAN REASON.
THE FIRST PART. CHAP. I. OF REASON IN GENERAL.
SECT. I.
In what sense Reason is taken and discoursed of here.
A double account of it; the first, more Notional;
the second, more Real. Of the Agreements of
Reason, Sense, and Imagination, (i.) That
all three are Cogitative and Conceptive Powers.
Cogitation what. Monsieur des Cartes, and
Honoratus Faber, their Opinion, that Sensation
is not Cogitation, considered. (2. ) That Sense,
Imagination, and Reason are Mental and Spir
itual, and not meerly Mechanick and Material
Powers. The Differences of those Powers;
that all Sensation is Imagination, and what is
commonly called Imagination, is but Internal
Sensation. Intellection or Reasoning, is Know
ing without Imagination. Instances, setting
out these several Notions. The power of Know
ing without Imagining, why called Reason. W
Reason taken for Human Mind, or Understand
ing (which is the sense I take it in now) is defined
56 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
by most, the faculty whereby a Man is said to be
Reasonable, or Understanding; in like manner as
Sight is denned, the faculty whereby a Living Crea
ture is Denominated Seeing, or Visive, or Reason
is that faculty whereby a Man does Exercise the
acts of Reason, or doth Understand; as Sight, the
faculty whereby a Man or any other Animal doth
see, or discern Objects.
Nor are they altogether without Reason, who do
so define and explicate it; for Acts of Perception
properly so called, are not Known, or Knowable,
but in and by themselves; we Know not, nor are
capable of Knowing, what the Act of Seeing is, but
by seeing; nor what that of Hearing is, but by
Hearing; or what the Act of Understanding is, but
by Understanding. And again, Perceptive faculties
are not Known, or Knowable, but by their Acts:
We Know not what the faculty or power of Seeing
is but relatively, with relation to the Act of Seeing :
Nor what the faculty or Power of Hearing is, but by
the Act of Hearing; nor what the faculty or power
of Understanding or Reasoning is, but by Acts of
Understanding or Reasoning: In a word, no Fac
ulties, no Powers are Known, or Knowable, but by
their respective Acts or Exercises, and therefore
they cannot be defined or set out but by them. All
this is certain.
However, since this is but a notional fruitless
way of Explicating Reason, and too short, too nar-
row to satisfie a Curious and Inquisitive Mind; there
fore to settle an Idea of it, that may be more to pur-
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 57
pose, more real, and more edifying; I will show, in
the first place, the Agreements it hath with other
Conceptive Cogitative faculties, what it holds in com
mon with them ; and afterwards, set out the Differ
ences that do discriminate and divide these several
faculties, each from other, and this particularly from
the Rest.
The Conceptive Cogitative Faculties that are in
Man, (for so I call the Faculties by which he makes
acquaintance with external Objects) are his exter
nal Sense, Imagination (as it is called) and Reason
or Understanding: Three Faculties which do all
Agree and Concur in this, that they are Conceptive
and Cogitative, and consequently Mental and Spir
itual, and not meerly Mechanick and Material
Powers.
First ; All three are Conceptive, Cogitative Pow
ers; Sensation and Imagination, as well as Reason
ing or Intellection, are W Cogitations. Cogitation
is conscious Affection; Conscious Affection, is Af
fection with Consciousness of that Affection; and
by another name is called Knowledge. Knowledge,
as it has a double relation, so it may be considered
two ways, to wit, either in reference to the Object,
which is Known, and so, properly, it is Apprehen
sion or Conscious Perception; or, as it respects the
Image and Idea, by means of which we do perceive
or know that Object, and so it may be called Con
ception. Conception properly speaking, is of the
Image, or Idea; Apprehension, Knowledge, or con
scious Perception is of the Object, by means of that
58 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Idea, or Image : It is as proper to say, that the Sense
and Imagination do conceive, as that the Reason
or Understanding doth; the former does as much
conceive Images and Sentiments, as the latter does
Ideas and Notions.
Conception and Cogitation, really are but one
Act, and consequently, all Conceptive are Cogitative
Powers, and Cogitative Powers Conceptive. Only,
to clear the Notion of Consciousness,, by which Cogi
tation or Knowledge is distinguished, tho' never divi
ded, from Conception, we must further consider the
Way and Manner how Consciousness Arises. And
it seems to me to arise, ordinarily, from the distinc
tion f5] and difference that is in Conceptions; for,
should any person have his Eye perpetually tied to
one Object, without ever closing of, or turning it
to another, he would no more be sensible that he
saw that Object, or know any more what it was to
see, than if he had been blind from his Birth. For
since Consciousness of Seeing is nothing but a per
ceiving by the Eye, that one is Affected, or other
wise Affected than he was, with the appearance of
Light, or Colour. If a person had never seen but
one thing, and never but seen it, he could have no
perceivance (that) he is so Affected, that is, he
could not be sensible or conscious (that) he did see.
Thus, tho' in our Members the parts that do com
pose them are contiguous one to another, and do
always touch, yet we do not feel them touch, that is,
they touch, but we are not sensible they do, because
no difference being in the Affection, there is no
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 59
Sense, no Consciousness of it : But Dislocation is
soon perceived ; as also it is when any part is pressed
unusually. I conclude, that as difference of Concep
tion arises from different Affections of the Faculties
by Objects, so Consciousness, or Sense of Concep
tion, arises from the difference of Conceptions. Did
we know but one thing, or had but one Act of Con
ception, we should not know ^ that we did know
that one, that is, that Conception would not properly
be Cogitation, but would be, as touching without
feeling. However, since there is so great a diver
sity of Objects in the World, all-around us, and con
sequently, so many various Impressions made upon
the Mind, by those Objects, so that its Conceptive
Power cannot but be diversly Affected, and moved,
and the Mind also have a perceivance of that diver
sity; hence it comes to pass, that Conception is al
ways Cogitation. In short, Conception is Modifica
tion of Mind, and Cogitation is Conception with
Consciousness of it. Consciousness of Conception
is a sense of the Alteration made in the Mind by that
Conception (of which it is conscious;) si nihil (says
Cotta apud Cicer. I. i. de Nat. Deor.y* inter Deurn
& Deurn differt, nulla est apud Deos cognitio nulla
perceptio,
I know very well that Monsieur Des Cartes™
the ingenious Honorato Fabri,28 and many others do
differ from me, for denying (as they do) that Sen
sation is Knowledge, and consequently, excluding
both Conception and Consciousness from the Idea
of it, they must also deny, that Sense is a Cogitative
6O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
or Conceptive Power. But then, it is hard to say,
what that Idea is, that they have of Sensation. Be
sides, 'tis I?] most certain that in Men, Sensation is
Conscious Perception, for whatever Impression is
made upon our Eye by any Object, we do not for
all that, discern, or see the Object, if we do not attend
unto, as well as receive, the Impression ; that is, we
do not discern or see, but when we Know we do.
Then only we have a Sensation of Objects, when we
are Conscious that they do Impress us ; that is, when
our Organs being Impressed, there arise and spring
up in us, by means of those Impressions, certain
Images or Conceptions, that (many of them) by a
Natural delusion do seem as really to Exist without
us, in the Objects themselves, as if they were indeed
so many real Affections of them, or Inherent Acci
dents in them. And those Images being but Modi
fications of Mind, arise not in us upon any Im
pressions but when the Mind Attends to them, for
else they cannot Affect it.
But happily it will be told me, that this Con
sciousness of Impressions, which is in men, when
they do see, or hear, or otherwise perceive Objects,
by the Affections of their External Organs, Arises
in them only from the Concomitance of the Under
standing; because in men, whatever Affects the
Sense, is also perceived by the Understanding; but
that there neither is, nor f8] can be, any such thing
in other Animals, which are as void of Conscious
ness of any Impression made upon their Organs, as
they are of that Reason and Understanding that
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 6 1
makes it in Men. But as this may be said, so it may
be as easily Replyed to; for 'tis as impossible, that
Men should have any clear, or indeed any Idea, at
all of Sensation, in other Species of Animals, but by
that, which they have of their own ; as it is certain,
that Sensation in Men cannot be understood to be
without Conception, nor Conception without Atten
tion of Mind. Attention of Mind, is the Application
of it unto Objects, and therefore in Men, is called
Minding: Without Attention no Conception, and
without Conception no Consciousness; Conscious
ness being (as I have said) nothing but a Sense of
Alteration made in the Mind, by some new Affec
tion of it, that is, by a new Thought or Conception.
Besides, there are many other things that do make
for this Opinion, that all Animal Sensation is Cogi
tation; particularly, that great Sagacity that is in
some Animals, which cannot be accounted for with
any clearness, but by allowing to them a great de
gree of Knowledge and Consciousness.
And hence it follows, that Sense and Imagina
tion, as well as the Understanding and Reason,
are Mental and Spiritual, not meerly Mechanick
and Material Powers. By Mechanick and meerly
Material Powers I understand such as do result
from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter; from
Local Motion and Rest, and from Size, Figure and
Texture. By Mental Spiritual Powers, I under
stand such as cannot be conceived to arise from
Matter only, and the Modes of Matter, without the
Influence of Mind; and in the number of these I
62 PHILOSOPHICAL WHITINGS OK 11URT11OGGE.
reckon Sense, and Imagination, as well as the
Understanding or Reason. It is true, the term
[Mind] is Appropriated, by way of excellency, to
the Understanding or Reason, this being a faculty
that hath the participation of Mind in a higher de
gree than the others have : But yet, there is Mind,
and as much of Mind in all the Conceptive Cogita
tive Acts of Sense or Imagination, as there is of
Conception and Cogitation in them. Thus I have
shewed how Sense, Imagination, and Reason do
agree, now I am to shew how they differ.
Sense, (by which I mean the power of Seeing,
of Hearing, of Tasting, of Smelling, and of Feel
ing,) is that by which we make acquaintance with
External Objects, and have Knowledge of them by
means of Images and Apparitions, or f10! (which is
a better expression, as being more General and
Comprehensive,) by Sentiments excited in the Ex
ternal Organs, through Impressions made upon
them from Objects. Imagination is internal Sense,
or an (After) Representation of the Images or
Sentiments (that have been) excited before in the
Sense: This is the Basis and Foundation of it; Com
position, Division, and Enlargement of Images, is
but Accessory, but Superstructure, and an Improve
ment of Sense. Reason or Understanding, is a
faculty by which we know External Objects, as well
as our own Acts, without framing Images of them ; ;
only by Ideas or Notions. In short, Sensation, prop
erly, is Imagination, for every Sense Imagines;
and that, which commonly is called Imagination, is
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 63
but Remembrance, or Recollection of Sensation.
Imagination, is Repetition of Sensation made from
within, Sensation, is Imagination occasioned by im
mediate Impressions from without us. Reason or
Understanding, is refined, Sublimated Sensation,
that is, a conscious preception of things by Notions
or Ideas, and not by Images, or sensible Representa
tions. And thus, all the cogitative powers that are
in Man, may be reduced to Two, to Sense and
Reason; the former comprehending the Imagina
tion, which is but Hi] the power of Remembering
Sensations, and of Amplifying them ; and the Letter
comprehending Intellectual Remembrance, which is
only a recollection of Ideas or Notions.
But to make a Reflection of more light, it may
be minded, that when we look on a Book, (to In
stance in a thing that is next to hand,) and read
any Sentence in it, as this, God is a Spirit., we have
at that time in our Eyes the Figures of the Letters
that compose the Words, and so do know by them,
what the words are ; and this is Sense. But if put
ting aside the Book we will endeavour to Recollect
those words, we must do it one of two ways ; either
by Retrieving in our thoughts the very Figures and
Images of the Letters and Words before presented
to our Eyes; or (which we oftnest do) by recalling
the Words and Sentence, and saying to our selves,
or unto others, God is a Spirit, without thinking in
the least, of any Figures of the Letters that do make
the Words, or of the Images of the Words that
compose the Sentence. In the former we do Imag-
64 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
ine the Sentence, as raising again the Images of the
Words that make it, and this is Sensible Remem
brance ; but in the latter, though, when we Recollect
the Sentence, we must withal (some way 1*2] or
other) mind again the words that compose it, yet we
do it without Imagining them, and this is Intel
lectual Remembrance, or the act of the Reason.
Add, that at the same time that we do see the
Schemes and Figures of the Letters, and have the
portraictures and draughts of the words presented
to our Eyes, which is Sense, we have, or may have,
in our minds the sense and meaning of those words.
of which sense or meaning however, we have nei
ther Picture or Figure ; and this is Understanding :
In the former we have Images, in the latter only
Ideas ; we See the words, but understand the mean
ing. This power of the Mind, (of perceiving with
out Imagining,) is called Reason, because in those
Acts in which it does converse with things by means
of words (and those are most of the Acts exerted
by it) the sense and meaning of the words is (as it
were) Inferred and Reasoned from them. What I
have said, suffices to make the Notion or Idea of
Reason or Understanding conceivable, by men who
use Attention, and do think, but nothing will be
enough to explicate and set it out to such as cannot
endure that trouble, but will swallow all things with
out chewing — f13!
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 65
SECT. II.
Of Reason as taken for Contrivance, Contrivance,
what, Sagacity what. Reason taken but for
Contrivance, not Characteristical to Man. Of
the Imaginative Contrivance in Irrational Ani
mals. An Instance of it in a certain Hen. Ap
prehension, Composition, Illation, Acts of the
Imagination, as well as of the Reason or Under
standing. Composition of Phantasms, how Il
lustrated by Mr. Hobbs. That Reason taken
for the Understanding (in the Notion of Under
standing setled before) agrees to no other Ani
mal but Man. Of Prince Maurices Parrot. The
Acts of Reason as taken for the Understanding,
reduced to two, to wit, Apprehension and Judg
ment.
CHAP. II.
Of Apprehension.
SECT. I.
Apprehension, the first Act of Reason. Of Words,
the ordinary Means of Apprehension. The
Ends and Uses of Words, i. To distinguish
things as they are in the Mind, in which, words
do stand for things. Why Mind is called Un
derstanding. 2. To express our Thoughts and
Conceptions one to another. The Importance of
66 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Words unto Knowledge, in this second Use of
them. Of the Sense of Words. Of Canting.
All Use of New Words, not Canting. The
Sense of Words twofold; Verbal, and RealL
This distinction of the Senses of Words Il
lustrated, and the Usefulness thereof explained.
Why the Meaning of Words is called Sense.
Apprehension, or that Act of the Reason or Un
derstanding, in respect of which it is said to see or
perceive things, is the same in reference to this fac
ulty, that seeing is unto the Eye: for the mind to
apprehend, perceive, or know any Object, is the
same (to speak by way of allusion and similitude)
as for the Eye to see, or discern one. t24!
What I have said in the former Chapter, does
cast some Light on this Subject; but yet to set it out
more fully, I will consider, First, the Ordinary
Means the Understanding uses in its Acts of Appre
hension, and those are Words. Secondly, The im
mediate Object of Apprehension, and that is Notion,
or Intellectual Sentiment; Sentiment of the Mind.
Thirdly, The two chief Affections of Apprehension,
and those are clearness and distinctness; of which
three considerations ; the Second properly is a Sub
ject of Metaphysicks ; the Third of Logick ; and the
First is common to both.
A Distinction then there is ( and that a remark
able one too) between the verbal, and real, meaning
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. >7
of words; which to set out more fully, I will show,
First, The Occasion, and Rise of it, and then
Secondly, The Use and Benefit of it.
First then, this distinction Arises from the Im
perfection and Inadequacy of Human Knowledge;
we Knowing little of things but under words, and
words being (immediately) the signs but, of our
Conceptions, which are always short and narrow,
and, too often, indistinct and confused. Now if the
sentiments we have according to the Vulgar and
Ordinary way of conceiving, which is but general
and confused, do cohere and hang together, when
one of them is affirmed or spoken of another, so that
the Notions are compossible in common acceptation,
we call it sense, though really the things themselves
(for which those words are understood to stand) be
Incompossible, and repugnant each to other, and
therefore indeed it is Nonsense. This is to be better
understood in Examples. Such Propositions as
these, that Colours (even as to their Images) are
in the Objects in which they do appear ; that Odours
are in the things smelled; that Sapors are in the
things that are tasted ; these and the like Assertions
are not com^monly understood, or said, to be Non
sense, because, Knowing in the general and con
fusedly, what is meant by colour, what by Odor, and
what by Sapor, as likewise what is meant by the
thing seen, by the thing that is tasted, and by the
thing which is smelled; nothing appears in those
confused general Notions (which we have,) to
hinder us from thinking that Colours, Sapors, and
68 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Odours do as really Inhere in those external objects,
as they seem to do. And yet to a Person that hath
distinct, real, and just conceptions of the several
subjects and predicates in those propositions, it is
evident, that 'tis as gross and palpable Nonsense to
affirm that Colours, Sapors, Odours, and other Ac
cidents, (which are but Phaenomena and Intentional
beings) do really exist in the Subjects where they
seem to be, as to say, that there are Notions and
Cogitations in a Wall, in a Figg, or in a Rose, than
which there cannot be a greater Bull or absurdity.
The Usefulness of this distinction, is greater
than most will think; since from the want of mak
ing, or of observing it, it comes to pass, that so many
do run into great mistakes and errours, in their dis
courses; Do skirmish one with another, to no pur
pose, and without end; and off37Hen do differ from
themselves, as much as each from other. For few
there are that do fix and settle even the verbal Sense
of words, (which often have a doubleness of mean
ing, and then are called Ambiguous;) and fewer
that do think of the real, without which yet, they
can never come to any certainty; so that, (as Mr.
Hobbs has ingeniously said; words that are Wise
Mens Counters, become Fools Mony.29
The meaning of words, as well the verbal, as
the real, is called Sense, because the Perception of
it ought to be as Clear, and distinct, and as steady
and fixt, as that of Sense is : For words, to be under
stood as they ought, must have their meanings be
as clearly and distinctly perceived, by the mind, as
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 69
objects of Sense when they are Seen, or Heard, or
Tasted, or Smelled, are by the Senses, f38!
SECT. II.
All Falsity is not Nonsense; but all impossible Fal
sity is. Repugnance in the mind to yield assent
to propositions that are Nonsence. Whence
it arises. Of Enthusiasm, as it is a kind of
Nonsence. What Enthusiasm is. The dis
tributions of it. Examples of the several Kinds
of Enthusiasm, out of Dr. Fludd, and in the
Magick Aphorisms of the Rosy-crusians. Thai
Enthusiasts where they seem to understand
one another, do so by Sympathy only, and not
by way of Apprehension and Judgment. Hoiv
this may be, set out in a story very Remarkable.
************
**'**********
SECT. III. t4?]
Of Questions, their Nature, and their distribution.
That a Question is neither true, nor false;
neither Affirmative nor Negative. An Objec
tion removed. That proceeding by way of
Question, or as it were of Inquiry, in Common
Discourse, is very useful, as well as Civil. Judg
ment required in putting Pertinent Questions.
7O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGK.
CHAP. III.
Of Notion, the immediate Object of Apprehension.
SECT. i.
That Notion may be considered two ways. ist. In
general; and 2\y. more specially. Of Notion in
the general sense of the Word. No Original
Native Notions. Why it seems as if there were.
The Notion of Apprehension cleared. Of No
tion in the special and limited Sense of the
Word, what it is. That the understanding ap
prehends things but inadequately, and under
Notions in the limited sense. This evidenced
by several considerations. An Objection against
it removed.
I have spoken of words the ordinary, but insti
tuted, means of Apprehension; I am now to speak
of Notion, the immediate Object (some would call
it the natural means) of Apprehension.
The word Notion, may be considered two ways,
either as it does signifie more generally and largely,
or as it is taken in a more restrained, special and
particular sense, f52^
A Notion in the general and larger aceptation
of the word, is any conception formed by the Mind
in reference to Objects; and so taken, is the same
with a thought, or that, in respect of the Mind, that
a Sentiment largely taken, is, in respect of the sense.
I say a Sentiment largely taken ; for instance ; when
Sentiment is taken in respect of the Visive Power,
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. J\
not strictly and properly for light, or colour only;
but largely, for any perception that the Eye has, by
way of sight, of things, or of their relations and
habitudes. And since there is so great an Analogy
between the Eye and the Understanding, and be
tween the Sentiments of the one, and of the other,
it will be an easy inference, that no reason can be
given why there should be Original Innate Notions
in the Understanding (as some imagine there must)
that it may be able to apprehend, which will not
equally argue, that there should be the like original
Figures and Images in the Eye, which should enable
it to see ; and yet none will Allow of these.
But to show how It comes to pass, that there are
(as there are) appearances as if the mind had some
original innate Notions,21 which for that reason are
called Prolepses and Anticipations, and withal to
bring some light to the business of Apprehension,
[53] which (as to the way of it) is obscure enough,
and but seldom touched to any purpose : I will offer
an Observation very common, but (as it may be
applied) very luciferous in reference to this Subject.
Everybody observes, that if a Blow is aimed at
the Head of any person, he will hold up his Arm to
receive it, and keep it from his head, without think
ing either that, or why, he does so ; and this is said
to be done Naturally, and by instinct; because, in
truth, it is done without premeditation, and so, at
that time, without any actual conceived design.
And yet again it is certain, that an Infant will
not do so, or any Child before it has been taught and
72 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
instructed to do it; which makes it plain, that the
doing so in those who are come to reason, is no effect
of natural instinct, but of use; only the Child was
taught to do it so early that by the time he comes to
the Age of Discretion, having forgotten, or rather,
having made no observation, when it was first
taught, or first did it, and upon what Motives, and
doing it now without deliberation it hath the aspect
of a thing effected by Nature, and not of a custom
or habit.
In the same manner in the business of Reason,
we may, and often do proceed up^on Principles
instilled into us very early, and are Acted by them,
without Knowing how, or why, it being no Effect
of present consideration. Experience confirms this,
since we may be certain, if we do but attend to our
own Actions, that, many times, we are carried to
the Affection, or Disaffection of things, and the Ap
probation or Disapprobation of them, we Know not
why, and yet all the passions and Motions of our
Mind, have Reasons for them; for all Effects must
have Causes ; but these, sometimes, are so early
graffed in us, and, at other times, so unawares, that
we remember not they were so ; and then the Effects,
only being observed, and the causes lying deep, hid
den and secret, we do call it Nature, or Instinct,
though in truth, it be Reason, and habit, as much as
any thing else is.
Again, much the same way we do compute or
reckon; for when we use any greater numbers,
either in Addition, or in Substraction, or in anv
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 73
other Arithmetical operation, we do it without any
actual consideration of what the lesser particular
numbers are that make the greater, for that wre have
done before, (perhaps long,) and consequently are
possessed of the Ideas (may I so express it) without
the Images of them. But at first, we had t55! a par
ticular Knowledge. As, when we Multiply and say,
Six and Six is Twelve, and Twelve and Twelve is
Four and Twenty, we do it without considering
actually at that time, that six is so many unites,
though at first (but possibly so long ago that we do
not remember it) we did so, and must (do so) to
Know the particular value of that number ; and the
like is of others.
And thus also with an easie Application may it-
be conceived, how words come to stand in the mind
for things, and that when we have the word, we
think we have the simple Idea of the thing; it is just
as the Figure [6] doth stand for the number [Six].
And that when once we have had a distinct Idea or
Notion of the Number, afterward, (without actual
thinking thereof,) we use the Figure instead of it,
and that as well, or better than if we did distinctly
consider the Number it self. Now, words do carry
the same Relation unto things, that Figures do unto
Numbers, and both Words and Figures seem to de
rive the power which they have of standing in the
Mind as Representatives, from the connexion they
have, Figures with Numbers, and Words with
Things; after the same manner as we hold up our
Arm, or a Stick, to save our Head, with^out
74 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
thinking of saving it. For though the Action pre
vents all actual thought of the End of it, yet 'tis
done for an End, in vertue of its first Direction
and Use. This Discourse attended to, and well di
gested, will open a great light into the way in which
the Understanding comes to have Apprehension of
things by the means of Words; and to form its
Ideas and Notions, taking Notions largely for any
Thoughts or Conceptions.
But besides the former Sense of the Word [No
tion,] there is Another which is more Restrained
and Limited; in which a Notion is Modus Con-
cipiendi, a certain particular manner of conceiving ;
a manner of conceiving things that corresponds not
to them but only as they are Objects, not as they are
Things ; there being in every Conception some thing
that is purely Objective, purely Notional ; in so much
that few, if any, of the Ideas which we have of
things are properly Pictures; our Conceptions of
things no more resembling them in strict Propriety,
than our Words do our Conceptions, for which yet
they do stand, and with which they have a Kind of
Correspondence and Answering; just as Figures
that do stand for Numbers; yet are no wise like
them. [57]
To make this clearer, it must be considered that
the Eye has no perception of things but under the
Appearance of Light, and Colours, and yet Light
and Colours do not really exist in the things them
selves, that are perceived and seen by means of
them, but are only in the Eye. Likewise the Ear
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 75
has no perceivance of things, as of a Bell, of a Lute,
or of a Viol, but under sounds, and yet sound is
only a sentiment in the Ear that hears, and is not,
or any thing like it, in the Bell, or Viol, or Lute
that is heard. For as the Eye has no Perceivance
of things but under Colours that are not in them,
(and the same time with due alteration, must be
said of the other Senses.) So the Understanding
Apprehends not things, or any Habitudes or Aspects
of them, but under Certain Notions that neither
have that being in Objects, or that being of Objects,
that they seem to have; but are, in all respects, the
very same to the mind or Understanding, that
Colours are to the Eye, and Sound to the Ear. To
be more particular, the Understanding conceives not
any thing but under the Notion of an Entity™ and
this either a Substance or an Accident; Under that
of a zvhole, ore of a part; or of a Cause, or of an
Effect, or the like; and yet all these and the like,
are only Entities of Reason con received within the
mind, that have no more of any real true Existence
without it, than Colours have without the Eye, or
Sounds without the Ear. Every person that hath
the least Understanding of the way in which we do
apprehend things, will yield this to be true as to
Whole and Part, to Cause and Effect, and to all the
Notions which are commonly termed by Logicians
the Second; and it is as certainly true in reference
to Substance and Accident, to Quantity, Quality,
and those other General Notions under which the
Understanding apprehends its Objects, though com-
76 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
monly they are called First ones, and in comparison
of the others are so.
I have laboured the more to make the Notion
that I have in this business plain and easie, because
much of what is to be said hereafter will depend
upon it; and now taking it for granted that my
meaning is Intelligible, what remains, is to evince
true; and this I shall do, from the very Nature of
Cogitation in general, (as it comprehends Sensa
tion as well as Intellection,) since that the Under
standing doth Finn its Notions upon Objects, arises
not from its being Such a particular Kind of Cogi
tative Faculty, but from its being Cogitative at
large', let us then reflect f59^ again on the Nature
of Cogitation at large.
It is certain that things to us Men are nothing
but as they do stand in our Analogy that is, in plain
terms, they are nothing to us but as they are known
by us; and as certain, that they stand not in our
Analogy, nor are Known by us, but as they are in
our Faculties, in our Senses, Imagination, or Mind ;
and they are not in our Faculties, either in their own
realities, or by way of a true Resemblance and
Representation, but only in respect of certain Ap
pearances or Sentiments, which, by the various im
pressions that they make upon us, they do either
Occasion only, or Cause, or (which is most prob
able) concur unto in Causing with our Faculties.
Every Cogitative Faculty, though it is not the Sole
Cause of its own immediate [apparant] Object, yet
has a shnre in making it: Thus the Eye or Visive
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 77
Faculty hath a share in making the Colours which it
is said to see; the Ear or Auditive Power, a share
in producing sounds, which yet it is said to hear;
the Imagination has a part in making the Images
stored in it; and there is the same Reason for the
Understanding, that it should have a like share in
framing the Primitive Notions under which it takes
in and receives Objects: In t6°] summ, the imme
diate Objects of cogitation, as it is exercised by men.
are entia cogitationis, all Phaenomena; Appear
ances that do no more exist without our faculties
in the things themselves, than the Images that are
seen in water, or behind a glass, do really exist in
those places where they seem to be.
But as this is a truth that Many will admit with
more facility in reference to the Obiects of Sense,
and Imagination, as Colours, Sapors, Sounds, &c.
Than to those of the Mind or Understanding, such
as Substance, Accident, Quality, Action, &c. So I
find my self obliged to give a farther demonstration
that it holds in these, as well as in those; which I
hope to do by the following Considerations.
First, the understanding converses not with
things ordinarily but by the Intervention of the
sense, and since sentiments of sense are but Ap
pearances, not Pictures, or proper Representations,
it is hard to conceive how such conceptions are
framed only by their occasion, and only wrought
out of them, should be portraits of the things them
selves, and made just and exact to them.
78 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Secondly, The understanding is a power t61! of
that nature that many think it doth not immediately
Attinge (as they call it) or reach particular singular
beings, which yet are the only beings that compose
the Universe, as members or parts of it; and really,
it uses to proceed by way of Abstraction, and there
fore doth more Connaturally converse with Uni-
versals, that are not of Mundane existence, than
with singulars that are. Now, since things as they
are in the mind, do undergo an Abstraction and
sublimation, certain it is, they must put on another
dress there, and so appear in quite another shape
than that they have in the World. In short, All
Agree that our conceptions of things are but inade
quate, as indeed they must needs be, since things
have much Refraction (may I so express it) both
before they come and after that they come, to the
mind; and if they are inadequate, they cannot be
commensurate, that is, they cannot be so just and
exact, to things, as to show them as they be, and in
their own existences.
Thirdly, It may be Argued from the very nature
of an Idea or notion ; since this after a sort is a senti
ment of the mind, as a sentiment (properly so
called) is, after a sort, an Idea or Notion of the
sense; the f62! immediate objects of the sense are
sensible sentiments, and those of the understanding
are Intellectual ones ; which they must needs be, be
cause the understanding it self is a kind of sense,
only a more sublimed and raised. Mens ipsa ( says
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 79
Cicero, 1. 4. Academ. Ouaest.} quae sensuum fans
est, etiam ipsa Sensus est, &c.31
In fine, this is so certain a truth, that whosoever
reflects, tho' never so little, cannot chuse but ob
serve that as he takes in nothing by his sense but
under sentiments, which are the notions of sense, so
he receives in nothing in his understanding, but
under certain notions, w7hich are the sentiments of
the mind ; since he knows nothing Intellectually but
either in general only, under the notion of a thing,
or more specially under that of a substance, or else
of an Accident; and what are all these but Objective
Notions?5 as will appear in particular upon the ex
amination and Tryal of them.
Let us then inquire first into the thing, (for we
shall shew it of Substance and Accident hereafter)
and what is thing but modus concipiendi? a notion
or sentiment that the mind has, of whatsoever any
wrise is, because it is? Thing indeed is the most
general notion, but then it is but a notion, because it
is general ; and has the most of f63! a notion, because
it is the most general. To be more particular; If
the Question be asked, what thing is? or what is
meant by that word? Some have no other Answer
but this, that a thing is that which hath essence. But
then it may be farther demanded, what is meant by
essence, which is said to be had? What it is to have
essence ? And what is meant by that, which hath it ?
Or if it be said, that a thing is that, which is, (as it
is by others;) the same difficulties again occur: for
it may be demanded, what that is, which is? And
SO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
what is meant, when it is said to be? And whether
Existence be Essence? especially since Existence
seems not the first conception of a thing; but is a
second, or after-conception ; as not being that, which
makes a thing to be what it is, [a thing;] but what
only makes it a thing in being.
By this, it plainly appears, that the meaning of
the word [thing,] is but an inadequate conception,
arising in the mind upon its conversing with Ob
jects, and so doth speak a certain particular senti
ment, which the mind has of them; a sentiment
better understood, than defined by words; but a
sentiment too, that doth not enter us into the knowl
edge of the Reality it self (may I so express it,)
of that which is; which we only apprehend inade
quately, t64! under the Disguise and Masquerade of
notions. As, that it is that, which is; or that which
has essence; or the like; but not by any adequate
exact conception. And as for Substance and Acci
dent, which yet are the first steps we make toward
a distinct Perceivance and knowledge of things;
what are they, but likewise Modi concipiendi':
Entities of Reason, or notions, that (it is true) are
not without grounds, but yet that have, themselves,
no Eormal being but only in the Mind, that frames
them ; there being no such thing in the World as a
Substance, or an Accident, any more than such a
thing as a Sitbject, or an Adjunct; and yet we ap
prehend not any thing but as one of these, to wit,
as a Substance, or as an Accident ; so that we ap-
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 8 1
prehend not any at all, just as they are, in their
own realities, but only under the Top-knots and
Dresses of Notions, which our minds do put on
them.
But here it will be told me, that plain unlearned
men, who yet do exercise the Acts of Reasoning- well
enough, and perhaps in the best manner, as doing it
without Art. and in a way the most agreeable to
Nature, do conceive and speak of things without
conceiving or minding of Notions, such as I have
mention'd; for they conceive and speak of man, of
good and f65! evil, of vertue and vice, and the like,
without conceiving or minding of Substances, or
Occidents. But this is easily got over. For tho'
unlearned plain men do not explicitly and in terms
denominate goodness, vertue, vice, &c. Accidents,
yet since they do conceive them (as All do) all
things that are in a man, or in some other thing,
tho' they do not call them Accidents, yet do they
conceive them as Accidents: And when they do
conceive, or say of a man, for instance, that he is
vertuous or vicious, or the like, they do conceive
him to have vertue or vice in him; that is, tho' they
do not think of the name substance, yet they do
really conceive that person to be one: since a sub
stance is nothing but a subject, or a thing that has
other things in it as Accidents; whereas in truth,
neither Accident, nor Substance hath any being but
only in the mind, and by the only vertue of cogita
tion or thought, f66!
82 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
SECT. II.
Inferences from the former Discourse; first, that
human knowledge for the most part is but in
tentional, not real. The usefulness of this In
ference; an Objection against it removed. (And
yet} Secondly, That the immediate Objects of
the cogitative Powers are somewise external to
those powers; and this, both as to appearances,
(ivhich is sensibly demonstrated} and as to
their grounds. Two other Inferences added;
the first in reference to the grounds of the Doc
trine of the old Academy; the second concern
ing the obligation we are under ordinarily to
conceive and speak of things as they are in out
Analogy, and do appear to our faculties.
I infer from the former Discourse; First, that
human knowledge (at least for the most part) is
but Intentional, not Real ; and that we have no Per
ception of any thing, (in any degree to speak of,)
just as it is in its own Reality and being. For all
our notions and conceptions of things, are of them
under sentiments; the understanding it self (as I
argued before) f67! being but a higher and more
sublimated sense; and sentiments (as such) are in
their own formalities but apparently only, not ex-
istently, without the faculties that do conceive them.
To be particular, we have no perception or knowl
edge of any thing but as it is a Substance, or an
Accident, or a Quality, &c. And these are only
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 83
notions: for example, as to Water; we have no
knowledge of it by all, or any of our senses, what
really it is in it self, just as it is, and absolutely
speaking; for we are utterly ignorant (otherwise
than by Conjecture) of the Magnitude and size of
the little parts that compose it; Ignorant of their
figure and shape ; and Ignorant also of the kind, and
degree of motion they have ; all this we are Ignorant
of, and yet this is all that is Real in Water. But as
Ignorant as we are of what it really is, in it self, and
absolutely considered, we have much Comparative
Relative Knowledge of it ; for we know it by sense
to be fluid; to have some degree of tenacity or vis
cosity ; to be moist ; in a word, to have so many Qual
ities (for so we conceive and speak) that all put to
gether, do give the mind a sufficient rise to distin
guish it, as a different substance, from Earth, or
Fire ; So that a person that has at any time had I68!
the perception32 of them all, will not mistake them
afterward, one for the other.
But here it must be remembred, that (as I have
shewed before) tho' we do not see the reality of
things immediately, and just as it is in the things
themselves, yet by means of sentiments and notions,
we do somewise, perceive it; as the Eye that sees
not anything immediately but Light or Colours, yet
by means of Light and Colours, discerns Gold, Sil
ver, Stones, Wood, as also the Magnitudes, the
Figures, the motions, the distances of things; with
a thousand other Realities, so the understanding
discerns infinite Realities, infinite habitudes of
84 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
things; not indeed immediately, but either under
the sentiments of sense, or by means of its own,
which I call notions ; as of Substance, Quality, Cause,
Effect, Whole, Part, &c.
I have been somewhat longer in the Explication
of this Inference, because to know the nature of our
Knowledge, must needs be of great advantage unto
us; and much relieve us in our Inquiry after the
nature of Things ; since it frees us from the confu
sion, that our mind must necessarily be in, should it
take the Apparitions of things (for such sentiments
and notions are) to be external and real Existences.
Would not a thinking man be much per^plexed,
to make a satisfying conception, what that Image
is, that he sees in a glass, or in water, if he was
perswaded of its being a Reality (of Existence,)
and not a meer Apparition? The like must he be,
who takes Objective5 Notions for real Existences,
and who confounds Attributes that are only Objec
tive, and that do belong to things but as they are
Objects with those that do belong unto them as they
are Things, and that are Real,
However, it will not follow, as some have weakly
objected, that then nothing is Real; for tho' the
Images themselves of Whiteness, Blackness, Red
ness, Greenness, that do seem inherent in visible
Objects, are not really so, yet really there are Dis
positions and textures of particles in those Objects,
that, by the various Modifications which they give
the Light, do occasion in the Eye, to which the Light
is reflected, all that diversity of sentiments (which
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 85
we call colours) that does appear in those Objects.
The same, mutatis mutandis must be said of sounds,
sapors, odors, and of Tangible qualities, and in pro
portion will hold also in mental notions. For tho'
the very Notions of Entity, Substance, Accident,
Whole, Part, Cause, Effect, and the like, do not
really exist without the mind; yet as they do seem.
Real, and some t7°l more Real than others, so really
they have in things without us certain grounds or
Foundations, that, upon our converse with these
things, do naturally Occasion, or Excite, such no
tions and sentiments in us. But I will speak to this
matter more particularly, because it is of importance.
First then, the immediate Objects of Cogitation,
both the Sensitive, and the Intellectual, are, in ap
pearance, external to their several faculties; that is,
such Objects do so seem to be without their several
faculties to which they correspond, that, in appear
ance, they are either the very ultimate Objects them
selves of those faculties, or. at least, do Exist in
them, and upon this account are called Objects: for
Whiteness seems to the Eye to be in snow, or in a
white wall ; and sound to the Ear, to be in the Air ; a
Man doth seem to the understanding, to be really a
Substance, or a thing that is invested with Accidents.
If it be Inquired how it comes to pass, that senti
ments and notions, which really are not in the things
that are without us. do yet appear as if they were,
and consequently that they seem to be Objects? it
must be Answered, that this arises from the verv
86 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
nature of cogitation it self, and of 1711 the cogitative
faculties ; and that both Reason and Experience do
evidence, it must be so.
First, Reason sheweth that it must be so; for as
we are conscious that we have a perceivance of Ob
jects under certain Images, and Notions, so we are
not conscious of any Action by which our faculties
should make those Images or Notions; and there
fore being sensible that we are Affected with such
Images, and Notions, so long as, and no longer than
we do Attend to things without us, (which things
are therefore called Objects-,) and not being sensible
that we are so by any Action from within our selves,
it cannot but appear unto us that we are Affected
only from the things without us, and so, what really
is only in our selves, must seem to come from those
things, and consequently to be really in them.
Experience also shews; (to wit, that what is
really but in the cogitative faculty, does yet seem
without it;) for if the Eye by any accident becomes
infected with Colours, as, (to instance in a more re
ceived, than often experienced, Matter,) with yel
low, by the yellow Jaundice, or with Green, (as I
have sometimes observed, before the coming of Con
vulsions;)33 that is, 1721 (for this is the Reality) if
the Visive Spirits, or whatever other parts of the
Eye, that are immediately concerned in the Act of
Vision, be Preter-naturally put into the same mo
tions with those, which by the Impressions of Yellow
or Green Objects they are naturally put into, in
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 8~
either of these Cases, the Object beheld by that Eye,
will appear as yellow, or green, tho' to every bodies
else, it is but White, or Red, or of some other colour
And whence comes this, but hence ? that the Images
conceived in the Eye, (for in the Instances alledged.
the Images of yellow and green are no where else,)
are naturally pinned upon the Object. As is farther
evident in Dazling*, which is, when an Impression
made upon the Eye by one Object, becomes trans
lated to another ; thus, coming out of a bright Sun
shine, on a Summers day, into a darkish room, one
sees a splendor in every corner, and upon every Ob
ject. The like Appearance there is, upon the behold
ing of Objects thro' tinctur'd Glasses: So that it
must be concluded, that the immediate Objects of
cogitation, I mean the very Images and sentiments
that are perceived, do, to all appearance, seem as ex
ternal to the cogitative powers, as even the ultimate
Objects themselves, that are 1731 perceived under
them ; which was the first thing to be shewed.
The second point to be shewed is, that the im
mediate Objects of cogitation are external in their
grounds, as well as in appearance, and in truth, are
therefore external in appearance, because they are
so really in their grounds. And this is as certain,
as that every Effect must have a Cause. For things
without us, are the Causes that do excite such Im
ages and Notions in us : In the order of Nature, we
do see a thing so long as, and no longer than, we
keep our Eye upon it ; and therefore that we do see
it, must come from some impression from the Thing :
88 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
and since to see a thing, is nothing but to have some
Image from it, and so of it, in the Eye, and the
Image is as the Impression, and the Impression as
the Thing that makes it, it follows that the grounds
of the Image is in the Thing without us. And since
the Image (by which I mean Light or Colour) is
the immediate object of Vision, and, that what is
instanced in one Act of cogitation, will equally hold
in all, it follows, that the immediate Objects of all
other cogitations, as well as of vision, are ordinarily
and naturally as external in their grounds, as in
appearance; that is, are fundamentally external, as
well as apparently. f74^
I thought once to have ended this Chapter here,
but now before I do so, I will add an Inference or
two from the former Doctrine; the first is, that we
learn from it the Foundation of that Opinion the
Academicks of old were in, That no judgment could
be made of Truth; that things do seem to us, but
cannot be perceived by us; and that no certainty.
but great probability only, is to be Attained unto lu
men. For as this Opinion had all the Phaenemena
of cogitation to give it countenance, so those Philos
ophers saw it ; for they evidently perceived, that they
saw not the Realities, but only the Appearances of
things; Plato the chief of them, one of the most
penetrating, as well as the most elegant, of all that
ever were, affirmed that the present, was a word, of
Veri similitude only, and not of Truth and Reality;
That the beings in this World were only Shadows
but that the Substances themselves were in the
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 89
Ideal.3* How far herein he went with the Truth,
may easily be perceived by what I have discoursed
before, concerning the Nature of Cogitation; as
also, where he strikes out.
The Second Inference is, That since Sentiments,
and Notions bottomed upon the Realities, do seem,
the former to the Sense, the latter to the Under
standing, to be Realities ; and since we are obliged to
cont^ceive, and speak, of things, ordinarily and
popularly (for all are not Philosophers) in that
way and manner that they seem to be; it follows,
that we are obliged to conceive, and speak of Senti
ments and Notions in Common Conversation, and to
the people, as if really they were the things them
selves that are perceived; or at least were in them:
And so may say, the Snow is white, the Emerald
is green, and the like. 1761
CHAP. IV.
Of the distribution of Notions in the Restrained
sense of the Word.
SECT. I.
Notions are either the Notions of things, or Notions
about things. Of the Notions of things. And
first of Entity or Thing. The Pinax Entium, or
general Table of things. Things are either
Real, or Cogitable. And these either meer
Cogitables, or real Cogitables. A Reality, what
A Cogitable what. Of Real Cogitables. Real
Cogitables, either Proper, or Reductive. Proper
9O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Real Cogitables of two sorts; of the Sense,
or of the Mind. These of the Sense, of two
kinds; Connatural, or Preternatural. Appar
ent colours, are real Connatural Cogitables.
Real Cogitables of the Mind, like those of the
Sense, of two Kinds; Connatural, or Preter
natural. Real Cogitables Reductive, subdi
vided into those of sense (External, Internal)
and those of the Understanding.
Notions taken in the limited Sense of the word,
for Objective Ideas, by t77! and under which the
Understanding apprehends, and conceives, of,
things, and which, for this reason, may be called
Fundamental (as being essential to the business of
Knowledge,) are either Notions of things; such as
Entity, Reality, &c. Or Notions about Things,
such as whole, part, cause, effect, <5r. of which the
former are conceived as absolute, the latter more
as relative Notions.
The Notions, (or Modi concipiendi, that I call
Notions) of things, may be reduced to four, to En
tity or thing, Reality, Substance and Accident.
Entity or thing is taken in several senses ; either
first, in the largest, in which it is the same with
something, or Aliquid. Or 2dly. more strictly, as
it comprehends but substances, Accidents and
Modes. Or 3dly. Most strictly, as it stands for
Substances only. I take it not at this time in the
largest Sense.
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 91
Thing in the largest Sense, is that which any
wise is. or that is Knowable, directly : for Nothing,
no wise is, nor is Knowable, but indirectly, and by
means of thing, of which it is a Negation ; Nothing
is Not a thing. (781
And thing, or Entity, taken in the largest sense
for
A liquid
some
thing
IS
Real
Cogi
Either-
table,
and
f Meer Co
this
gitable,
Either-
•{ Real Cogi
table,
f Substance,
[A Thing-,'
[ Accident.
[•Cogitabel.As •{ Some thing about
j Thing ; As
[ Cause, Effect, &c.
For that which any wise is, is either without the
thinking of any one upon it ; or it is no longer than
while one is a thinking, and because he is a thinking,
on it.
That which is without the thinking of any one up
on it, and whether it be minded or no, is a real Thing,
or a Reality ; a thing that so is in the world, as that
it is a part, or Appurtenance of it, and such a thing
is matter, and every Affection, and every System of
matter ; and such a thing also is Mind.
That which no longer is than while one is a
thinking, and because he is a thinking, on it ; [so that
tho it have that which is t79] called in the Schools
an objective being,5 a being in the Cogitative Facul
ties, yet hath none without them in the World : ]
92 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
this I name a Cogitable; a Cogitable thing, or En
tity. And thus, all the Sentiments of Sense, those
of the Mind, and even meer Objective Notions, are
Things, not things of Mundane and External Ex
istence, but of Cogitation and Notion; Intentional,
not Real things. For such are Colours, Sounds.
Sapors, Time, Place, Substance, Accident, Cause,
Effect, &c. they are Intentional things, things that,
as such, have only an esse Objectivum, an esse Cog-
nitum, as the Schoolmen phrase it.
SECT. ii.
Of meer Cogitables, or Fictions. What a Fiction
is. That all Fictions are Creatures either of
the Mind, or of the Internal Sense; None made
by the External Senses. The Reason of it. Two
Philosophical Doctrines observed, one concern
ing meer Cogitables, the other about Real Cogi
tables Reductive. Why the Representations of
things in Prophetical Dreams, are always made
as if they were present.
SECT. III.35
Of Thing strictly taken, and of the Difference be
twixt the Notions of things, and those that are
only about things. Of the Idea of Substance,
and that of Accident. Spinosas Notion of Sub-
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 93
stance, and that of an Accident considered.
Maxims of Thing in general.
Thing taken strictly, as it comprehends but Sub
stances, Modes and Accidents, is whatever seems
External to any Faculty, and consequently, seems to
have Being in the World, as a Part, or an Appurte
nance, of it, whether it be really so or no. And in
this sense of the Word, as Real Things themselves,
(which are eminently called Things.) So likewise
the Sentiments we have of these things, as Colours.
Sounds Sapors, &c. are Things ; and thus also, No
tions are t92^ Things, both the more general and
common Notions, those of Substance and Accident,
and the more special, the Notions of the several
Species of Quality, and those of Relations, &c.
But when I say, that not only things themselves,
but the Sentiments and Notions we have of them,
are Things, it must be understood with distinction ;
for the Things themselves, (so I call the grounds
of Sentiments and Notions) are Realities of True
Existence; but Sentiments and Notions being only
Real Cogitables, are only seeming Realities ; Reali
ties of Apparition only, not of Existence : Thus the
Notion of Substance is a Reality of Appearance
only, but the things that we apply it to, are Realities
of Existence.
By the Notion of thing as taken strictly, we have
a Rise afforded us to apprehend the difference be
tween the Notions the Understanding hath of things,
and those it hath only about things ; for the Notions
94 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
that I call the Notions of things, appear to the Under
standing as Things External unto it; for (not to
mention Substances) even some Relations, and In
telligible Qualities do seem to the Understanding,
as really Inherent in the things they are Attributed
to, as the sentiments of t93^ Colours, Odors, and
Sounds do unto the Senses. But for Notions that
are only framed by the Mind about Things, such as
Cause, Effect, Measure, Measured, &c. they seem
not to it to have being in the things themselves, but
to arise from its own Reflexions, upon comparing
and considering of Things. Thus, at the same time
that the mind conceives of Almighty God, that he
is the Cause of all, as it does conceive, that the word
[God] is the name of a Real Being, so it conceives
also, than the term [Cause] is not, but that it only
signifies a certain Kind of Relation between God
and Things, as these do spring from him, and so is
only the name of a certain Objective, and not of a
Real, Being.
Of the things that do Appear unto our Faculties
to have a Reality of being, some are perceived by
them immediately, in their own proper Formal Na
tures, and those are either Modes, or Compleat Acci
dents', Others are not perceived by them imme
diately, in their own proper Formal Natures; but
only by means of, and under, those that are per
ceived so; and these are called Substances: Com
pleat Accidents and Modes are Appurtenances, Sub
stances are the things to which they do Apper
tain. [94]
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 95
It is true, Spinosa is in another perswasion;
who tells us, that he understands by Substance,
that which is in it self, and is conceived by it self,
that is, as he expresses it, a thing in whose concep
tion that of another is not involved. Adding, that
by Attribute he understands the same that he means
by Substance, to wit, a thing conceived in and by it
self, in whose conception that of another is not in
volved. Thus says he, Extension, in as much as it
is capable of being conceived in and by it self, is an
Attribute: but Motion that cannot be conceived but
as something in another thing, is None. Only he
says too, to prevent Objections ; that a Notional dis
tinction may be made between a Substance and an
Attribute, in this manner, that a thing may be called
an Attribute in respect of the Understanding, which
doth Attribute such a certain Nature to a Substance ;
and then a Substance is the thing that the Under
standing doth Attribute that Nature unto.
But as what this Philosopher says on this occa
sion is not very clear, so it is certain, that the Notion
of Substance,36 as also that of an Attribute, is Rela
tive ; nor are the Instances he puts so well adjusted,
but that some exceptions may be brought against
them. I can no more conceive I951 any Real Exten
sion, than I can any Motion, but as a thing that
belongs to another ; Extension to the thing extended,
as Motion to the thing moved. And tho' I do not
believe my Understanding, the measure of other
mens; yet I cannot but think, it will be found on
tryal, as hard a task for any other, as it is for me.
96 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
to think otherwise; For what is meer Extension,
but an Extension that belongs to nothing? And
what is Extension that belongs to nothing, but an
Extension of nothing? and certainly, an Extension
of nothing, is nothing really, whatever it may be in
Imagination; but more of this in another place.
Maxims concerning Thing in general
1. Nothing can be, and not be at once.
2. Things that but Appear, do equally Affect
the Mind as those that really are.
3. Things are not to be Multiplied Unnecessar
ily ; as they are, when the Fictions of Men, are made
to pass for the Creatures of God. t96!
CHAP. v.
Of Substance.
SECT. I.
The Idea or Notion of Substance. Self Subsistence,
how in the Idea of it. The Idea of Substance
only Relative. Neither Extension nor Exist
ence the Idea of it. Substances are either
Principles, or Principiates. The Grounds of
this Division. Substance that is a Principle,
is either Mind or Matter. Considerations prem
ised for the better Understanding of this Dis
course. The Ideas of Mind and Matter. The
Grounds of the distribution of Substance into
Mind and Matter. Abstracted Mind is as con-
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 97
ceivable as Matter, under the Notion of Sub
stance. Spinosa's Notion of Mind rejected.
The Primary Notion or Idea which we have of
Substance,36 is (as I have hinted in the former
Chapter) that of a thing which is a Subject, or an
Ultimate Object ; that is, we have not any Real im
mediate Conception of it, but only a Notional. Or
(to speak more plainly, t97! according to the Prin
ciples laid before) Substance as such, is not a thing
conceived just as it is in its own Reality, but a thing
conceived under a certain notion ; that is, a substance
is a thing that is a Subject. For when the Understand
ing does think of the things we call Accidents (which
are the only things that do immediately, and at first
present themselves unto us,) for example, when it
thinks of Odours, Colours, sapors, figures, &c. it
doth at the same time conceive, that besides these
there must be other things that have them, in which
those odors, colours, sapors, figures, &c. are. And
those things that are conceived to have others, we
call substances; as those that are conceived to be had
of others, or to be in them, we call Accidents: but
what those things, which we do Denominate Sub
stances, Are, in themselves, stript of all their Acci
dents, is no wise known; All we know of any sub
stance is, that it is the subject of such and such
Accidents ; or that it is Qualified so or so ; and hath
these, and the other Qualities.
This Notion of a substance [that it is the same
with a subject,] I call Primary, because though
98 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
that [of subsisting by it self,] is deemed so by
others, yet, in our ordinary way of Reasoning, and
Investigating of things, this [of self subsisting] is
a consequent one, to that of being t98! a subject.
For conversing with things; as the first that do
present themselves to our consideration, are the
Accidents of them ; so the first reflection the under
standing makes, upon these Accidents, is, that other
things are under them, which do uphold and support
them, and consequently, that are subjects, or sub
stances. But then indeed, when it comes again to
consider, whether these subjects are also in subjects,
finding in its self a certain Reluctance to conceive
(that) they are, because, if they were, there would
be no end, things would be in one another infinitely :
therefore it concludes, that that, which is a subject
of Accidents, is it self in no subject; that is, it is
self-subsistent. Thus the notion of being self-
subsistent, arises from that of being a subject : Nor
is the notion of [being self-subsistent] a more Real
one, than that of [being a subject.] For what is
Self-subsistence but an Attribute that belongs to
something else ? but what that something else is, to
which it belongs, I am willing to learn ; and will ever
honour as my great Master, that Person who will
effectually teach me. We have no Ideas of any sub
stances, but such as are Notional and Relative ; that
is, such as do arise from them as they stand in our
Analogy, and are cloathed with Accidents. l"l A
truth that might be made to appear by a full Induc
tion of all the particulars; But I will instance but
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 99
in some ; but those the most obvious, and most com
monly discoursed of. For what Idea have we of
Earth, but that it is something material, that it is
fixt and tastless ? What of Salt ? but that of some
thing sapid, and easily soluble in water ? And what
Idea have we of water? but that it is something
material, moist, and fluid in such a degree, and the
like? So that the Idea of a substance is that of a
thing which is a subject; and this is a Relative
Idea.36
But many, who cannot satisfie themselves with
the former, do conceit that they have found a Better,
a Real, a Positive Idea of Substance. Of these, some
do hold, Extension is that Idea, so that substance is
Extension ; and accordingly as Extension is either
Penetrable, or Impenetrable, so they frame the No
tions of Spirit, and Body; or the species of sub
stance, as it is immaterial, or material.44 Others
hold, that Existence or Being is the Idea of substance
in general, and that substances of this or that partic
ular species, are only determinate Talities of Being;
for since in being is the Idea of an Accident, being
(say they) must be that of a substance, and as to
be is to exist, so being is nothing but existence. 110°1
I shall have another occasion hereafter to con
sider the first of those Opinions when I come to
Answer a certain Objection, touching the Idea of
God ; but will say of it now, that those who profess
it, cannot make out (as they ought to do) a clear
and satisfactory Idea of Extension in general, that
shall agree in common, both to that which is Im-
TOO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
penetrable, and to that which is Penetrable. Besides,
it is not conceiveable, that a Spirit should be only a
Penetrable Extension, since (as will appear more
fully hereafter) Extension has but little to do with
mind or thought, which is Essential to a Spirit : and
without which a Spirit cannot be a Spirit : and Pene
trability, and Impenetrability has all as little.
Nor is the second Opinion more conceiveable.
For not to Insist, that Existence properly taken is
only of Causates, (existere properly being [esse
extra causas,] and nothing properly is [extra
causas] that was not first (in causis\} I will take
it at large, for any being in act ; yet even so, it is
not of the Idea, or first Conception, of substance:
for [being] taken not as a Noun, but as a Participle
(as here it is taken,) is in the very sense of the
term, a word of Relation ; being is not a thing, but
of a thing; not a thing, but a mode of it, f101! and
consequently presupposing it; and that which pre
supposes thing or substance, cannot possibly be in
the Idea, or first conception of it. In short, Acci
dents have being, tho' not the same being as sub
stances ; but to proceed.
Now, if this is the proper notion of substance
in general, that it is a thing that is a subject of
Accidents, it will follow, that we cannot frame any
Notions of substances in particular, or make any
agreeable Distributions of them, but according to
the several Accidents, of which they are subjects.
And this I desire mav be noted, because it will be
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. IOI
of very great use in clearing what I shall say here
after, in the prosecution of this Discourse.
Of Substances some are Principles, some Prin
cipiates. By Principles, I mean substances that
are causes of other things, but are themselves un
caused. By Principiates, (give me leave to make an
English word of one not very good Latin) I mean
substances that are caused, or composed of Prin
ciples. Principles make, Principiates are made to be.
That there are substantial Causes, and substan
tial Effects, in the World, is evident to sense; For
even to sense, some substances begin to be, and some
do cease being. Now that which begins to be, is
[102] made to be after having not been, must of ne
cessity have Something, (and this something must
of necessity be another thing,) that makes it to
be; that is, it must have a Cause. So that Causes
and Effects there are; else nothing could begin to
be, or cease being. And if there are Causes, either
those Causes, all of them have Causes also, and con
sequently, as they (as Causes) make other things
to be; so, (as things that have Causes) themselves
are made to be by others; or else, at least some of
them have no causes, but are self-subsistent and
uncaused. If all Causes have Causes, then an in
finite Progression must be owned in the account of
Causes, than which nothing can be more repugnant
to the mind of Man; to Science; and to the Order
and Unity of the Universe. And indeed then, there
must be a number actually infinite, since all Causes
are actual. But if any Causes are uncaused, (as
IO2 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
certainly some must be, for the reasons Alledged)
those uncaused Causes are Principles, or first
Causes. More shortly, either something in the
Universe of being is uncaused, and so is a Principle,
for what is uncaused is a Principle; or else, every
thing- is Caused ; but every thing cannot be Caused ;
for if every thing is Caused, Nothing must be the
cause of Something. For if f103! every thing is
caused, every thing was once nothing, for what i*
Caused was nothing before it was Caused; and if
every thing was once Nothing, either Nothing must
be the Cause of some, or, (which in effect is the
same) nothing may become something without any
cause, than which No thought can be more unrea
sonable.
Again, as nothing is more certain than that there
is some Principle, so the Stoicks (the Wisest of all
the Philosophers, as well as the most Devout) af
firmed, that there are two, Mind and Matter. Thus
Seneca in his Epistles (Ep. 65.)" Universa ex Ma-
teria & ex Deo constant. All things (says he) are
composed, or, do Consist of God and Matter. And
indeed, we cannot be more assured by all our facul
ties, that there is Action, and Passion in the World,
and that the World could neither be, or persevere in
being, without them, than we are to speak Philo
sophically, that there are two Principles, one, the
Principle of all the Action ; the other, the Principle
of all the Passion is in it; the former the Active
Principle, or first subject of Activity, the latter the
Passive Principle, or first subject of Passivitv;
AN ESSAY UPON REASON.
of which, I call the first, Mind, the second, Mat
ter. This Assertion Zeno in Laertius fully agrees
unto, when he tells us, that the Principles of t1041
things are two, TO jioiovv xal TO jtacf^ov,38 the Active,
and the Passive ; Nor doth the great Originist Moses
say much less, when in his Genesis, he writeth of
the Spirit of God that moved, and of the Abyss and
Waters upon which he moved; and methinks, in all
Animal Generations, in which there must be a Male
and a Female, as who should say, an Active and a
Passive Principle, there is some (and this no very
Dark or Obscure) Adumbration of it.
Before I do proceed to a more particular Con
sideration of these Principles, I would have it ob
served, that we ought to Distinguish what is mani
fest, certain, and of undoubted truth concerning
them, from that which is but doubtful and uncertain.
Now it is certain, that there is such a thing as we do
call Matter; such a thing as Mind, such a thing as
Motion; and that Matter is alter 'd, figured, textur'd,
and infinite ways wrought upon & moulded by means
of motion. Again, it is certain that all things have
not Mind in equal proportions, but that some exert
the acts of it in a higher way and degree, and some
in more ways for kind than others do ; and also cer
tain, that the exercises of Acts of Mind in all the
ways and all the degrees of them in Corporeal Ani
mals, (for we are not so well acquainted with
others,) do much depend tlosl upon the Nature and
Qualifications of their Organs; that is, upon Tex
ture and Disposition of matter. These things we
IO4 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
are as certain of, as that our selves be, and have
a true use of our faculties. But if we advance
farther, and to endeavour to Enter and Penetrate
into the very nature of Matter, into that of Mind,
and into the Nature of Motion ; here being forsaken
and destitute of sense to hunt for us, we are much
at a loss, and as unable to proceed in our search an
inquiry after them, as to their just Realities, as we
are in that of things, which are wholly out of our
view. It is hard to conceive just what matter is in
its own Positive Reality; also what Mind is, and even
what Motion is, (as taken for a subordinate Prin
ciple.) Nor can it be Demonstrated, that (as some
will have it) there is only one substance in the Uni
verse, and that Matter and Mind are only several
Modifications of that one substance ; nor be Demon
strated, that Matter (for this I think they mean by
substance) is in its own Nature, a vital Energetical
thing; and that the diverse Gradations of Life, that
are observed in the several species of Animals, arise
only from the several Modifications of Matter, and
of that life of nature (as those Philosophers call it)
which is Essential thereto, and is [106] the root of
those Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive Powers
that do dress up being in all the Shapes and Forms
in which it appears upon the Stage of the World.
I will not build upon such Hypothesis; which be
ing unevident, must needs be doubtful and uncer
tain, if not false. A Philosophy that shall be solid.
and sound, must have its Ground-work and Foun
dations firmly laid; which none can have, but that
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. IO5
which is bottomed, rais'd and built upon evidence;
I mean, upon the certain Testimony of our faculties.
And therefore since our faculties do rather go upon
Notions, than on Realities, and do plainly Distin
guish between Mind and Matter, and (as I will show
in the Progress of this Discourse) do Contradistin
guish them, I hold my self obliged to treat of these
distinctly, but still in the Real Notional way.
Mind then is Cogitative, thinking, or perceiving
substance ; or, Mind is the first subject of Cogitation.
Matter is Extensive, spacious, substance; or, the
first subject of dimensive spacious Quantity. In
other, but Equivalent terms; Mind is Active sub
stance, Matter Passive substance. I affirm, that
these latter Definitions are equivalent to the former,
because, in effect, it is the same to say, that Mind
is Active, as to say, it is Cogitative'', and the same to
[107] say that Matter is Passive, as to say, it is Spa-
tious Extensive substance. Nor is Mind Cogitation,
or matter extension, as Des Cartes makes them:
but the former is Cogitative, the latter Extensive
substance.39 We find a Reluctance in our minds to
conceive that Cogitation is a substance, as also to
conceive Extension as one; and yet we cannot con
ceive Mind and Matter but as substances.
The main Reason why I do distinguish Sub
stance into Mind and Matter, as into first Original
kinds, is, because (as I hinted before) Cogitation
and Extension, that do Constitute their several
Ideas, are of no Relation one to another, for what
hath a Thought to do with a Cube, or a Triangle ?
IO6 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
or with Length, or Breadth, or Depth? Certainly
Cogitation and Extension are quite different Acci
dents, without any thing in their Ideas, that is Com
mon to both; and therefore the first subject of the
one, cannot be conceived the first subject of the
other ; their subjects must be substances of quite as
different kinds as themselves are, at least to us;
since all the diversity we can conceive in substances,
is and must be, taken from the accidents they have,
these being the Characters by, and under which
alone, we do perceive and know, and by consequence,
can only distinguish them, t108^
I insist herein the more, for that many think
that Mind is only an Accident, and that taken for a
substance, it is unintelligible, and a meer Chimera:
so that, tho' Matter is acknowledged (by them) to
be a substance, it will not be yielded, that Abstract,
separate mind can be one.40 But those that think it
so, if they consider'd, that men have no conception
of substance, nor can have any of it, but as it is a
subject of Accidents, they would soon change their
Opinion. For the Accident of Cogitation, or of Ac
tivity, that Mind is the subject of, is as distinctly
and clearly conceivable, as that of Extension, or of
Passivity, which matter is the subject of. Nor is
the thing it self that is the subject of Extension, or of
Passivity ; any more Conceivable but by, and under
this" that is, the substance of mind and matter are
equally conceivable, and equally unconceivable. They
know no more what that is in it self, that is extended,
AN ESSAY UPON REASON.
than what that is, that is Cogitative; and may be as
sure, that they do think, as they are, that they are
spacious, ay, they cannot know that they are spa
cious, but by thinking. But of spatiosity or exten
sion, (the Accident that constitutes matter,) I shall
have occasion to discourse hereafter, when I come to
speak of quantity, I proceed now to discourse of
mind. nwi
The Idea I have given of Mind, that it is the Im
mediate subject, or (as others perhaps would chuse
to say) the Immediate Principle, of Cogitation,
Energy, or Activity, is much more easie to be con
ceived than that of Spinosa, when he defines the
human mind to be the Idea of a body, or thing.
actually existing:41 for Mind, even the human, is not
so properly said to be an Idea, as to be the Prin
ciple, our Cause efficient, of Ideas; since all Ideas
(even in common sense) are conceived; and Mind
is that, which conceives them. Thus it is in our
Refracted, Inadequate, Real-Notional way of con
ceiving; and for an Adequate and just one, as it is
above our faculties, so I do not find that Spinosa,
or Mai. Branch e after all their Ambitious Re
searches in that higher way have edified the World
thereby to any great Degree. This way of seeing
all things in God*' and in their own proper Reali
ties, is a way much out of the way. Otherwise,
when they keep the lower way of sense, many of
their thoughts are surprizing, and excellent,
IO8 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
SECT. II.
A two fold Consideration of Mind; one, as it is Ab
stracted from Matter; the other as it is Con
cerned with Matter. What is meant by Con
cernment of Mind ivith Matter — Of Mind.
That is the Idea of God. God as pure Mind, is
in himself, and directly incomprehensible. How
ever, he is knowable as it were by Refraction,
and Reflection; in an Hypothesis, and by way
of similitude. That a Parabolical, Comparative
way of knowing God, ought to content us. Of
the Divine Attributes; the true conception of
them. The vanity of those who talk of seeing
all things in God. Spinosa's Opinion that God
is all substance Rejected, for several Reasons.
That this Opinion seems to imply, that God is
no singular self -existent, self -sub sistent Being.
The Ground of this Opinion touched. Another
sentiment concerning God, that he is infinite
Extension indued with Goodness, Wisdom, and
Power, considered. The Ground of this under -
minded, and the nature of the Divine Omni
presence represented. I111!
Mind may be considered, either in it self, as it is
Abstract and simple, free from all Concretion and
Composition with matter; or else as it is concreted
or concerned therewith.
By the Concretion of mind with matter, I mean
nothing but the acting of Mind in this or that par-
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. ICX)
ticular manner, by means of matter. As it is in our
selves, who do not see, or hear, or feel, but by means
of Organs, that is, of matter.
Mind as it is in it self, Abstract and Simple,
free from all concretion or concernment with Mat
ter, I call Pure Mind; Mind Concreted with Matter,
I term, Mind in Matter.
Pure Mind, is the Notion or Idea of God; as is
implied by our Saviour, when he says, John 4. 24.
God is Spirit; he does not say, God is a Spirit, but
God is Spirit ; jtve\)[Aa 6 fteog, All Spirit, nothing but
Spirit. In like manner Seneca, in the Preface to
his natural Questions, first demanding what God is ?
Answers, he is Mens universi, the mind of the Uni
verse; and being obliged, for the cleering of his
notion, to show the difference between the nature
of God, and that of Man, adds. Mind is only the
Principal part of our nature, but the whole of Gods,
which is not112lthing but Mind God is pure Mind,
all Reason. In his own terms thus, Quid ergo in
terest inter naturam Dei & nostramf Nostri meliot
pars Animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animuni.
Again, in his Epistles (Ep. 65.) He has this ex
pression, Nos nunc primam & Generalem causam
quaerimus, haec simplex esse debet; nam & ma-
teria simplex est; now, says he, we seek the first
Universal cause, which ought to be simple (or un-
compounded) for even matter it self is simple
Only, I doubt, he (as many other Philosophers did)
took God but for an immanent an ingredient Cause
IIO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
of all; which perhaps is only true of the Mosaical
Spirit of God.43
But God as he is Pure mind, is an Inaccessible
Light, that dazzels all the eyes that behold it; and
therefore, we can hope to acquire but very little par
ticular knowledge of him, or acquaintance with him.
under this notion. But then again, as the Sun that
cannot be beheld directly, in its own proper light,
may yet be seen by Reflection; so may the Deity,
in an Hypothesis, and by way of Parable; by speak
ing of him after the manner of men. The holy
Scriptures themselves go this way. They Repre
sent God as an Infinite Almighty Person, (suppose
a man,) that hath Understanding, Will, and Affec
tions; that t113J consults and decrees; and that is
touched (as men are) with the motions of Love,
Hatred, Desire, Aversion; and in consequence of
this Notion, do further Represent him, sometimes
as a Father, sometimes as a Lord, or as a great
King, that Governs the Universe, according to the
Rules and Laws that he himself hath set, and by
rewards and punishments. Now, all this is Para
bolical, and but Comparative Knowledge : However,
we ought to satisfie and Content our selves there
with ; for though it is not to know the Deity in the
Reality, as he is in himself, yet it suffices for the
Principal End for which we should endeavour to
know him; which is to Adore and Obey him. Be
sides, it is well nigh the only particular Knowledge
of him that we Mortals are capable of, in this Ter-
restial State; and, in fine, is almost as much, in
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. Ill
effect, as that which we have of any thing else, even
in the Corporeal World.
It is true we understand that Matter and Motion
are Real things, and that all others that are Cor
poreal, do result from these; but this (at least) is
only a General Confused Knowledge, and no more
than that we have of the Abstracted Pure Mind.
For, as to the particular Natures of things, their
Internal Fabrick and Texture, [1141 and that degree
of Motion, that is in the particles which compose
them, (of this) we have only a weak imperfect Con
jecture, without certainty. All the particular Knowl
edge that we have of things by which we distinguish
them one from another, both in reference to their
Kinds, and to the Individuals of those Kinds, and
by which we resolve their Operations, is of nothing
(to speak of) but of Accidents; and Accidents are
nothing but (as I have touched before, and shall
shew again more fully hereafter) the Sentiments
we have of things ; they being not so much as
Grounds or proper Representations of Grounds, but
only certain Appearances, under which our several
Senses do dress up things, and so show them unto
us: and this is enough for Use.
As therefore any person would know but little
of this Corporeal World, and nothing usefully, that
would not take it in by his Senses, and know it (as
he only can) under the Mascarade of Sentiments,
that are not without him, but only in Appearances,
and in their Grounds ; so, he shall know but little of
God, that will not condescend to see him in an Hv-
112 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
pothesis, by way of Analogy and Similitude. What
was said by God himself unto Moses, will t115^ hold
true in every Mortal ; Thou shalt see my Backparts,
but my Face shall not be seen : All our Knowledge
of him at present, is but ev alviyM-a™, we can but
Riddle at him ; the Ideas we have of him, are only
Attributes; and Attributes are not Qualities really
Inherent in him, but only Notions of his Operations,
and of the various Relations and Aspects which
they bear, to one Another, and to Us,) that are
excited into us, upon the view and considerations
which we take of his works. Thus the several At
tributes of God, that we conceive and know him
under, are, in reference to him, just as the Accidents
of things Corporeal, their Colours, their Odors,
their Sounds, their Tangible Qualities are unto
them ; we see him but cog ev eaojitpco as in a Glass ;
and to see a thing as in a Glass, is not to see the
thing it self, but only by Appearances ; and yet, he
that will look behind the Glass, to see more, shall
see nothing at all.
What, then, must be said of those, who think,
they See all things in God?*2 When God, though
in himself he is Pure Light, without any Mixture
of Darkness, yet, as to us, in respect of any clear,
just, distinct Knowledge of him, He dwells in the
thickest Darkness: No t116! Windows in the Sanc
tum Sanctorum, where the Seat of God was ; and the
very Heathen, many of them, Adored him with
Silence, as one that was Ineffable and Unconceiv
able: Methinks, it is meer Enthusiasm, to talk of
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 1 13
Seeing All Things in the Original, when we can
not so much as look upon it ; God is Pure Mind, and
Pure Mind is Pure Light, of too Transcendent Glory
to be immediately beheld by us, but Blear-eyed.
Weak-sighted Mortals.
There are two Opinions in reference to the Na
ture of God, that Differ from mine ; both of which
I will consider.
The First is, that of Spinosa, That he is all
Substance, and that Particular Beings (even for
mally taken) are but Participations of his; as being
only so many several Modifications of the Divine
Attributes.44 But this is a Notion (of the Deity)
that I cannot receive, as for other Reasons, so for
this particularly, that it makes him to be the Uni
verse, and to be Matter, as well as Mind ; whereas,
God is neither Matter, nor the World or Universe,
but only Pure Mind; for t11?] the Great World has
a Mind, that made, and Governs it, as well as the
Little. Even Mr. Hobbs, has said, He that thinks
this World without a Mind, I shall think him with
out a Mind :16 And says Seneca, Nat. Quasi. Lib. I. C.
45. Eundem quern nos Jovem intelligunt, Custodem,
Rectoremq; Universi; Animum ac Spiritum, Mun-
dani hujus operis Dominum & Artificem, cui nomen
omne convenit, &c.43 Which I would Render thus ;
God is the Father All-mighty, All-wise, All good,
the Maker of Heaven and Earth, Soveraign Pre
server and Governor of All.
114 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
For my own part, I much doubt that those Phi
losophers, who profess themselves in this Opinion,
[that God is all Substance, or that he is the World,]
do really believe he has no Being at all, but, only
in Fiction of Mind, and by way of Prosopopoeia;
and that as Nature Fortune, Chance, which yet are
said to do This, and to do That, do, really, only
signifie Causes so or so considered; so, God, with
them, is only a Notion, a Name, a Mode of Expres
sion, by which they mean all Causes taken together ;
and so no more the Name of a Real Individual
singular Being, than that of Nature, or Fortune.
Sunt (says t118! Lucilius in Cicero 1. 2. de Nat. Deor.}
Qui oiimia Naturae nomine appellent, ut Epicurus,
&c."
The unwary Expression of some Theologues,
and Theologizing Philosophers, who Denominated
God Nature Maturing, might give occasion to this
improper conceit of him, among the moderns; as
might also that mistaken Idea of Infinity (as an
Attribute of God) that some have given, which
seems to shock his distinction and singularity of
Being. For thence it is Argued, how can God, be
Infinite Being, if he be not all Beings? And if he
be, how can he be One by himself? be a Singular
Individual Being, distinct from all others? These
were the speculations, that obliged Spinosa to con
ceive of God, that he is the Ingredient, Immanent
Cause of all Things ;44 and the speculations too, that
tempt others, to other mistakes concerning him. But
when I come to discourse of the Notions of Finite
AN KSSAY UPON KKASON. TI5
and In-finite, and to Represent in what Sense the
latter is truly Ascribed to God, T hope to manifest,
that there is great Mistake in such Speculations and
Arguings, and to exempt the true received Notion
of Infinity both from these, and from all the like
intangling Embarrasments and Difficulties, f119!
The Second Opinion is that of Dr. More and his
Followers, who do hold, that God is an Infinite Ex
tension ;46 that he is indued indeed with all Goodness,
Wisdom, and Power, but he is an Extension so in
dued; and of this they are so confident, that some
require a belief thereof as of an Article as great
as any in the Creed ; an Article that is the Founda
tion of all Religion ; both revealed and Natural. But
as I believe, that no Man hath known the Father
except the Son, and he to whom the Son hath re
vealed him, so, since among all the Revelations that
the Son has pleased to make of God the Father, this
is none [that he is an Extension] I cannot admit his
being so, to be a Notion so Essential unto all Re
ligion, as they would make it; Especially when I
consider, that it might as easily have been said, that
God is Extension, as, that he is a Spirit; and Christ
hath said the latter but not the former. Besides, I
cannot understand how Wisdom, Goodness, and
Power should be said of meer Extension, which is
but space; it seems to me a lesser incongruity
(though even this is Incongruity enough) to say
that God is Matter so indued, that he is Space so
indued ; seeing, even in common sense, there is more
Il6 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
of Reality and Being in meer Matter, t120! than there
is in meer Extension or Space. But to urge this
Argument more home. By Extension, (which the
persons who are in this Opinion do Attribute to
God,) they must mean either meer Space, or else a
thing that in the Idea of it is Spatious. If meer
space is intended; As this does in no ways differ
from inane or vacuum, so one may think, it might
as well be said (which yet its hard to say) that God
is an Infinite inane or vacuum, that is, in plain Eng
lish. an Infinite Nothing indued with Wisdom,
Goodness and Power, as, that he is infinite Exten
sion so indued. On the other side, if by Extension
is understood a thing that in the Idea and first Con
ceplion of it is Extensive, that is, a thing that does
essentially take up space so that it cannot be con
ceived, but withal space must be Imagined, as an
Appurtenant of it; in this Sense, I cannot see how
it differs from Matter; and then to say, that God is
Extension, is to say, that he is Matter ; whereas, God
is Pure Mind, not Matter. In fine, as it is certain,
that God is Mind, rather than Matter; so likewise
it is certain, that in the Ideas that we frame of Mind,
and of all the things that properly relate to it, such
as Wisdom, Goodness, Thought, &c. We never do
once think of Extension or f121! Space: And if at
any time we do endeavour to apply Extension or
Space unto Mind, or to any thing properly mental,
there always arises a Repugnance in us, upon but
the thoughts of it ; an Inch, a Foot, a Yard of Under
standing, or Goodness, is a Bull.
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 117
I know it is Argued from the Omnipresence of
God, that he is Extended; and in truth it is very
hard to imagine any presence with things that are
extended, but withal, there must be an Imagina
tion of some Extension in the thing that is present :
but still, this is but Imagination, which is apt to
impose upon us, and therefore it must be examined
by Reason. And Reason tells us, that we cannot
have a distinct and clear conception of the presence
of God, if we have not (as we have not) such an
one of his Essence, since the presence of God is but
a Mode of his Essence; and if we have no distinct
and clear Conception of the presence of God, nor
consequently of his Omnipresence, or the way how
he is present with all his Creatures, where ever they
are; I do not see with what Cogency or Force an
Argument can be Deduced from it, in this business.
In short, since things are present one with another
very differently, in proportion to their several Na
tures, it will follow, that t122! things Mental, must be
present with others, in much another way than those
that are Material, and Consequently that God who
is pure M ind, must be present with Material Beings,
much otherwise, than these themselves are, one with
another. Mind can no more be present the same
way that Matter is, than be the same thing with
Matter. H23]
Ll8 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
CHAP. [V.47
Of Mind in Matter.
SECT. I.
Mind as concerned with Matter comes under a
double consideration, i As it actuates a most
subtle and more than Etherial Matter, that
is diffus'd throughout the World. 2ly. As it
actuates some particular Vehicle or Body. In
the first Notion of it. Mind in Matter is the
Idea of the Mosaical Spirit of God. This Spirit
according to the Scriptural Hypothesis, is the
Immediate cause of all things in the first Crea
tion, and ever since. The Being of this Spirit
Evinced, both by Authority and by Argument.
Dr. Mores Distinction,, between the Spirit of
Nature (which he calls Principium Hylarchi-
cum) and the Spirit of God, considered.
SECT. II. H29]
An Inquiry into the Original and Rise of Motion.
What is meant by Motion in this Inquiry. That
Motion conies from Mind in Matter, or the
Mosaical Spirit. This shewed in many in
stances, by the Connexion betzveen Cogitation
and Motion. How Motion comes from a Prin
ciple at Rest, and how Matter from Mind set
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. I IQ
out in the Metaphysical Hypothesis, and by
other Illustrations.
By Finer and Delicater Impressions. I mean
such as have less of Local Motion. By Finer and
Delicater Faculties, I mean such as are sensible of
Finer and Delicater Touches, or Impressions.
In this sense, the Imagination must needs be a
finer and more delicate faculty than any external
sense, for as much as it receives the impressions of
External Objects but by Rejection, or Communica
tion from the Sensories, but these have them directly
from the very Objects themselves ; and by the same
Reason, the Understanding, that receives impres
sions from the internal sense, f139! must needs be (as
indeed it is) a much finer and delicater faculty than
That.
Upon the whole, it is evident, that there is a near
relation between actual motion and cogitation, and
consequently, that it is no unreasonable thought to
think, that as they are near of kin, so both are Off
springs of one Original cause, [mind in matter;]
but then it will follow also, that motion, and indeed
all Energy whatever in the Spring and Principle of
it is Rest, for so mind is. But this is the difficulty.
For that motion should come from a Principle that
is at rest, appears as unintelligible, as that Frost
should come from Fire, or Darkness from Light.
Wherefore to make this clear, I must consider
things in the Metaphysical Hypothesis, as all are
I2O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
understood to come from one, by way of Emanation :
and thus, all Created Being is compared to Light.
that flows from the Sun ; and then its Emanation is
in the same manner, as the Radiation of Light, which
is from a Center into an Orb or Sphere, in Extenu
ating Lines. Now in this Hypothesis, as all Beings
(even those that are most opposite) do come from
one, so they come from it in this way, that the more
Removed any is from the Central Being, the more
Extenuated it is ; that is, as God or pure mind is the
Central Being, ^40] that Sun, that is the Father of
Lights ; so all the Being that proceeds from him, has
less of Light and more of Darkness, in proportion
to the distance it has, upon the Scale of Being, and
in its utmost Elongation or Removal from him, ter
minates in that, which in Appearance has nothing
of Resemblance to the Original Light; but (to be
compared with it) is only Darkness and shadow;
and this last is the Idea of meer matter, as that of
the Central Light is of pure Mind. God is Light;
Matter is Darkness; all intermediate Beings are
Light and Darkness, in several proportions.
What I have said is sensibly set out in the shades
of Colours, and in Colours themselves, which arc
but shades of Light ; For the Extremes of any Col
our, for Example, the Brightest Red, and the Dark
est; or the Extreams of all Colours, as White and
Black ; compare them each with other, and they are
so contrary, that nothing can be more, especially the
two latter; and yet they do participate, the former
not only of Colour in general, but also of Red; and
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 121
the latter, tho' of no particular Colour, yet of Light,
which is the Ground of Colour in general ; and also
the Darkest Red, if it doth not come from the Bright
est; and the Blackest Col141 Hour from the Whitest;
yet, by the Gradation of Shades, or Participle, inter
mediate Colours, they are so continued one to an
other, that the Ascent and Descent from one unto
the other is most Agreeable and Delightful, as made
by easie steps, without any Patches, or Chasms. It
is true, if we look on Contraries in their Physical
Consideration, so they are of opposite Natures, op
posite Operations, and one expels the other, when
they are immediately set together ; but if we look
upon them in their Metaphysical Consideration, so
they are but degrees of the same nature, and ca
pable of being United and Reconciled: insomuch,
that One in a right sense may be said to come
from Another; as Darkness from Light. For
however contrary Light and Darkness are, each
unto other, as to Qualities and Physical Operation,
and so in their Physical Consideration, yet as to
their Metaphysical, they differ but in degrees; both
have the same grounds; for Shadow really is but
lesser Light, occasion'd by the interposition of an
Opaque Body, and Darkness is but a great Shadow.
And thus a Flat and a Sharp, tho' contrary sounds,
as to their Physical Consideration, yet as to their
metaphysical, they are but different degrees; the
Sharp a greater, the Flat a lesser det142Jgree of
Celerity. And thus as Darkness comes from Lieht,
o
only by the Lessning or Extenuating of it ; so mav
122 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
matter come from mind : mind is pure Light, or, all
Being in Eminence ; but matter, as it doth Partici
pate nothing at all of mind, but only by meer Exist
ence, so it is meer darkness, without the least degree
of Vitality or Life; and all Beings between Mind
and Matter, are as Colours, in respect of Light, or
as Shades, in respect of any particular Colour.
But to add some further cleering to this Subject,
and to shew how actual local motion may come from
a Principle that is at rest, which being shewed, will
shew withall how Matter may come from mind,
since there is no greater Repugnance (even to com
mon sense) in the one, than is in the other, I will
consider the Relation that the Center of a Circle
has unto its Circumference, and how things are in
the one, and how in the other; For this will afford
it much Illustration. In the Center then of a Circle,
or of a moved Sphere, all is at Rest, and out of it
all in motion, but in such proportion, that that por
tion of a Radius which is at a farther distance from
the Center, is more in motion, by reason of that
distance, and that which is nearer ^43] js }ess
Well then, supposing that the Principle of En
ergy and Motion is in the Center of the Orb of
Being, (and we may well suppose it, since even
Nature has its Sphere of Activity, and Acts as from
a Center to a Circumference; (so Seeds Act, so
Light Acts and Diffuses it self;) it is certain that
motion must come from something not in Motion,
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 12^
but at Rest ; for so that is, which is in the Center :
and indeed, else there must be infinite progression
in Motions. Again, since in the Orb of being, Pure
Mind is in the Center, t146! and matter in the utmost
Circumference, it follows, that the nearer things
are unto pure mind, and the more they do partici
pate of that, the more they have of Rest, and the less
of motion; but the farther off they are from pure
Mind, and the nearer to matter, the more in motion
they are. And indeed, all Energy in matter is Local
Motion. Thus all the Effects of Mechanism, as they
are purely material, so they are performed only by
Local Motion ; but the business of Cogitation, even
in the lowest step of it, which is sensation, as it is
of nearer Relation unto mind than to matter, so it is
performed rather by way of mutation, than of Local
motion; the Eye is not sensible of any motion im
parted to it, nor is the Ear, or the Nose, or any other
of our Sensories, and yet each is sensible of a muta
tion made therein, (or rather in the Faculty) which
comes from motion. But tho' the more refined any
Beings are, and the nearer that they are to the Cen
tral Mind, the more at rest they be, and the less in
motion in their several Actions; and consequently
Abstract Spirits that do not live in gross Elementary
Bodies, are more at rest, and have less of motion, in
the exercises of their several Powers, than Men
have, who are imbodied in Elementary Vehif147]cies .
yet no Spirit whatsoever but only God himself, who
only is Pure Mind, is so wholly, so Absolutely at
Rest, as that it sees all Things at once, by one Entire
124 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
view and Intuition; all Principles and all Conclu
sions in them ; all Ends and all Means and Motives
to them ; without the least degree of Succession, or
any Addition. Only the Central Being sees so, and
he doe's.
For seeing all the Circumference is in the Cen
ter, so that all the Lines however divided they be in
the former, do meet together in the latter ; it is plain,
that an Eye placed in the Center, must needs see
all in the Circle, as clearly as any thing in it; and
this too with one Individual, single Intuition, with
out Succession, or, Addition ; seeing there is nothing
of Motion, but all is Rest in the Center. And this
properly is to see in Eternity. Thus God sees. But
all other Beings beside God, as they are not God, or
Pure mind, so they are not in the Center, and not
being the Center, but at Distance from it, some at
Greater, some at Lesser, but All at some, they All
have something of Motion, and consequently cannot
Act, or See, in the same manner as Central Pure
Mind, by way of Absolute Rest, without Succession,
or Addition, H48] anci without Distinction of past,
present, and to come : For tho' all the Lines do meet
in the Center, yet there being no place without it in
which they do so, Creatures cannot see as God sees,
no more than they can be in the Center as God is.
It is too short and Inadequate a way of Arguing
to Infer that any Creatures can see All things at
once, but from the notions (confused enough) that
we Mortals have of Time and Eternity \ as that Time
is Successive, Eternity a Permanent Duration; to-
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 125
gather with a Conceit, that all Spirits (they being
things Abstract and Separate from Bodies,) both
Are, and Act, in Eternity, as all Imbodied Beings
Are, and do Act, in Time. Certainly every Being
but God, is in Time, tho' not in the same Kind of
Time ; for as God only is in the Center, so he only is
Absolutely in Eternity. And if Time is taken for all
Duration that is not Eternity, God only is without
Time, and so without Succession of Actions. But
to Return,
SECT. III.
Of Mind as it Actuates a certain Particular Body;
Mind in this Notion called a Soul. Body is a
System of Organs. Soul and Body an Animal.
Body Considered two ways. To ivit, in Ref
erence to External Objects, and in Reference
to the Internal Principal that Acts it. In the
First Consideration of Body, the Ends and uses
of Organs are shewed, and withal the Reason
of their variety. This illustrated by several
Instances and Observations. The use of Body
in Relation to the Internal Principle that Actu
ates it, is to Individuate and Singularize that
Principle. This set out in sensible and plain
Resemblances. A Comparison betiveen Vital
and Locomotive Energy; ivith a Recapitulation
of the whole Discourse, as it unfolds the Mys
tery of Animals.
126 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
We have Considered Mind in the first Step of
Relation that it carries unto Matter, Namely, as it
doe's Actuate a most subtle Matter diffused through
out the Universe, in which Notion is called Spirit
simply, as was showed from Malachy, Ch. 2. v. 15.
Come we now to Consider f15°] it in the next place.
as it Actuates some Particular System of Matter,
in a Particular Manner; and so it is called a Soul;
and that Particular System of Matter, which it
doth Actuate, is a Body, or a Particular Vehicle;
and the Result of both an Animal. An Animal is
nothing but Soul and Body together; or a Body
Actuated by a Soul. A Body is a System of Organs ;
an Organ is Matter framed and Contrived after a
Particular Manner for some Animal Use, and End ;
some Use, End, or Action of a Soul: A Soul is a
certain Determinate Vital Energy ; or a certain Por
tion of the Spirit of the Universe, Vested in a Body,
or particular Vehicle; in which Notion all Souls
are Spirits; as indeed they are stiled in the Holy
Scripture, wherein we Read of the Spirit of the
Beast, tho' it goes Downward, as well as of the
Spirit of a Man that goes Upward.
We will first Consider a Body in the Relation
that it has unto External Objects, and here we must
set out the Nature, that is, the Ends and Uses of the
Organs which compose a Body, as also the Reason
of the Variety, and number of those Organs; why
any Organs at all, and why many: both which
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 12,7
be done with one Performance. An Organ properly,
is Matter Particularly Textured, and Framed for
some Particular use : And an Animal Organ is Par
ticularly Textured, and Framed for an Animal use:
I will give the Example in only Sensitive Animals,
and in the Acts of Sensation, as being best under
stood; but what is said of Sensation, and of the
Organs of it, will, by Proportion, hold in all the
other Actions of Animals, and in all other Organs,
with a due Alteration. f152^
In all Acts of Sensation there is first an Affection
of the Organ, and then a Perception of that Affec
tion by the Soul; or rather, a Perception Excited
in the Soul by means of that Affection; and this is
the End of the Organ,, and the only Use of it, that
the Soul makes, to wit, to come by means thereof
unto a Perception of External Objects; as, to see
their Colours, to hear their Sounds, to Relish the
several Tasts they have, and the like. In short, a
Soul cannot but by means of Organs, take any
notice of External Objects, nor the Organ be a
means of conveying any notice to the Soul, but by
being first Affected it self. Now the Affection of
the Organ arises from a Perception (may I so ex
press it) or a Reception of the Motions Communi
cated to it by Objects; and a Capacity for this Re
ception from the Particular Frame of the Organ.
For since all Matter indifferently is not capable of
receiving all kinds of Motions and Impressions; but
that for some Particular Motions and Impressions
(of which sort are sensible ones) there must be Par-
128 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
ticular Textures and Frames of Matter to Catch
them; it follows, that there must be Organs; and
these too in such Variety and Number : there must
be Organs, to Receive the Impression and Motions
of Objects, which t153! without a Particular Texture
of Matter could not be Received ; and there must be
Variety of Organs, to Correspond these various
Kinds of Motions and Impressions that are in Col
cured, in Sonorous, in Sapid, and in other Species
of Objects.
So much concerning Body in its Relation to Ex
ternal Objects; come I now to consider it in the
Relation which it has to the Soul, (the Internal
Principle that Actuates it, and Acts in, and by it;)
and so, the Great work and Business of the Body is
to Singularize and Individuate the General Vital
Principle of the Universe, that it may become a
Soul, or a Particular Vital Principle of a certain
Particular Body. To understand this it must be
[155] Consider'd, that the Mosaical Spirit (the Rise
and Principle of all Created Cogitation,) as it is
Extended throughout the whole Universe; so, to
become in Particular a Soul, of any Particular Ani
mal, it must be Singularized, and Individuated, that
is, it must be Apportioned (as it were) to that
Particular Animal, which it comes to be by means
of the Body. To Illustrate this, it must be Remem-
bred. that a Voice or Sound Diffused throughout the
whole capacity of the Medium (as the Mosaical
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. I2Q
Spirit is throughout that of the universe) is yet in
the Phonocamptick Center or object (which is noth
ing but a place conveniently Disposed for this Pur
pose,) so Individuated and Singularized (as the
Mosaical Spirit is supposed to be by a Congruous
fit Body,) that Really it has other Affections and
Properties, than those it owns, in all the rest of the
Medium, insomuch that by Vertue of it, this place
instead of being a Medium of Sound, becomes to all
Appearance a Principle of it, and so a Speaker, and
this is called an Echo. It may also be set out in a
Speculum or Looking-Glass, (for a Body is to the
Mosaical Spirit, what a Speculum or Looking-Glass
is to the Image of an Object in the Medium;) A
Speculum Catches the Diffused Image, and so Sin-
gularises it, that f1S6l it becomes a very Different
thing, and puts on other very Different Properties
than those it has in the Medium, for in the Looking-
Glass it doth appear as an Object which it doe's not
out of it. But what doe's set it out most naturally,
is, that it is so in Man ; For the Soul or Cogitative
Principle of a Man, as it is Extended throughout
the whole Capacity of the Body, in like manner as
the Mosaical Spirit is, throughout that of the Uni
verse ; so it is Singularized and Individuated, in, and
by, the particular Organs: insomuch that the Eye
only does See: the Ear only does Hear, and only
the Tongue Tasts. in Vertue thereof; for which
Reason these are owned to have several particular
Faculties, which are as so many several Souls unto
them. Now what the Organs are to the Soul in
I3O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
any Body (that is but a System of Organs,) Bodies
themselves are, unto the Mosaical Spirit, the great
Soul of the Universe, of which all particular Bodies
are Organs. But since this Notion is of so much
Importance, that it will deserve a more particular
Consideration, and I design to give it one in another
Chapter, I shall dismiss it at present, without fur
ther Insisting on it; and now will only add some
Improvement to the former Discourse, by making
a Comparison bef157hween the Vital and the Me
chanical Energy.
First then I lay it down as certain, that there
is such a thing as a Vital, as well as a Mechanical
Energy: by Vital Energy I mean all that is not
meerly Mechanical; and therefore do comprehend
in that Term whatever is properly Mental', by
Mechanical Energy I mean Impulse or Springines,
the nearest Physical Principle of Actual Local Mo
tion. Now we are as sure by our senses, and by
the Reflection that we make upon our selves, and
upon the Notices which we receive from Things
without us, that there is such a thing as a Vital
Energy, as we are that there is a Mechanical:
Because we are as much assured of the Effects of
the one, as we are of those of the other; as much
assured that there is life, Sensation, and Intellection,
that come from a Vital; as we are that there are
Actual Local Motions; Motions of Ascent and De
scent, Motions Direct, and Motions Circular, &c.
which (as Motions) come from Impulse, the Me
chanical Energy.
AN ESSAY UPON REASON.
Again; As it is Certain that Local Motion, or
that Impulse which is the nearest Physical Principle
of it, is not Matter, or Materiate, but yet is in Mat
ter, as United unto it: so by this Consideration we
may f158! become as certain, that Vital Energy and
the Effects of it, though they be Immaterial, yet they
may be in Matter ; since there needs no more of
Hooks and Crooks to make the Latter, than to make
the Former, to stick, and hold together.
In the next place ; As the Mechanical, or Loco
motive Energy is Diffused throughout the World
(for there is nothing in this, that is Entirely at
Rest;) so is the Vital: Since it is certain that wher
ever, and whenever, any Matter becomes Disposed,
the Vital Principle is always at hand to Actuate
that Matter, and Act in it, according as the Dis
positions of it do Invite or Permit: All Putrefac
tion or Digestion any where, determines in Insects,
or little Animals, (as Experience evinces,) the Spir
its being Unfettered and let Loose thereby.
And yet as the Mechanick or Loco-motive Im
pulse is not Received in all Textures of Matter indif
ferently, but that, (as I have showed already) there
must be some certain Modifications of Local Motion,
be certain particular Textures of Matter, so neither
is the Vital Energy Catcht and Received indiffer
ently by all Textures of Matter ; but as all Life con
sists in Motion, or in something Analogous, so for
certain Gradations and Exercises of f159! Life, there
must be certain particular Fabricks and Textures
of Matter, called Organs, and also certain partic-
132 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
ular Dispositions in the Mechanical Spirits (for so
I call the subtle Active Corpuscles in every Con
crete) that are the immediate instruments of the
Vital Principle in all its Actions of Life, in this
Corporeal World.
CHAP. vii.
Animals arc eitJicr Invisible or Visible ; in the Former
sort I reckon Angels, Good and Bad, which are
Ethcrial'. As also the Genii, which are Aerial
Animals. Invisible Animals, why called Spirits.
That they are Spirits Evinced, i. From the gen
eral Tradition of the World. Mr. Hobbs'jr
Evasion of this Argument Considered. 2. From
Operations that cannot be Accounted for but
from such Causes. 3. From Intelligences and
Notifications that cannot be Resolved but upon
this Hypothesis. 4. From Spectra or Appari
tions. Of the way and manner liow Spirits do
Appear, that it is twofold, Real and Visional.
TJiat Good Angels ivhen they do Appear are
called jtvei^KXTa or Spirits; and the Bad cpav-
or Fantoincs.
SKCT. rr. H71]
That there are Spirits, proved by General Tradition.
Mr. Hobb\? Answer to this Argument shewed
AN ESSAY UPON REASON. 133
to be but an Evasion, from the Evangelists
Matthew and Mark, &c.
SUB. i.
Another Argument to Prove Spirits. Of the Con
version of an Indian Raja. A Remarkable
Story of Witchcraft, out of Mr. Gage's Survey.
SUBS. ii.
The Third Argument from Supernatural Adver
tisements. An Instance out of Simocatto. An
other, of a strange Omen out of Sir W. Raw-
leigh. Of the Corps-Candles in Wales, &c.
* ^ -Jf. % •%. -Jf. ;J<
SUBS. in. C2111
The Third Argument from Apparitions. Three
Stories of them from the Junior Pliny, in his
Epistles. A Recent Story of an Apparition.
SECT. in.
The Apparition of Spirits twofold, Real, or Visional;
both ways Explained. A Conceit about the Ap
pearing of Ghosts Rejected. That most Appa
ritions of Spirits are Visional, not Real, Evinced
by several Considerations. Some Phaenomena
134 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BL'RTHOGGE.
of Apparitions Salved. Of the Distribution of
Spirits.
CHAP. VIII.
Another Essay about the Nature of Animals and
Spirits.
SECT. I.
The Subject farther Illustrated, by a Comparison
of the Universe with a particular Animal. The
Universe a whole; Particular Animals but
Members of that whole. A Particular Animal
is as an Organ with its faculty; the Universe.
as a Body composed of several Organs, with a
Soul that endues these Organs with several
Faculties. A Demonstration even to sense, of
a common Principle that penetrates throughout
the Universe. In what sense a Soul is a faculty,
and in what a Principle of Faculties. Two
senses of the word Soul, and how in both, it
may be conceived as a Principle of Faculties.
The Soul in its state of separation becomes a
Spirit properly. Soul is the name of a part, a
Spirit the name of a whole Substance. God the
Central Sun, and Fountain of all Souls and
Spirits. The Emanation of Souls and Spirits
from God, or from his Spirit, set out in the
Comparison of Light and Colours. Not onlv
AN ESSAY UPON REASON.
Philosophers, and Poets, but even many Chris
tian Doctors, and particularly St. Augustin,
compared God in respect of his influence in and
over the Universe, unto the Soul in a Man.
SECT. II.
[252]
Several Objections against the Former Hypothesis
considered, First, that it makes Souls to be
Faculties or Powers, whereas indeed they are
Actions, or Acts. This Objection Answered,
and the notion of the Souls being a Principle
and Faculty, rather than an Action, cleared.
The Second Objection, that in this Hypothesis
the Deity is considered as an Immanent, and
not (what he is] as a Transient cause of all
things, Removed ; and how he is both the one
and the other, shewed, and Confirmed by the
Authority of St. Austin, and other Christian
Fathers; as well as of the Chief est Philosophers.
The Third Objection, that hereby God and Na
ture are Confounded; Answered, by shelving
how God and Nature are Distinguished in this
Hypothesis. The Last and strongest Objec
tion, that if there were but one Original Per
ceptive Principle throughout the Universe, alt
Animals would have the same Perceptions.
136 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
which they have not. This Objection Removed,
and the Reason of Different Perceptions in Dif
ferent Animals cleared.
CHAP. IX.
O/ Substance in tJie Scholastical Consideration of
it. Substance what, that it is First or Second.
Second Substance is called a singular, a supposi
tion, or subsistent. Of the Principle of Indi-
viduation, or that zvhich makes a singular to
be so. Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Individua-
tion of Spirits. Of a Person. The true Idea
of it. Laurentius Valla his notion of a Person,
the unusefulness of it to the salving of the Holy
Trinity shelved. The Trinity a Mystery, and
Doctrine of Faith; not a Point of Philosophy;
and so the Idea of it to be derived only from
Revelation in the Holy Scriptures, and not from
bare Discourses of Reason.
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD.
O F TH E
SOUL
O F T H E
W O R LD;
A N D O F
Particular Souls.
I N
A Letter to Mr. Lock, occafioned by
Mr. Keifs Reflections upon an Eflay late
ly publifhed concerning T^eafott.
*By the Author of that Effay.
Aftnut. F*L in Oflav.
Veritas obvia, fed requirentibus.
Erafmut in Hyperaffift. I. 2.
Verborumumbris territamur, quum in renihil
fit abfurdi.
LONDON,
Printed for Daniel Brown, at the Black Swan
and Bible without Temple-Bar. M.DC.XC.1X.
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD, AND OF
PARTICULAR SOULS.
TO JOHN LOCK, ESQ;
SIR,
It may seem an improper way of making satis
faction for a former Trouble, to give a new one : yet
since you have pardoned the Confidence that made
a Present to you of my Essay concerning Reason,
and that some very sharp Reflections have been pub
lished on a part of that Essay, I hold myself obliged
to send you my Defence of it.
My Intention in this Address is not to ingage
you in the Protection, or to the Countenance of any
Opinion., further than as Reason allows it; nor is it
to insinuate that you are of mine, to gain it the more
Authority : For though I could not procure a greater
Advantage to any Opinion I own, W than to have
others perswaded that you are of it; yet I must do
you the justice to profess that I am wholly ignorant
what yours is, as to the Point in debate.
I only appeal unto you now, as I did at first, as to
an Arbiter or Judg, for which your excellent pene
trating Understanding highly qualifies you, without
142 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGK.
inviting you as a Party to come to my Assistance,
which at this time I hope I shall not need.
Mr. Keil50 in the Introduction to his Examina
tion of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth,51 hath
done me the Honor (tho I am not sure he designed
it for one) to mention me with several very cele
brated Persons ; but he doth it in that manner, and
with that Abatement, that I have no great cause of
being exalted on that regard.
After he had instanced in Spinosa, Dr. More,
and Mr. Hobbs, as Authors of great Discoveries,
which might well demand Esteem and Veneration,
if they were real, he picks out some of their Opin
ions, which he believed the most obnoxious, that by
them his Readers may see how well they deserve
such a Character. He then adds, "But a new Phi
losopher (naming me, who am not ambitious of that
Title) "has much outdone any I have yet mentioned,
"in a Book lately printed concerning Reason ; there
"t5! he assures us that there is but one universal Soul
"in the World, which is omnipresent, and acts upon
"all particular Organised Bodies, and makes them
"produce Actions more or less perfect, in proportion
"to the good Disposition of their Organs. So that in
"Beasts that Soul is the Principle of the sensitive
"and vital Functions; In Men it does not only per-
"form these, but also all other rational Actions:
"just as if you would suppose a Hand of a vast Ex-
"tention, and a prodigious number of Fingers, play-
"ing upon all the Organ-pipes in the World, and
"making every one sound a particular Note, accord-
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 143
"ing to the Disposition and Frame of the Pipe: So
"this universal Soul acting upon all Bodies, makes
"every one produce various Actions, according to
"the different Disposition and Frame of their Or-
"gans. This Opinion he as confidently asserts to be
"true, as other Men believe that it is false ; tho it is
"impossible he should any other way be sure of it
"but by Revelation; and I believe he will find but
"few that will take it upon his word".
Mr. Keil, I hope, will give me leave to tell him
without offence, that the Representation of my
Opinion, had he pleased to make it in my own
Terms, would have been less invidious, and withal
more just f6! than it appears in his. However, since
he hath endeavoured by a Comparison to illustrate,
or else to expose [for I cannot well resolve which
'tis] the Sentiment I own, and that this Comparison
is capable of being- applied unto it to good purpose,
I will my self make use of it my own way.
But first I must give a Plan of my true Notion,
which in short is this; That the Mosaical Spirit
(called Gen. i. v. 2. the Spirit of God) being a Spirit
of Life, and present every where, in all the Parts of
the Universe, is the Original of all the Energy, Mo
tion, and Action therein, especially of that which is
Animal. And that particular Souls [for such T
acknowledge there be] are Portions of that Spirit
acting in the several particular Bodies in which
they are, according to the Capacities, Dispositions,
and Qualities of those Bodies. A Sentiment con
formable to two received Maxims : Quicquid re-
144 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
cipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis. Actus
activorum sunt in patiente disposito.
To make it imaginable, let us suppose a vast
Organ, consisting of innumerable Pipes of different
Sizes and Fabrick, and this Organ to be filled with
Wind blown into it, and the Wind to be received,
and some portion of it appropriated by each particu-
f7Har Pipe: Imagine also innumerable Fingers play
ing upon those several Pipes; For then each par
ticular Pipe being played upon, will, by means of
the Wind, be made to sound a particular Note, dif
fering from the Notes of all the other Pipes, accord
ing as its Qualities, Dispositions, and Fabrick differ.
The World is as such an Organ [an orderly
Aggregate;] and the several Sorts of Bodies that
compose it are as the several Pipes of that Organ;
the Mosaical Spirit present every where through
out the whole World, is as the Wind (which is)
blown into the Organ. This Spirit is received and
apportioned by the several particular Bodies, as the
Wind in an Organ by the several particular Pipes:
and as these inspired with Wind, being played
upon, do sound different Notes or Tunes; so those
animated with their respective Portions of the Mo
saical Spirit, being impressed and acted upon by
Objects, do perform their several vital Functions,
according to their several Dispositions and Fabrick.
Thus far the Comparison plainly holds; but it
may be carried a greater length, and made serve to
illustrate what I say in my Essay concerning the
nature of Animals, of Spirits, and of Souls. For it
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 145
may be £g] added, that as the power of making an
Organ sound at all, or the power of making a par
ticular Pipe to sound a particular Note, arises not
solely from the frame of the Organ, or from that of
the Pipe ; for the Organ sounds not at all, if it be not
inspired with Wind, and tho inspired with Wind,
and consequently tho it gives a Sound, yet it will not
sound to such and such a particular Tune, if it be
not played upon with the Fingers. In like manner,
the Power of making a Body live, or of any partic
ular Instrument of it exercise any particular Action
of Cogitation, as of Seeing, or of Hearing, arises
not solely from the frame of the Body, or from that
of the particular Instrument, the Eye, or the Ear:
for the Body lives not, if it be not animated with
some Portion of the Mosaical Spirit; and if it be
animated, and consequently hath Life, as the in
spired Organ hath Sound, yet it doth not exercise
that Life in this or that particular manner of Cogi
tation, by its several Instruments, as in seeing by the
Eye, or hearing by the Ear, if it be not acted upon,
and impressed by Objects, any more than an Organ
which is only inspired, tho it sound, will sound to
this or that particular Tune, if it be not played upon
with the Fingers. Thus Life originally comes from
t9! the Soul: I say, comes from the Soul; for that,
speaking properly, it is not in the Soul, consider'd
as a Soul, any more than Motion is, which properly
is not in the Soul, but from it. And as Life, so Cogi
tation, which is a Species of Life, proceeds from
the Soul, but the Specification of it from the Body.
146 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGK.
And for the actual exercise of Cogitation in its
several Species, whether of Sensation, or of Intel
lection, it comes originally from the Impressions
and Operations of Objects. For Images and Ideas.
that is to say, the Sentiments of the Sense, and those
of the Mind or Understanding (they) are nothing
but different Modifications of Cogitation; the for
mer, Modifications of Sensation, the latter of Intel
lection; after the same manner as different Notes
or Tunes are but different Modifications, or diverse
Modulations of Sound.
In this Way of conceiving, the Production of 7m-
ages and Ideas is more perspicuous and intelligible,
as well as more connatural, than in that of Mai-
branch ;42 which, methinks, in things of Nature, in
stead of having recourse to natural Causes, doth a
little too unphilosophically, too soon repair unto the
first Cause, which is the Author of Nature. But
(as I said) in the way before set out, the Conception
of it is very easy: 1101 For Images and Ideas being
but the Modifications of Cogitation, they are made
by Impressions, and made different by different Im
pressions of Objects upon the Faculties; as Notes
and Tunes are made by the playing, and different
Notes and Tunes by the different playing of the
Fingers upon the several Pipes of an Organ.
This Comparison of the World animated with
the Spirit of God, to an Organ filled with Wind
blown into it, cannot but be acknowledged to have
much of Resemblance and Agreeableness ; and the
more, if we consider that this Spirit of God is called
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 147
Ruach in Hebrew, a word signifying Wind; and
likewise that Pneumatical or Wind-instruments of
Musick are said (tho but metaphorically) to be ani
mated, as I think they are in Psalm 150. v. last. For
here it is said, Let every thing that hath Neshamah ;
the same Word that is used for the Soul of Man,
Gen. 2. 7. when God is said to breathe into him the
Breath of Life: so here, Let every thing that hath
Neshamah, every thing that is animated with Wind,
let every Wind-instrument (for the Coherence
plainly carries it unto Musical Instruments) Praise
the Lord. And as Neshamah comes from Nasham,
Anhelare, to pant or breath, so likewise Nephesh,
another Wrord in Hebrew for a Soul, de^Mves
from a Root of the like signification, and often
stands for Breath, as well as for a Soul.
Nor was this a particular Sentiment only of the
Jezvs, but both the Greeks and Romans were in the
same : For in Greek the Name for Spirit is Jtvevjia,
and ;rveijna comes from jrveoo to blow ; and i^iTO the
WTord for Soul, derives from ijnjxco to breathe. With
the Romans, the word for Soul is sometimes Anima,
sometimes Animus; words that come from ave^ioc,
which signifies Wind, as in like manner Spiritus
does from Spiro.
When I affirm that [Anima} and Animus are
often used promiscously in Latin Authors, I have
good Authority to support it, since Cotta in Cicero
\. 3. de nat. Deor. saying, Qul magis quam praeter
Animam, unde Animantium quoque constet Animus,
ex quo Anima dicitur" intimates the same: for
148 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
there he calls the vital Principle of inferior Animals
Animus, and in effect says, both that it consists of
Anima or Breath (which is inspired Air or Wind)
and that for this reason the Breath is called Anima,
because it is to inferior Animals what the Animus is
to Man; {Animus ex quo Anima dicitur.] Anima
it is Animus with a little distinction ; Anima is the
Animus or Soul of Brutes, and Animus is the Anima
or Soul of Men ; t12l as in the Holy Scripture, where
St. Paul speaks of Body, Soul, and Spirit, what he
means by Soul may be expressed by Anima, what he
intends by Spirit by the word Animus', the former
word importing the sensitive Principle, which is
common to Beasts, the latter the rational or intel
lectual which is proper to Men.
To clear this Passage further, which I have
quoted out of Cicero, and the sense I have given to
it, we ought to consider that the Stoicks held an
opinion that all Souls were Fire; and Balbus (who
was one of them) taking it for granted, is told by
Cotta that he was too forward in assuming so much ;
for, says he, 'tis the probable Opinion that the vital
Principle or Soul is not Breath only as most think,
or Fire only as Stoicks think, but a Complex or
Result of both; probabilius videtur, tale quiddam
esse Animum, ut sit ex ignc atque anima tempe-
ratum."
It is true Julius Scaliger91 in his loyth Exercita-
tion against Cardan,69 is extream severe upon that
wonderfully knowing and learned Man for saying
but by implication, that other Souls besides the hu-
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 149
man were called Animi. For Cardan having said.
Animi vires praecipue humani, &c. Scaliger replies
upon him, Quasi verb alius sit Animus ab hu-tW
mano. Insinuating thereby, that to hold that every
(or indeed that any) Soul might be called Animus
is very absurd, as in truth it would be, if what he
says was well grounded, to wit, that all wise Men
did ever understand by Animus a Faculty of the
human Soul, which he says; tho at the same time
he confesses Cicero (who, it seems, for this reason
he thought not very wise) to be in a different
Opinion: Nam tametsi Cicero (says he) Animal ab
Animo dictum scribit, tamen hominis proprium Ani-
mum, id est, Animae vim, sapient es omnes int el-
lex ere.
And to lessen Cicero's Authority in this particu
lar, he impeaches him of Inconstancy, telling us
that at another time, speaking of Apronius, he uses
such Expressions as do evidently so distinguish be
tween Anima and Animus, that no room is left to
imagine but that he took the latter for only a Power
.or Faculty of the former. At (says Scaliger) non
servabit [Cicero] constantiae opinionem invitis doc-
tis viris, ejus enim verb a de Apronio sunt, qui non
modo Animum integrum, sed ne Animam guide m
pur am conservare potuisset, ubi aperte Animae fa-
cult at em innuit Animi appellatione.
But our Hypercritick has not exercised his Tal
ent to advantage in this place: for tho it must be
acknowledged that Animus is f14^ very often used
for a Faculty of the Soul, and not alwavs taken for
I5O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
the Soul it self; yet when Cicero says of Apronius
that he could not conservare animam pur am, he does
not mean by Anima his Soul (of which the Animus,
that he distinguishes from it should be a Faculty)
but he understands his Breath, which was impure,
foul, and stinking. This is evident from the Orator
himself, who in Verrem lib. 3. describing this Apro
nius, says of him, that his Breath was so fetid, that,
as some affirmed, the very Beasts could not endure
its Stink: Ut odor Apronii teterrimus oris & cor-
poris, quern, ut aiunt, ne bestiae quidem ferre pos-
sent.
In truth, nothing more surprizes me on this occa
sion, than to find Scaliger (a very extraordinary
Man, and agreatCritick) so positive in this Opinion,
that none of the Antients who had any Wit, ever
denominated the Souls of inferior Animals Animi,
or even that of Man Animus. For Seneca Epist. 113.
tells it to Lucilius, as the Opinion of the Antients,
that the Animus is an Animal, for that it makes us
Animals; and that Animals receive their name from
ANIMUS: Quaesint (sayshe)quaeAntiquosmove-
rint dicam; Animal constat Animum esse, cum ipse
efficiat ut simus Animalia, & cum ab illo Animalia
nomen hoc traxerint52^]
However (to note it by the by) it must not be
said neither that the Antients never gave the name
\ Anima} to the Soul, or that Anima of old did only
signify the Breath: For tho Anima was us'd to
signify the Breath, it was so but in a secondary
Sense, the Breath being therefore called Anima,
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. I51
because the Anima or Soul was generally under
stood to be contained therein, or to consist thereof.
This is manifest not only from what is said already,
but (to omit others) from a Passage in Seneca 1. de
provid. where As he says, sive haustus ignis cursum
Animae remeantis inter scidit, &c. where [Anima
remeans] signifies Respiration or Breathing: So he
likewise says, Id quod vocatur MORI, quo Anima
discedit a corpore, &c. For here [Anima] is taken
for the Soul. But to put it out of question, that even
the human Soul is called Anima by antient Authors,
I need to cite but Seneca his n/th Epistle; where,
writing of the Immortality of Souls, and saying that
the Consent of Mankind in that Point is a cogent
Argument for the truth thereof, he uses the Word
[Anima] not [Animus] for a Soul; cum de ANI
MA RUM aet emit ate disserimus, says he, non levc
momentum apud nos habet consensus homimim, aut
timentium Inferos, aut Colentium.
I have a fruitful Subject before me, and f16^
could add a great deal more, if I believed it proper ;
but it may suffice at this Time to have shewed that
both Anima and Animus are Names for a Soul, and
that both derive from a Word that signifies Wind
or Breath: for this evinces that the Comparison I
have made between the animated World and an in
spired Organ, is not any remote one, or (as we
usually speak) farfetch'd but very fitting and agree
able.
However, tho this Comparison between the
World and an Organ is well enough imagined, and
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
carries much resemblance ; yet since an Organ is but
a Machin, and only artificial, and that Animals are
Works of Nature, and more than mere Machins,
I chose in my Essay to illustrate and set out my
Notion by Comparisons taken from Nature, as from
Sound and Echo, from Light and Colours ; but more
particularly from our own Souls, and their different
Operations in the several Organs of Human Bodies,
by means of their several Faculties.
In that Treatise I have shewed at large, that
there is a universal vital Principle diffused through
out the World; and withal have shewed how that
Principle comes to be singularized, and individuated,
so as that there be particular Souls. I have also en-
deavour'd to satisfy Objections, and have instanced
in the Theodosian and Scotish t17! Monsters, as
sensible Demonstrations of the truth of what I affirm
in Reference to this Subject.
I have shewed likewise that the Jewish Doctors,
many Philosophers, some Fathers, and several
Schoolmen, were in the same Sentiment as to the
main: for tho perhaps they a.11 agreed not either
each with other, or with me, as to particular expli
cations ; yet all held a vital Principle that doth per
meate the whole World; and that, unto the Uni
verse, is what the Soul of Man is to his Body. And
if common Language does signify a common Senti
ment, this must be owned to be one. For why else
is Man called a Microcosm or little World, but be
cause he is like the Great, and has Soul and Body?
And tho this Expression is appropriated unto Man,
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 153
yet if we believe Galen, the Antients held that every
Animal is a Microcosm, a World in little ; and then
surely, in their Opinion, the World itself is, after a
sort, an Animal in great.
Upon the whole it is evident, that for any to im
agine I exclude particular Souls, because I do affirm
a general (one,) is to do me injury; and in effect,
the same as to infer that I deny there are Colours,
because I affirm there is Light ; or that I deny there
is Echo, because I affirm there is H8] Sound. Tn
sum, he might as fairly conclude that all those deny
the Powers of Seeing, of Hearing, of Feeling, &c.
to be in any Animal, who do affirm that the Animal
has a Soul which is the Principle of those Powers;
for those Powers in divided Bodies would be so
many Souls, that in the same Body are only so many
Faculties of one Soul. This way of Reasoning goes
on the same Ground that Seneca's does, when, in
another case, he says, Epist. 113. Animal sum &
Homo, non tamen duos esse dices: Quare? quia
separati esse debent. Ita dico alter ab altero debet
esse diductus, ut duo sint.
Yet, after all, it has pleased Mr. Keil to make
a sharp Reflection upon me for this Opinion (but
with how much Equity or Candor, our Readers must
determine) and he doth it in these Terms:
"This Opinion he as confidently asserts to be
"true, as other Men believe it is false; though it is
"impossible he should any other way be sure of it
"but by Revelation; and I believe he will find but few
"that will take it upon his Word.
154 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
First he says, / confidently assert, &c. As for
Confidence, I acknowledge that a Confidence like
his in this Reflection, that does only assert but not
prove, cannot merit at19^ny great Commendation:
But otherwise I know no fault in being of any
Opinion or in a confident asserting of it, (which
however I am no way conscious of) if there is rea
son for that Confidence, and that the Opinion be
well grounded.
But this he supposes mine is not; for he says, /
confidently assert, &c. tho it is impossible I should
any other way be sure of it but by Revelation. If
he mean it is impossible I should be absolutely sure
of it but by Revelation, and that for this reason 'tis
a Presumption in me to assert the Opinion, since I
am not assured of it that way, he must excuse me
if I differ from him. For, in the first place, I will
take the liberty to tell him what I believe most others
who consider, would upon occasion, that there are
many Degrees of a just Confidence, that yet do all
fall much beneath Infallibility, or absolute Certainty.
Besides, methinks it should content him, as being
a sufficient ground of asserting any Opinion, even
with Confidence, that there is Reason for the Opin
ion, tho he that asserts it cannot be absolutely sure
of it without a Revelation ; especially since Mr. Keil
himself, I dare say, will not affirm he had a Revela
tion for all he confidently asserts in his Book, of
which yet he cannot be absolutely sure t2°l without
one ; but what there is of Revelation in the Question
between him and me, he may be told hereafter, and
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 155
might have learned somewhat of it from the Essay,
where also he might have seen that there was some
reason for the Opinion.
And whereas he says, that I as confidently assert
my Opinion to be true as other Men believe that it
is false: If I should yield him so much, what would
follow but this, That if this be all, 'tis only Confi
dence on either side ; I confidently assert it to be true,
other men as confidently believe that it is false?
And when equal Confidence and nothing else is in
both the Scales, what shall turn them? But cer
tainly, tho other Men (if but other Men) believe
an Opinion to be false, that any one affirms to be
true, it will not necessarily follow that 'tis false in
deed ; for if it should, Mr. Keil himself, who writes
in opposition to other Men (and those very worthy
Men) must believe himself in the wrong Box, till
he can convince them, ay, and all the rest of Man
kind that think otherwise than he does ; for till then
other Men will believe that what he says is false.
Indeed, if my Opinion went contrary to common
Sense, and that all other Men, or but all considerate,
wise, and thinking t21! Men were in another belief,
I should be very apt to suspect I was imposed upon
by false Appearances; but there is nothing of this
in the matter, as will be manifest presently.
Mr. Keil closes up his Censure (for all he says
against me is Censure only, not Argument) with
telling his Readers his Belief, which is, that I will
find but few that will take the Opinion upon my
word. In truth it is not my desire, as it is not
156 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
reason any should; nor as it falls out, is there any
need they should: for if a Revelation in the Holy
Scriptures, if the Authority of some of the most
thinking and sagacious Philosophers, and if Reasons
taken from the Phaenomena of Nature, can put any
Sentiment beyond the Misfortune of being precari
ous, mine is safe enough from that Imputation.
As for Revelation, what Interest it hath in this
Opinion, I have shewed in my Essay from Genesis
Ch. I. v. 2. compared with Psalm 147. v. 15, 16, &c.
which I will not repeat, only I will add that I think
it abundantly confirmed by an Evidence I find in the
Book intituled, The Wisdom of Solomon, where it
is said, Ch. I. v. 7. The Spirit of the Lord filleth all
the World; and the same that maintaineth all things
hath Knowledge of the Voice, t22!
This Spirit, as it hath in the Holy Scriptures the
Denomination of the Spirit of God, because it comes
from him, and is his hand in all his Influences upon
the World; so it hath that of the Spirit [or Soul]
of the Creatures, whether these be Plants, Sensi
tives, or Men, as being that vital Principle that acts
and actuates them all. Thus in Psal. 104. v. 29.
that which is called the Breath of the Creatures, or
the immediate Principle that makes them live, and
is their Soul, upon whose Departure they are said
to die, and to return to their Dust, is, in the 30^/1
verse of the same Psalm, called the Spirit of the
Lord, which being sent into them, makes them live :
Thou scndest forth thy Spirit, and they live; and
thou renewest the face of the Earth.
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 157
This is particularly affirmed as to Man by Elihu.
Job 33. 4. The Spirit of God hath made me, and
the Breath of the Almighty hath given me Life:
By Job himself, Chap. 27. v. 3. All the while my
Breath is in me, and the Spirit of God is in my
Nostrils: And by Elihu again more comprehen
sively, Job. Chap. 34. v. 14, 15. // he set his Heart
upon Man [to take notice of him, and remark his
Iniquities] and [consequently] gather unto himself
his Spirit and his Breath; all Flesh shall perish
together, and Man shall t23J turn again unto Dust.
Plainly intimating that the Spirit of God (as if
it were a common Soul) is the Original Principle
of Life and vital Operation in Man, as well as in
all things else that have life. See Isa. 42. 5.
The Prophetical Scheme in Ezekiel, Ch. 37.
concerning the dry Bones, is very pertinent, and full
to the same purpose. For when the dry Bones are
to be made to live, God is introduced saying to them,
v. 5. Behold, I will cause Breath to enter into you,
and you shall live. And he effects it by the same
steps, and in the same manner as he created Man
at first. For first he organized Bodies, v. 7, 8,
The Bones came together, Bone to his Bone, the
Sinews and the Flesh came upon them, and the
Skin covered them above. But tho the Bodies were
organized, yet being not inspir'd, [for there was
no Breath in them] they were not made to live as
yet ; and therefore to make them living Bodies, and
put Soul into them, the Prophet had a Commission
to the MUNDANE SPIRIT to come and animate
158 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
them, v. 9, 10. Then said he unto me. Prophesy
unto the Wind, prophesy. Son of Man, and say to
the Wind, Thus saith the Lord God, Come from the
four Winds, O Breath, and breathe upon these slain,
that they may live: So I propheW\sied, as he com
manded me, and the Breath came into them, and
they lived. Where it may be observed, that the
Spirit that quickneth and giveth Life to those Bodies
is compared to inspired Wind or Breath ; that this
Spirit of Life or quickening Breath is diffused
throughout the Universe in all the Quarters thereof ;
and that it is intirely at the Command and Beck of
God: For it is Breath is called upon to come and
quicken those Bodies; and it is called upon to come
and quicken them from the four Winds; and it is
no sooner called upon, but it comes forthwith, and
quickens them.
It may also be observed that the Breath or com
mon Spirit of Life, that blew upon those Bodies, as
it came upon them all, so it was apportioned by each ;
for the Breath must be in them: And where the
Breath is in all, each hath his Portion of it in par
ticular, and then may say as Job, Chap. 27. v. 3. All
the while my Breath is in me, and the Spirit of God
is in my Nostrils, &c. So long his Breath is in him,
as the Spirit of God is in his Nostrils.
Thus every Man hath his own Soul, but this
Soul is only a Portion of the Spirit of God that, as
a Soul, does permeate the Universe; so that it is (as
in Pythagoras's Expression, which I find in Lucre
tius} f25! 'Ajioojiaana 'AifteQog, a Spark of Ether;
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 159
or as others choose to express it, particula Aurae
Divinae: which, according to the grounds that I
have laid in my Essay, I would render a Portion
of Mind in Matter. So much for my Opinion from
the Authority of Revelation.
As for that of Philosophy, I produced in my
Essay as Vouchers of my Hypothesis, not only the
great Philosopher last named, who was Founder of
the Italick Sect, but also Zeno, Seneca, Plutarch,
Marcus Antoninus, and Apuleius. To all which,
from as many as would fill a Volume, I will add a
few more.
Thales the Father of the lonick Sect, held (as
Laertius tells us)63 that Water was the Principle of
all things, and that the World was animated [eji-
ijruxov] In which Doctrines (as is very probable)
he was instructed by the Mosaick Tradition [of the
Waters, and the Spirit that moved upon them] for
unto this his Dogmata are very conformable.
There are in Plato so many Testimonies of a
mundane Soul, and his Opinion is so generally
known, that it were to overdo to instance Partic
ulars.
I have mentioned Zeno Citticus in my Essay:3*
but seeing he was Founder of the 1261 Stoick Sect,
and that I find in Laertius, who wrote his Life, a ful
ler State of his Opinion, and in more particulars con
sonant to mine than what I have mentioned already,
I will produce him again. He then, as Laertius tells
us, asserted a Mind that permeated every Portion
of the WTorld, after the same manner that the Soul
l6o PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
in us doth permeate the Body, eig cbav atJtov [xoa-
|j,ou] (ispog Sirjxovtog, xaMjteg eqp' v\itiv Tf]g ilruxfjg.
But through some more, through others less cxAl'
r\br\ 81' cov [lev jxaAAov, 81' cov 8e rjrcov.] For instance
some, he says, it pervaded only as a Habit [(be; e|tc~j
as through the Bones and Nerves; but through
others as a Mind [cog Nous], as through the under
standing or rational part : [cog 8icx toij f|y8|iovixoij ] .
This Sentiment of a Divine Virtue that pervaded
the whole Universe, was in antient time so generally
received, that even the Tyrant Phalaris, in an
Epistle Consolatory written by him to the Children
of Stesichorus (if indeed he was the Author of those
Epistles passing in his name)54 mentions it as such
an one; f| yap cxftdvatoc TOV @eoi) Molga, says he,
JiQog TO Ildv ovacx, ourrr| &c. which his honoured and
very learned Translator renders thus: Immortalis
quippeDei vis, quae per universum diffunditur, mihi
nihil f27! nisi hacc ipsa harmonia I'idetur. He is
also understood by that excellent Person in his An
notations, to mean the mundane Soul of the Pytha
goreans, when in his 104. Epistle, \vhich is to the
Inhabitants of Cat ana, he says, ei ye fteiag tvyr\q,
coa;t8Q TCX AoiJia tfjg cpuaecog atoixeia, &c. Si cnim
Dwinae fortis, quemadmodum caetera naturae ele
ment a, &c.
And even Aristotle, tho a great Opposer of the
Platonick Soul (yet) being prevailed upon by irre
sistible Experience (he) in a Paragraph quoted out
of him by Julius Scaliger,61 in his 26th Exercitation
against Car dan f' comes somewhat near to my Opin-
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. l6l
ion: For there he affirms, yivetat 8e ev TTJ yfj
vyQco, xal td ^caa xatd cpvrd, 8id TO ev yfj
vygov, ev 8e vSatt Jtvei3|ia, EV 8e TCO jidvrt
\jnjX ixA,T]v, cog TQOJIOV tiva JICXVTGC ^vx^l
That both Animals and Plants arc produced in the
Earth and in the Waters, for that there is, as in the
Earth Moisture, so in the Water Spirit, and through
out the Universe an animating [inznfick] Heat; in
somuch that after a sort fit is true that] all things
are full of Soul. f28^
To those Philosophers I will add the well-known
Testimony of a philosophical Poet, Virgil A En. 6.
Principio coelum, ac terras, camposq; liquentes,
Lucentemq; globum lunae, Titaniaq; astro,
Spiritus intus alit, totamq; infusa per Artus
Mens agitat rnolem, & magno se corpore miscet.
Rendered by Eugenius Philalethes35 thus:
The Heavens, the Earth, and all the liquid Main.
The Moon's bright Globe, and Stars Titanian,
A Spirit within maintains, and their whole Mass
A Mind, which through each Part infus'd doth pass,
Fashions and works, and wholly doth transpierce
All this great Body of the Universe.
I begin to be fatigued with the unpleasant
Drudgery of quoting and transcribing; and there
fore wholly omitting modern Testimonies, I will
add but one more of the antient, and that shall be
1 62 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
from Cicero, who /. 2. de natur. Deor. introduces
Balbus def29hnonstrating that all things in the
World are subject to a sentient perceptive nature,
and are administered and governed by it. This he
evidences by shewing, that particular works of Na
ture have infinitely more of the Beauties of Art and
Contrivance than the most noble Productions of
Human Skill, and yet that no particular Operation
of Nature, for example, the Production of a Vine,
of a Tree, or of that of the Body of any Animal,
can shew as to Conformation, Order, and Situation
of Parts, or as to Adjustment and Fitness of them
for ends and uses, that wonderful Sagacity, that
Subtilty of Invention, or that wise Contrivance that
shines with great brightness in the general frame
of the World; whence he confidently, but justly in
fers that the whole World is under the Conduct and
wise Administration of a sentient and perceptive
Nature, or else that nothing at all is so. Aut igitur,
says he, nihil est quod a sentiente Natura regatur,
aut mundum regi confitendum est.
This last Testimony, as it is an Evidence, so it is
also an internal Argument; and being taken from
the Phaenomena of Nature, reminds me of what T
undertook to do in the third place, which was to
shew that my Opinion had Reasons for it in Nature,
and [30] grounded upon things themselves: And
these I will now produce.
The First is taken from the Uniformity even in
Difrormity, the mutual Relation and the Harmony
of Parts that is in the World in its general Fabrick,
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 163
if it may be allowed to make a judgment of the
whole Frame by that of a particular System, which
we our selves belong unto : But I will not now insist
any longer on this Argument, because it is set out
at large in my Essay in many Instances, and the
learned Reader will find more in Nemesius de nat.
Humana.
Again, this Hypothesis accounts for another
Phaenomenon that cannot be so well accounted for
any other way, that whenever any Matter becomes
disposed for Animal Life, this is presently afforded
to it; which how it should come to pass, is easily
conceived, on supposal of a mundane Soul, or a
Principle of vital Energy diffused every where ; but
otherwise one must imagine particular Souls, and
those too to be Spirits (that are) always every
where in waiting for an Office, which is hard to be
admitted. I say [and those too to be Spirits] for
that 'tis certain that mere corporeal Souls (as some
call them) suffice not for Animal Operations, even
tho we should conceive I311 them (as those do) to
consist of Flame for vital Actions, and of Light for
the sensitive ones: for if Matter be not radically
vital, and so there be no need at all of Spirit or
Mind, and then there is no such thing, it will be ab
solutely unconceivable how Flame and Light (which
are only Matter under greater comminution of its
parts of a particular Texture, and in rapid Motion)
can of themselves be vital and perceptive, or make
other things become so. But to return.
Mr. Lewenhoec's™ Experiment of pepper'd Wa-
164 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
ter, every Drop whereof affords (as he says) so
many Thousands of Animalcules,57 is a sensible
Demonstration of an omnipresent vital Principle
that acts as occasion is; and a sensible Demonstra
tion too of spontaneous equivocal Generations: for
so I call the Productions of Animals that do not
come from Seeds in the common Acceptation of this
word. I acknowledg it almost a Scandal but to
name equivocal Productions at this time, they are
now so generally disbelieved and exploded; but for
my part, I am not ashamed to confess that as yet
I have not observed so much said by the excellent
Redi,™ or by any other Author against the Reality
of them, as to oblige me to depart from a Sentiment
that 1321 hath been the common Belief of most In
quirers into Nature, in all Ages before this last.
And the Hypothesis of a mundane Soul will make
Productions of that kind conceivable ; without which
indeed it will be hard to apprehend how they can be.
Dr. Cox, in a Process of extracting volatile Salt
and Spirit out of Vegetables, which is described in
the Philosophical Transactions, intimates this Ob
servation; That many of the Herbs putrefied and
fermented after his way, did swarm with Maggots,
especially at the Bottom, and in the Middle, where
(he tells us) Flies and other Insects could have no
access to deposite their Eggs,59 and where the Heat
is so violent that they could not possibly subsist.
Some years after that learned Person, I find an
other, the experienced Juncken, in Processes of
much a like nature, making the like Observation,
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 165
that in the Putrefaction and Fermentation of the
Vegetables, great numbers of Insects and little Ani
mals were generated, tho (as he says) the Vessels
were never so close stopp'd: And indeed it is com
monly observ'd that Putrefactions do terminate in
Animals of one sort or other, f33!
The Relations of Barnacles, that are said to be
Birds arising out of the putrefied Relicks of ship-
wrack'd Planks,60 which Relations have been con
firmed to me by an Eye-witness of unsuspected
Credit, are further confirmed by the Testimony of
an Eagle-eyed Philosopher, who tells us he hath
seen a Creature of that kind; for so I understand
Julius Scaliger*1 when in his 59 Exercitation against
Cardan02 he says, In Oceano Britannico magis mi-
reris ignotam avem, anatis facie, rostro pendere de
reliquiis putridis naufragiorum, quoad absolvatur,
atque abeat quaesitum sibi pisces, wide alatur: hanc
quoq; vidimus nos.
To the former Story Scaliger in the same Exer
citation adds another, which he calls miraculous;
it is of an Oyster-shell not very great, that was
presented unto Francis, King of France, and con
tained in it a little Bird, almost finished with Pin
ions, Feet, and the Bill, sticking to the Extremities
of the Shell. This Bird he says, some Learned Men
believed a Transformation of the Oyster. His own
words are these, Singularis nunc Miraculi subte.r-
enda historia est, ubi de Aquis agimus. Allata est
Francisco regi opt. max. Concha non admodum
magna, cum aviculd intus pene perfcctd alarum
l66 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
fastigiis, ro^^stro, pedibus, haerente extremis oris
ostraci. Viri docti mutatum in aviculam Ostreum
ipsum cxistimaruni.
My Lord Bacon, in his natural History, Cen
tury $th, Exp. 228. tells us, That if the Spirits be
not merely detained, but protrude a little, and that
Motion be confused and inordinate, there followeth
Putrefaction, which ever dissolveth the consistence
of the Body into much inequality, as in Flesh, rotten
Fruits, shining Wood, &c. and also in the Rust of
Metals; but if that Motion be in a certain order,
there followeth Vivification and Figuration, as both
in living Creatures bred of Putrefaction, and in
living Creatures perfect: But if the Spirits issue
out of the Body, there followeth Desiccation, &c.
In Experiment 339, his Lordship further tells us.
that all Moulds are Inceptions of Putrefaction, as
the Mould of Pyes and Flesh, the Moulds of Or
anges and Lemmons ; which Moulds afterwards turn
into Worms, or more odious Putrefactions, &c.
And methinks the Production of Plants without
Seed affords a very weighty AH3S]gument for the
like Production of Animals. My Lord Bacon" gives
us many Instances of the former in the 6th Century
of his natural History, where he tells us, Experi
ment 563. That it is certain that Earth taken out
of the Foundation of Vaults and Houses, and Bot
toms of Wells, and then put into Pots, will put forth
sundry kinds of Herbs: but some time is required
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. l/
for the Germination; for if it be taken from a
Fathom deep, it will put forth the first year, if much
deeper, not till after a year or two. And in the
565^ Experiment, adds, that the nature of the
Plants growing out of the Earth so taken up, doth
follow the nature of the Mould it self; as, if the
Mould be soft and fine, it putteth forth soft Herbs,
as Grass, Plantane, and the like; if the Earth be
harder and coarser, it putteth forth Herbs more
rough, as Thistles, Furs, &c.
Scaliger,*1 in his 323d Exercitation against Car
dan,™ speaking of the Production of Frogs,84 that
sometimes have been rained in great abundance, of
which there he gives several Instances, tells Cardan,
who affirmed them to be bred of Frogs- Eggs or
Spawn, that they were spontaneous or equivocal, as
being Productions of a genet36! ral Nature, and not
seminal ones; which kind of Animal Productions
he evinceth to be possible the same way that I have,
by shewing that there are the like in Plants: Quid
mult a, says he, nonne quotidiana foetura coelestis
genii, quae natura est potentiam declarant Plantae,
nullis ortae seminiis?
My Lord Bacon assures us for a certain truth,
that Toads have been found in the middle of a Free
stone,95 where it cannot be imagined that an Animal
of that Kind should come and lay her Eggs; and
I have been credibly informed, that very lately a
living Toad was found in the Heart or Middle of
a large Oak when it was felled.
l68 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
The Animation of Horse-hairs66 lying in the
Summer time in Pools, has been observed of many,
some of which I have discoursed concerning it ; and
an understanding Man of my acquaintance assured
me, that more than once he hath made an Experi
ment which very much confirms the truth thereof.
He takes a Hair with the Root, pluck'd from the
Main or Tail of a Mare that is proud, and in a warm
Season puts it into a wooden Dish full of Water,
where letting it lie two or three Days, the Hair in
that space will, for the most part, be f37^ come quick-
ned with a strong Motion, and a Head like that of
a Serpent grow out of its Root.
The infectious Water of the Showers that ac
company the Tornadoes on the African Coast, stand
ing any where, do (as Mr. Terry tells us in his
Relation of a Voyage to East-India} presently bring
forth many little offensive Creatures ; which is like
wise affirmed by Mr. Herbert.
The termination in Human (as well as other
Animal) Bodies,87 of which there are innumerable In
stances in Medical Writers, as in Bartholinus's Cen
turies, in Borellus's, in Tulpius's Observations, &c.
is another weighty Argument for spontaneous Gen
erations; but I will mention only one: A Worm of
an unusual Figure, with Head of a Serpent, found
in the left Ventricle of the Heart of a Gentleman,
whose name was John Pennant. The Relation well
attested, together with the Figure of the Worm,
was in the year 1639. printed at London by one
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 169
George Miller, to which Relation I refer the Reader.
This Phaenomenon of Vermination is a good Evi
dence of SPONTANEOUS GENERATION; and
this, a weighty Confirmation of the Existence of a
mundane Soul, t38!
Another Argument for it may be taken from
the Difficulties that the admittance thereof will re
move, as to the Production of Human Souls ; which
some conceive to come, as they express it, ex tra
duce; not indeed by way of Eduction from the
Power of the Matter, for they acknowledg no such
Power therein, but by propagation. But others
think them immediately created by God, either all at
once, as those do who hold the Doctrine of Prae-
existence, or (as most imagin) on occasion, accord
ing to the exigence of Matter.
As for the first Opinion, that of Traduction, I
find it in Nemesius, lib. de nat. human, cap. 2. where
he tells us, it was the Sentiment of Apollinarius,
that Souls do propagate Souls, as Bodies do Bodies ;
and Julius Scaliger concurs with him, affirming that
Souls may come from Souls, ut lumen de lumine,
that is, that Souls do propagate one another, after
the same manner as Candles light one another.
Poiret believes as the two former, that Souls are
propagated, but extends the business of Propaga
tion somewhat further than they do, and upon other
Grounds. For in his Co^^gitat. rational. I. I. c. 5.
in Annot. he affirms that all things are Prolifick.
and that as Matter produces Matter, and Motion
I/O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
is productive of Motion, so in like manner one Soul
or Spirit may generate and produce another.
But there are many Difficulties in this Opinion,
of all which I will insist on this only; That a Soul,
if it be an immaterial Substance (as most conceive
it to be) is as uncapable of Propagation (otherwise
than by a Metaphor) as it is of Discerption or actual
Division. For even the Propagation of Light is by
Discerption; some Effluvia or Emanations of the
enlightning Candle passing into that which is light-
ned. And for the Propagation of Motion, the way
thereof is so obscure, it cannot afford Light to this
Subject. Only this is certain, that in local Motion
derived from Body to Body, so much of it as is im
parted unto one, departs from the other; which (I
suppose) will not be admitted in the Propagation
of Spirits. And as to the Prolifickness of Matter,
I should think but few will allow thereof, who con
sider, that there is no more of Matter in the World
now than ever was, and that Matter is ingenerable
and incorruptible, being a Subject of C40! all sub
stantial Mutations, but not the Term of any: So
that if the Generation of Souls has no other, or no
better Foundation than this, That Soul is productive
of Soul, as Matter is of Matter, I conclude the belief
thereof will never become general with knowing
Men.
As for Creation of Souls (an Opinion generally
held by Divines, and among our late Philosophers,
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. I/I
particularly embraced by des Cartes} many Ob
jections lie against it ; of which I will touch but one
or two, as sticking most with me.
The first is, that it seems a little unphilosophical
to call in a supernatural Agent for a Business and
Work of Nature, such as is (if any is) the Propa
gation of Kind : My full consent is with Julius Sca-
liger, when he says Nihil quod est in natura praeter
naturam est: Nothing is in Nature that hath not
a Cause in Nature.
Again, it may be further argued, that if human
Souls are immediately created by God, it must be
admitted that those of Beasts are so too, since noth
ing can be clearer, even to Sense, than that Men
and Beasts do propagate their kinds the same way,
f41! whether that way be by Creation, by Traduction.
or by any other whatever. There is in Mankind,
as well as in the kinds of Beasts, a Distinction of
Sexes for the Business of Generation ; a Furniture
and Disposition of Organs for it in both ; and in
both a like Use and Application of Organs. All
Men and Beasts are alike conceived in their respec
tive Wombs, alike nourished and augmented, and
both come out in the same manner: and therefore
there being the same Evidence, it is but reason to
make the same Conclusion for both.
I know this Argument will have but little effect
upon Cartesians, who, against the testimony of
172 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Sense, believing that Beasts are only Machins, with
out any conscious Perception or Knowledg, do not
own them to have Souls as Men have, in the proper
Sense of the Word. But yet it cannot want its due
Weight with all others, who, believing their own,
refuse not Senses unto Beasts; as thinking they
have reason to conclude that Beasts see and hear,
&c. as Men themselves do, because they have Eyes
and Ears, &c. as Men themselves have, and, to
all appearance, make the same use of them upon
occasion, as Men themselves upon the like would
do. And all these will find the same 1421 reason to
infer that Men and Beasts beget their like the same
way, because there are the same Appearances to
make us think they should.
These Appearances are obvious, and they ought
to be considered; nor are they capable (I think) of
being solved, or the other Difficulties, that do lie in
both the ways of Creation and Traduction, capable
of being removed otherwise than on the Hypothesis
I have proposed, by acknowledging a Mundane
Soul, that, according to the Exigence and Disposi
tion of the Matter, is always ready with a Portion
of it self to animate and actuate it; so that there
is no need of any new Creation, of Praeexistence,
or of any Traduction of particular Souls. But to
proceed.
There is another Phaenomenon very obvious, that
is better solved on this Hypothesis of a mundane
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD.
Soul, than it can be on any other ; to wit, that certain
Animals do move and stir, and give other Tokens
of Life and Sensation, tho cut in several pieces,
such as Eels, Snakes, Earthworms, Butterflies, &c.
This in the common way is hard to be conceived,
since it must infer either that there is a Discerption
and actual Divi fusion of Souls, of which, if Souls
be immaterial, they are absolutely uncapable; or
else that vital Effects may remain in being after
that the Soul, which is the next immediate Cause
of those Effects, is departed ; contrary to the Maxim,
Sublata causa, tollitur effectus.
But the Reason of this Phaenomenon, if we sup
pose an universal mundane Soul, will be very plain :
for since the Parts of those divided Animals do retain
for some time the same Qualities and Dispositions
that they had before their Separations, there not be
ing in them, as in those of other Animals, that sudden
Dissolution of the Texture, or of the Spirits ; it fol
lows that they must receive the same Influences
which they had before from the mundane Soul, and
consequently, that for some Time they must con
tinue to live, and in convenient Circumstances would
longer ; for like Reasons as the Parts of Vegetables
do, which, tho separated from their Wholes, yet con
tinue to live in Slips, in Buds, in Grafts, when in
serted into other Wholes. Nor do I see but that the
Parts of Animals might be inoculated, or ingrafted
into Animals, as well as those of Vegetables are into
Vegetables, if the Qualities and Dispositions of Ani-
1/4 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
mal Parts, when separat^ed, could be as well pre
served as those of Vegetables, and a Coalition of
them as well made: a Sentiment that is confirmed
by the Experiment of Taliacotius, and by all the
others that the Chirurgia Curtorum affords.
Thus I have instanced in a few Phaenomena of
Nature, to which I might have added many others
of a higher Quality; but these sufficiently confirm
my Hypothesis, against which I cannot imagine any
Objection of moment, capable of being rais'd, except
this, that it does seem to render the Distinction be
tween human and inferior Souls less conceivable,
and in consequence the Immortality of the former.
But this Objection will soon vanish, if we but
suppose there is a firm and indissolvable Union
between the Spirit of God and its Vehicle in Man,
and that there is not the like Union between it and
its Vehicle in inferior Animals. And this Supposal
is not without ground. For such a firm indissolv
able Union betwixt the Spirit of God and its Vehicle,
must be admitted to be in Angels, if they are (as
they are) immortal ; and then the Ligament or Bond
of that Union, provided it be natural, must consist
in a natural, but a naturally immut45! table, Con-
gruity. Now the System of Spirits, that in Man
is the Vehicle of the mundane Soul, must be owned
to have more Alliance unto that of Angels than the
Vehicles of it in inferior Animals have, if we con
sider the advantage the Human Understanding hath
OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 175
in excellency of Operations, above the Imagination
of Beasts; and also consider that the Souls of Men
are capable of the Divine Image, which those of
Beasts are not: for thence it will evidently follow
that the former have more of a natural congruity
to the Spirit of God, which is the Soul of the World,
than the latter have ; those as to their Vehicles being
of a celestial, but these of a terrestrial and elemen
tary matter. No wonder then if the Spirit of a Man,
when he dies, goes upward, but that of a Beast goes
downward.
Thus Sir, I think I have evinced from the holy
Scriptures, and from several Phaenomena of Na
ture, that there is a Principle of Life diffused
throughout the Universe; and I have likewise
evinced that it was the Sentiment of many great
Philosophers : so that tho I am not very fond of any
Opinion, I hope I may say of this, without Injustice
to Mr. Keil, that what he hath offered in contradic
tion to it, does in no degree impeach its Credit, or
lessen mine for I46! asserting it. However I do
own I am obliged to that ingenious Gentleman for
the occasion he hath given me of further explaining
and confirming my Hypothesis, and thereby too of
professing a second time before the World, that
I am with the greatest Respect, Sir,
Your Devoted Humble Servant
Rich. Burthogge
June 13. 1698
OUTLINE.
OUTLINE OF BURTHOGGE'S PHILOSOPHY.
A. THE DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE.
The Faculties of Knowledge : "Conceptive, Cogitative Faculties"
(Essay, Ch. I, Sect. 1, pp. 3-4; cf. Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, pp. 58-59.
Organum, Sects. 3, 10, 13).
a. Sense, affected directly by the external thing (Org., Sect. 24;
Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 60), furnishes the perceptual element
which is the beginning of knowledge (Org., Sects. 6, 24, 32;
Essay, Ch. I, Sect. 1, pp. 9-10; Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 59) :
"I am apt to think that person who should never have seen,
nor heard, nor tasted, nor smelt, nor felt any thing, would
have his minde as little furnish'd with Idea's or Notions, as
his Memory with Images, and would understand as little as
he had sensed" (Org., Sect. 74*).
b. Reason, stimulated by sense perception (Org., Sect. 24; Essay.
Ch. I, Sect. 1, p. 8), apprehends the "meaning" of the object
through the notion (and in no other way) :
" as the Eye has no Perceivance of things but under
Colours So the Understanding Apprehends not things
but under Certain Notions" (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 57,
cf. Ch. I, Sect. 1, p. 10; Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 62, Sect. 2, p. 68)
ii.
The Object of Knowledge is
a. Complex, made up of
1. The sense factor (Org., Sects. 63, 74s; Essay, Ch. I, Sect. 1.
pp. 9-10; Soul of the World, p. 10).
2. The notional factor (Org., Sects. 6, 8, 63; Essay, Ch. II,
Sect. 1, p. 23; Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 57; Soul of the World,
p. 10).
b. Dependent upon mind : no object apart from the knower.
ISO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
1. The parts of the object known through sense (i.e., the "senti
ments of sense") have no existence apart from the "cogitative
powers" :
"No such thing as Colour but in the Eye, nor as Sound
but in the Ear, These, though they seem in the Objects,
and without the cogitative Powers, yet are no more in them
than the Image that seemeth in the Glass is there indeed"
(Org., Sect. 10; cf. Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, pp. 57-59).
2. The parts known through the notion, i. e., the notions of
things (substance, entity, etc.) and about things (cause,
effect, etc.) exist in the mind only:
a) If it be admitted that "sentiments of sense" hare no
external existence it must be admitted also that notions
have none:
1) Notions are dependent upon "sentiments"; "senti
ments are grounds to notions" (Org., Sect. 24;
Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, 60).
2) Notions are themselves "sentiments," i. e., "Intel
lectual Sentiments"; "Reason... is refined, Subli
mated Sensation" (Essay, Ch. I, Sect. 1, p. 10; Ch.
Ill, Sect. 1, p. 62).
b) If notions give only an inadequate knowledge of things
(as all admit), they cannot exist in things themselves
but only in the mind (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 60).
c. Phenomenal, not real :
"....the immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation .... are
Eniia Cogitationis, All Appearances; which are not property
in the things themselves" (Org., Sect. 10).
" the immediate Objects of cogitation are entia cogita-
tionis, all Phaenomena; Appearances that do no more exist
without our faculties in the things themselves, than the Images
that are seen in water, or behind a glass, do really exist i»
those places where they seem to be" (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1,
p. 60).
The Thing (or Cause of Knowledge).
a. Real, i. e., independent of mind :
"That which is without the thinking of any one upon it
is a real Thing" (Essay, Ch. IV, Sect. 1, p. 78; cf. Sect. 3,
p. 90).
b. yirtvally Unknown : we have only a very inadequate knowledge
of the thing.
OUTLINE. l8l
1 Our senses communicate directly with the external object
(Org., Sect. 24; Essay, Ch. I, Sect. 1, p. 10; Ch. IV [VI],
Sect. 2, p. 138), but do not give even a true copy of it (Org.,
Sect. 9; Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 59; Sect. 2, p. 66).
2. Reason gives us notions of the thing, but these notions are
not like the reality itself :
" few, if any, of the Ideas which we have of things are
properly Pictures ; our Conceptions of things no more re
sembling them.... than our Words do our Conceptions, for
which yet they do stand" (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 56;
cf. pp. 59, 63; Sect. 2, p. 66).
c. Essential to Knowledge : though outside the realm of knowledge
the thing directly impressing the organs of sense is the cause of
sensation :
"....things without us, are the Causes that do excite....
Images and Notions in us" (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 2, p. 73;
cf. p. 70).
B. THE DOCTRINE OF TRUTH.
The Definition of Truth.
a. Negative Statements.
1. Truth cannot be denned as that which corresponds exactly
with its original model, for
a) We have not the original with which to compare the copy
(Org., Sect. 65) :
1) The original is in the mind of God (Org., Sect.
65).
2) We have no "anticipations," no innate notions,
either of God (Org., Sect. 39), or of things (Org.,
Sect. 73) :
a) If we did have innate notions, knowledge
would not be founded, as it is, on impressions
and images of sense (Org., Sect. 74'; cf
Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 62).
ft) Although immediate assent to certain prin
ciples and immediate action under certain
circumstances seem to indicate "innate no
tions," both assent and action are really due
to previous learning (Org., Sect. 742; Essay,
Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, pp. 53-55).
1 82 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
7) "Beings are not to be multiplied without Ne
cessity" : there are no original images in the
eye or ear and there is no reason for suppo
sing original notions in the mind (Org., Sect.
74s; Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 52).
b) Even if we did have "anticipations" or innate notions
they would be "particular" and therefore too narrow a
test of truth which is infinite (Org., Sect. 74s).
2. Truth cannot be defined as that which is "congruous" with
our faculties, for
a) Congruity between object and faculty gives merely
knowledge of the object (Org., Sect. 72).
b) A "falsity" as well as a truth may be congruous with our
faculties (Org., Sects. 7, 63).
b. Positive Definitions.
1. "Truth. .. .is objective Harmony," i.e., that which is con
gruous with itself and which fits in with the whole objective
scheme of things is true (Org., Sect. 75; cf. Sect. 17).
2. That is true which conforms to the "notion" or "form" of
truth which is in the mind, independent of the sensuous per
cept to which it is applied (Org., Sects. 63, 69, 72, 74s).
n.
The Relation of Truth to Knowledge : knowledge of the object as
object precedes knowledge of the object as true, for
a. Knowledge of the object as object follows bare congruity be
tween object and faculty (Org., Sect. 72), while
b. Knowledge of the object as true comes only
1. After the reasoning, i. e., the forming of a judgment, about
the object already known (Org., Sects. 7, 56, 82, 83, 86).
2. After the "form" of truth is perceived in the object already
apprehended or known (Org., Sects. 63, 68, 69, 72, 74").
C. THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE.
NOTE: Burthogge's teaching about substance is inconsistent. He
says not only (1) that substance is a notion of the thing (or.
as he sometimes phrases it, "a thing conceived under a certain
notion" — Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 97), in other words, that
substance is merely the way we think of reality, but also (2)
that substance is the thing itself, the reality about which we
have notions*
OUTLINE. 183
Substance as Notion.
" Substance and Accident ; what are they, but likewise
Modi concipiendi ? . . . .notions, that. . . .are not without grounds,
but yet that have, themselves, no Formal being but only in the
Mind, that frames them; there being no such thing in the
World as a Substance, or an Accident" (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect
1, p. 64; cf. p. 57; Sect. 2, pp. 67, 69; Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 96).
it.
Substance as Thing.
a. Its Nature :
1. In itself unknown : what substance is itself, "stript of all. ...
Accidents, is no wise known" (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 97.
cf. p. 101).
2. Certain facts about it known :
a) That it is subject of accidents :
"All we know of any substance is, that it is the subject
of such and such Accidents" (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1,
p. 97; cf. pp. 99, 101 ; also Ch. Ill, Sect. 2, p. 67).
b) That it is self-subsistent :
" that which is a subject of Accidents [i.e., sub-
stancel, is it self in no subject; that is, it is self-sub
sistent" (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 98; cf. p. 102).
NOTE: Burthogge often implies (Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect.
1, p. 64; Sect. 2, pp. 70, 71), and sometimes posi
tively asserts that the "attributes," (1) of being
subject of .accidents, and (2) of self-subsistence,
are only notions ; and that we can not say whether
substance itself is possessed of these attributes:
"....a substance is nothing but a subject, or a
thing that has other things in it as Accidents ;
whereas in truth, neither Accident, nor Substance
hath any being but only in the mind, and by the
only vertue of cogitation or thought" (Essay,
Ch. Ill, Sect. 1, p. 65; cf. Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 98).
c) That it is real, i. e., independent of mind (Essay, Ch.
V, Sect. 1, p. 97; cf. p. 108).
d) That there are two kinds of substance. (1) Mind and
(2) Matter:
"That which is without the thinking of any one upon
it.... is a real Thing, or a Reality ;... .and such a
thing is matter .... and such a thing also is Mind"
184 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
(Essay, Ch. IV, Sect. 1, p. 78). "Mind. ...is Cogita
tive, thinking substance," "Matter is Extensiye,
spacious, substance" (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 106).
NOTE: There are passages where Burthogge says that
we distinguish two kinds of substance only "no-
tionally," i. e., as phenomena (Essay, Ch. V, Sect.
1, pp. 106, 107). But this teaching is not inconsis
tent with his general teaching about substance as
thing. Burthogge's meaning seems to be that there
are two kinds of substance, in themselves unknown,
but distinguished "notionally," i. e., in our represen
tations of them, as mind and matter (Essay, Ch. IV,
Sect. 1, p. 78; Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 107).
b. Classification and Description of Substance.
1. Principles, "substances that are causes of other things, but are
themselves uncaused" (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, p. 101) :
a) Matter: "Passive substance" (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, pp.
103, 106).
b) Mind: "Active substance" (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, pp.
103, 106) :
1) "Pure Mind", i. e., God (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 2,
pp. 110, 111, 112).
2) Mind in matter:
a) Soul of the World (Essay, Ch. IV [VI],
Sect. 3, pp. 149, 150, 154f).
0) Particular Souls (Essay, Ch. IV [VI], Sect.
3, pp. 149, 150, 154f).
2. Principiates, "substances that are caused" (Essay, Ch. V,
Sect. 1, p. 101) :
a) Matter (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, pp. 103, 106).
b) Mind (Essay, Ch. V, Sect. 1, pp. 103, 106).
NOTES.
The Notes which follow to Burthogge's ORGANUM,
ESSAY UPON REASON and SOUL OF THE WORLD, are histor
ical, bibliographical and philosophical in character. The
pages referred to by the Notes are those of the original
editions (the bracketed numerals of the present edition).
The cases in which a given note elucidates not merely
one but several passages are shown in the Index.
NOTES.
I. NOTES TO "ORGANUM VETUS & NOVUM."
1. (Note to p. 1.) Andrew Trevill to whom the Organunt
is addressed is undoubtedly Burthogge's father-in-law. Tn
Lyson's Magna Britannia, London, 1814, Vol. Ill ("con
taining Cornwall"), p. cxviii, under the head of "Extinct
Families/' appears the following note : "Treville of Ethy or
Tethe in St. Winnow — extinct in the latter part of the seven
teenth century. The coheiresses married Burthog, Savery,
and Arscot." Furthermore, in both the Organum and in the
Taya(9or (1670, dedicated also to Andrew Trevill), Bur-
thogge signs himself "Your most humble Servant and Son."
It is interesting to note that in the year 1651 "Andreus Tre
vill" was "High Sheriff of Cornwall" (cf. Hitchins, History
of Cornwall, Vol. II, p. 685).
2. (Note to pp. 2 et a/.) No criticism of Burthogge's
Causa Dei as a whole could have called forth the Organum
in reply. The Causa Dei is a long-drawn-out attempt to.
show that the everlasting torments to which the wicked are
condemned are not inconsistent with God's goodness. (Cf.
pp. 12-13 for Burthogge's statement of his aim in writing.)
The book is a fair example of Burthogge's theological writ
ings embodying the current views of his day and bearing
little resemblance to his more original philosophical works.
The criticism to which Burthogge refers may have been
l88 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
made upon a short section (pp. 395-407 ),1 more or less inci
dental to the main purpose of the essay, in which Burthogge
discusses the role of reason in conduct. Reason, he says, is
an "intellectual Sense," a "Light within" by which we know
good and evil, just as white and black are "sensible ones,"
by which we recognize things as white or black. (Cf. Bur-
thogge's theory that the "form" of truth is an innate notion
which we apply to objects to determine whether they are
true or false, Organum, Sects. 63, 69, 72, 74.) Reason, un
assisted, does not, however, point out "duty." To know
duty, the good must be recognized as the "will of a Supe
rior." And the principle which shows it to be the "will of
a Superior" is "conscience," which is an instinct.
The fact that the Causa Dei was written in answer to a
still earlier essay, Tayadov, 1670 (cf. letter following "The
Epistle Dedicatory" in Causa Dei), lends further emphasis
to the introductory paragraph of the Organum.
3. (Note to p. 6.) Burthogge can not mean to refer to
the Jewish historian as a chronicler of the persecutions of
the Christians by the Jews. Josephus mentions the Chris
tians but once throughout his writings, and that in a merely
casual manner. (Cf. his so-called "Testimony," Antiquities
of the Jews, Bk. XVIII, Ch. Ill, par. 3, translation by Wil
liam Whiston ; in some of the older translations the chapter
divisions differ, and the "Testimony" appears in Ch. IV,
par. [2].) Burthogge's reference is evidently merely to
Josephus as an historian who "hath left on Record" "what
manner of men" the "zealous" Jews were, zealous not in
persecuting the Christians but in maintaining their own
independence of Roman authority. (Cf. Antiquities and
The Jewish Wars.}
4. (Note to p. 13.) In the original this word is misprinted :
Understanding.
1 All citations are from the first edition, noted in the Bibliography,
pp. 227ff.
NOTES TO "ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM." 189
5. (Note to pp. 13 et a/.) Burthogge uses the terms
"formal" and "objective" in the sense generally accepted in
the seventeenth century. The thing itself was said to exist
"formally," i. e., independent of mind. Cf. Descartes, Medi
tations, III and VI ; cf . also Fleming's "Vocabulary of Phi
losophy" (in Krauth's Vocabulary of the Philosophical
Sciences, New York, 1878) for a brief history of the use
of the term "objective."
6. (Note to pp. 19 et a/.) Jacob Behmen, 1575-1624
(variously spelled Behm, Behme and Behmen by his English
translators in the seventeenth century). For a clear and
sympathetic treatment of the significance of Behmen's teach
ing as an outgrowth of the Reformation and a forecast of
the Quaker movement, cf. R. M. Jones, Spiritual Reformers
in the i6th & i?th Centuries, London, 1914. A complete
bibliography of first editions of the works of Behmen will
be found on p. xii of the Everyman edition of The Signature
of all Things. For a bibliography of English translations
cf. Jones, op. cit., p. 213.
Burthogge rightly characterizes the works of Behmen as
obscure. In the Aurora (1612) Behmen's first and most
widely known work, he frankly admits the unintelligibility
of his writings even to himself, when the dictating "Spirit"
has left him. "....this work," Behmen says (p. 54 of
translation by Sparrow, 1656), "comes not from his [the
author's] Reason, but from the impulse of the Spirit," and
" .... if the Spirit were withdrawn from me, then I could
neither know nor understand my oivn Writings" (p. 73).
7. (Note to pp. 20 et a/.) Robert Fludd, Oxford, B.A.
1596, M.A. 1598. M.D. 1605, is perhaps most widely known
for his connection with the fraternity of the Rosicrucians.
He has been called the "English Rosicrucian." (H. Jen
nings, The Rosicrucians, Their Rites and Mysteries, New
York, 1879, Ch. 38.) He probably got his first knowledge
I9O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
of this fraternity of mystics from his friend Michael Maier
who introduced Rosicrucianism into England. (Cf. A. E.
Waite, The Real History of the Rosicrucians, New York,
1888, Ch. X.)
On two points, at least, the biographers of Robert Fludd
agree, (1) that he was a man of great erudition, but (2)
that his writings are. for the most part, so obscure as to be
quite unintelligible. Granger says of him (Biographical His
tory of England, London, 1775, Vol. II, pp. 3-4) : " a
vein of unintelligible enthusiasm runs through his works."
In Wood's Athenae O.ronienses, London, 1815, Vol. II, pp.
618-19, we read: "... .as he [Fludd] wrote by clouding his
high matter with dark language. . . .so he spoke to his pa
tients, amusing them with I know not what, till by his ele
vated expressions he operated into them a faith-natural,
which consequently contributed to the well working of
physic." And again Chalmers (General Biographical Dic
tionary, London, 1814, Vol. XIV) says of him: "He did not
begin to publish until 1616, but afterwards became a volu
minous writer, being the author of about twenty works,
mostly written in Latin, and as dark and mysterious in their
language, as in their matter" (p. 418). "All the mysterious
and incomprehensible dreams of the Cabbalists and Para-
celsians, he compounded into a new mass of absurdity. . . .
he. . . .describes the whole mystery of production and cor
ruption, of regeneration and resurrection, with such vague
conceptions and obscure language, as leaves the subject in
volved in impenetrable darkness" (p. 419).
For an annotated bibliography of Fludd cf. F. Leigh
Gardner, A Catalogue Raisonne of Works on the Occult
Sciences, Vol. I, "Rosicrucian Books," London, 1903, pp.
23-28. Other bibliographies will be found in (1) Wood.
Athenae Oxonienses, Vol. II, p. 619; (2) Dictionary of
National Biography, Vol. XIX; (3) A. E. Waite, Real
History of the Rosicrucians, New York, 1888, pp. 287-88 ;
(4) H. Jennings, The Rosicrucians, Their Rites and Mys-
NOTES TO "ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM.
teries, New York, 1879, pp. 363-64; (5) Chalmers, General
Biographical Dictionary, London, 1814, Vol. XIV, pp. 418-19.
8.2 (Note to p. 20.) Gnosticism (c. 100-300 A.D.) is a
form of mystical religion grounded in dualism. The Gnos
tics believed themselves to be endowed with a peculiar and
mysterious sort of knowledge hidden from the uninitiated
and imparted to them by special revelation.
Burthogge's knowledge of the "Whims of Basilides, of
Valentinus and the Gnosticks" was probably not first-hand.
Very little of the writings of the early Gnostics has survived
(for an annotated collection of the fragments cf. Hilgen-
feld, Ketsergeschichte des Urchristentums, Leipsic, 1884,
pp. 195-218). And Burthogge's acquaintance with the Gnos
tics was made, more probably, through their contemporary
opponents : Irenseus, Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria
and Tertullian. There were three early systems of Gnos
ticism: (1) the Egyptian, (2) the Asiatic, (3) the Syrian.
And it is generally conceded that although these early sys
tems arose simultaneously with Christianity their ideas were
borrowed from various sources much older, e. g., from Greek
philosophy, from Buddhism, from Parseeism and from Jew
ish-Alexandrine philosophy. It was only later, when Gnos
ticism was declining and could find nothing in the older
philosophies to bridge the gap between spirit and matter,
that it incorporated Christian beliefs in order "to bolster
up a crumbling fabric." Gnosticism began to wane in the
second half of the third century running more and more into
mysticism.
Basilides and Valentinus were both leaders in the early
Egyptian school of Gnostics. Basilides, born in Alexandria,
was the founder of that form of Gnosticism known as the
"Abraxas" religion, based, as all forms of Gnosticism were,
upon a fundamental dualism. For an exposition of the
2 Notes 8 and 21, in part, and Notes 14, 17, 23, 27 and 42, entire,
were written by Professor Calkins.
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
teaching of Basilides cf. Mansel, Gnostic Heresies of the
First and Second Centuries, London, 1875, Ch. X, and for
a shorter statement of his theory of the creation of the world
cf. Kramer, Sources of Gnosticism, Princeton, 1896, pp.
8-10, also Irengeus's summary in C. W. King, The Gnostics
and Their Remains, London, 1864, pp. 34-35. Basilides
died about 133 A. D. He published twenty-four volumes of
"Interpretations upon the Gospels," besides "Odes" and
"Spiritual Songs."
Valentinus, born also at Alexandria, but of Jewish origin.
followed Basilides and elaborated his system of emanation.
Of the two, Valentinus was the more prominent leader of
the Gnostic movement. He was the founder of a great
number of subordinate schools. For a statement of the
system of Valentinus cf. Mansel, op. cit., Chs. XI and XII.
Valentinus died in 158 A. D.
9. (Note to pp. 20 et a/.) The religious sect known as
the "Familists" or "Family of Love" was founded about the
middle of the sixteenth century, by Henry Nicholas (or
Niclaes. fl. 1502-80), and was in existence as late as the
opening of the eighteenth century. The teaching of these
mystics is closely allied to that of their successors the
Quakers. Many of the doctrines generally supposed to have
originated with the Quakers were probably borrowed from
the "Familists." The central idea in the teaching of Nicho
las, called by Henry More "the begodded man of Amster
dam," is that real righteousness is reached not through con
formity to any external law or ceremony, but through the
attainment of a spiritual union with God, a union in which
the man becomes "godded." For an excellent sketch of the
life of Henry Nicholas, "Father of the Familists," cf. the
Dictionary of National Biography. A bibliography of his
works (all written originally in Low German) will be found
there also. For an exposition of the teaching of Nicholas,
with quotations from his writings, cf. R. M. Jones, Studies
NOTES TO "ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM. IQ3
in Mystical Religion, London, 1909, Ch. 18. The names of
the various contemporary opponents and an account of the
charges which they brought against the "Family of Love"
will be found on pp. 442-48 of the same book.
10.3 (Note to p. 20.) The terms "demoniacal" and "com-
plexional" are very common terms for types of enthusiasm,
by which is meant the claim to direct divine guidance. I
give one illustration from Cornelius Agrippa's Occult Phi
losophy which was translated into English in 1651. Agrippa
says, in speaking of "enthusiasm": "Melancholy men, by
reason of their earnestness, do far better conjecture, and
quickly conceive a habit, and most easily receive an impres
sion of the celestials. And he [Aristotle] in his Problems
saith that the Sibyls, and the Bacchides, and Niceratus the
Syracusan and Ammon, were, by their natural melancholy
complexion, prophets and poets. The cause, therefore, of
this madness, if it be anything within the body, is a mel
ancholy humor ; not that which they call black choler, which
is so obstinate and terrible a thing, that the violence of it is
said, by physicians and natural philosophers (besides mad
ness which it doth induce), to draw or entice evil spirits to
seize upon men's bodies" (p. 186).
I have also run across the following passage in Holland's
translation of Plutarch's Morals (1603) : "The Daemons
use to make their Prophets and Prophetesses to be ravished
with an enthusiasm or divine fury."
A great number of writers who followed Paracelsus
used "complexions" for combinations of the so-called four
"humors," the "choleric," "phlegmatic." "sanguine" and
"melancholic." Dreams and revelations of one sort and
another were believed by these writers to be the result very
often of "complexions," or, as we should say to-day, of
emotional conditions. From the time of the Renaissance it
3 Extract from a letter from Prof. R. M. Jones, of Haverford
College, to Miss Calkins.
194 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
was customary either (1) to treat "enthusiasm" as an in
vasion by a good or bad spirit, or (2) to consider it to be
a result of "temperature" or "tincture" or "complexion,"
these being various terms which cover pretty much what
we mean by a psychical or emotional condition of the sub
ject. Abundant illustrations can be found in the writings,
for instance, of the English Platonists, especially in those of
Henry More.
11.4 (Note to p. 21.) It is extremely difficult to be ab
solutely sure about the "upstart sect." There are three sects
to which Burthogge might be referring: the Quakers, the
Behmenists and the Muggletonians. I feel very sure that
he is referring to the Quakers. They were far and away
the most numerous and they had aroused far greater interest
and comment than any other "upstart sect" of the time.
There were probably thirty thousand Quakers in England
at the time this tract was written and they had made very
sweeping claims to the possession of the direction of the
Spirit. The Muggletonians came into notice about 1652
and claimed to have a wholly fresh and new revelation from
God. They were, however, always few in number and are
not nearly as likely to be meant as are the Quakers. I hardly
think Burthogge can be referring to the Behmenists, though
they, too, claimed to have full guidance of the Spirit, and
they were striking examples of "enthusiasm." The "Fam-
ilists" and the "Seekers" had so greatly waned in numbers
and in influence by 1675 that they, I think, are eliminated.
12.5 (Note to p. 21.) Despite the vast amount which has
been written in praise and in disparagement of Paracelsus,
the famous iatrochemist and physician (1493-1541), the
facts definitely known regarding his life are few. He was
4 Extract from a letter from Prof. R. M. Jones to Miss Calkins.
•For this Note the editor is indebted to Dr. Charlotte Fitch
Roberts, late professor of chemistry at Wellesley College.
NOTES TO "ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM.
born at Einsiedeln in Switzerland, led for the most part a
wandering life, though he was settled for about three years
at Basel as city physician and lecturer in the University ;
and he died in Salzburg. His constant attempts at reforms
and innovations brought him many enemies. "That you
other physicians are angry/' Paracelsus writes (in the Pref
ace of Das Buck Paragranum}, "because I write differently
from your books, is something which depends upon your
unreasonableness, not mine. No one cries out who is not
wounded, and no one is wounded who is not vulnerable.
The art of medicine does not cry out against me, for it is
invulnerable and immortal." Though ranked as an al
chemist, his principal work in the development of chemistry
consisted in turning away attention from the attempt to pre
pare gold and silver, and in applying chemistry to medicine,
thus founding the school of iatrochemists. As a physician,
many brilliant cures were attributed to him in his lifetime,
but his claim to recognition now lies not so much in the con
tribution of new discoveries as in the introduction of the em
pirical method in the study and practice of medicine. "All
things," he writes, "are possible to science" (De Natura
Rerum, Huser edition, Basel, 1589-90). He did a real
service to the advancement of science in general by his em
phasis on investigation and on independence in work. This
idea of independence is brought out in the motto which he
adopted for himself, which appears in connection with many
of his portraits: "Alterius non sit qui suus esse potest."
Another favorite saying which recurs in many forms in his
writings is : "Lehren und nicht tun, das ist klein ; lehren und
tun, das ist gross und ganz." Again, he writes: "At the
basis of a good physician is fidelity — not halved nor divided.
For, as little as the truth of God can be divided or limited,
so also is it with fidelity" (Paramirum, Strassburg folio
edition, 1616-18).
A vast number of writings on many and varied subjects
are extant which have been published under the name of
196 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Paracelsus, but in many cases the books were published after
his death and are of doubtful authenticity.
13. (Note to p. 21.) Jean Baptiste van Helmont (1577-
1644). was a Belgian chemist and physician and a disciple
of Paracelsus, although he repudiates some of his master's
teachings. (Cf., e. g., his "Nativity of Tartar in Wine,"
tr. by Charleton in A Ternary of Paradoxes, etc., London,
1650, Sects. 1, 13. 15: and Oriatrike, tr. by Chandler, Lon
don, 1662. Ch. 115, on "The Arcanums or Secrets of Para
celsus.") Helmont was a curious paradox, both mystic and
scientist. He was "a careful observer of nature and an
exact experimenter who in some cases realized that matter
can neither be created nor destroyed," yet at the same time
he resorts to supernatural agencies in solving his physio
logical problems. His works were collected by his son and
published at Amsterdam, in 1668, under the title of Ortus
Medicinae. For the facts of his life cf . Encyclopedia Britan-
nica, llth ed., also the Catholic Encyclopedia. A bibliog
raphy of French and German works on Helmont will be
found in the former. For English translations cf. Charle
ton, op. cit., and Chandler, op. cit.
14. (Note to pp. 24 et a/.) Burthogge's "Light of Na
ture" is only roughly parallel to Descartes's. For Descartes
does not make the contrast between the "Light of Revela
tion" and the "Light of Nature," whereas he distinguishes
the "natural light" — by which he means self-evident truth
(cf. Meditations, III, par. [3]) — from "natural impulse"
which he describes as "only a certain spontaneous impetus
that impels me to believe in a resemblance between ideas
and their objects, not a natural light that affords a knowl
edge of its truth" (ibid., par. [9]). Natural light, not
natural impulse, is described by Descartes as "clear and
distinct perception."
NOTES TO "ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM.
15. (Note to p. 32.) The gods of Epicurus were "un
known" in the sense of being unrevealed. which is apparently
Burthogge's meaning. In a region of perpetual calm and
serenity, in the space between the worlds, they lived in per
fect happiness, aloof from men, and "not concerned, nor
concerning themselves with things below them." These
gods resembled men, but were immortal and of a superior
nature. Like men they feasted and conversed together.
And their bodies were of human form, though of a more
ethereal substance. They required food (of a kind suited
to their bodies), but no sleep.
This conception of the gods was a result of Epicurus's
attempt to prove the absurdity of the two opposing views
— alike intolerable to him — which were current at the time,
(1) the theory of divine interference, and (2) that of Stoic
fatalism. According to his conception of the gods, both
views become impossible. The gods cared nothing for men
and their affairs, and were content to let them guide the
course of nature as well as their own fortunes. For a
statement of the theology of Epicurus cf. Wm. Wallace.
Epicureanism, London, 1880, Ch. IX; E. Zeller, Stoics,
Epicureans and Sceptics, tr. by O. J. Reichel, London,
1892, Ch. XVIII ; and R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean,
New York, 1910, Ch. VII.
16. (Note to p. 33.) It is interesting to note that* the
conception of God as unknown is, in the view of Hobbes.
the natural outcome of a materialistic system (cf. Leviathan,
Pt. I, Chs. XI and XII; Pt. II, Ch. XXXI: Pt. Ill, Ch.
XXXIV). Hobbes conceived of the whole universe as
"corporeal substance." On this materialistic view of the
universe, God (if he exist at all) must be either "corporeal"
or unknown. Unwilling to deny His existence, but un
willing also to make Him merely a part of the material
universe, Hobbes makes God the unknown "cause." To this
unknown God, he teaches, we apply the attributes of cor-
198 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGK.
poreal substance, as well as the "indefinite" attributes:
"good," "just," "holy." (Ci. Leviathan, Pt. II, Ch. XXXI.)
But what He really is in Himself we do not know. The doc
trine of an unknown God is the natural development of
Burthogge's doctrine of knowledge. If our knowledge of
the material world is subjective, that is, if we can know
objects only as they exist in the mind, and never as things
in themselves outside of the mind, how much more true must
it be that we can know God only "as He stands in our
Analogy," and not "as He is in Himself." It is inconceiv
able that our "Notions" which are inadequate for knowl
edge of things, should be adequate for a knowledge of God.
17. (Note to p. 40.) Prof. Arthur O. Lovejoy has
pointed out6 that this is the earliest use of an argument best
known in the form which Kant gave it in his Second An
tinomy. From the opposition between the "common No
tion" of Quantity and "the composition of the Continuum,"
Burthogge argues that quantity is a "Phenomenon" or "Ap
pearance," not a "Reality." For Arthur Collier's use of the
same argument cf. his Clavis Universalis, p. 63 of the Open
Court edition, edited by Ethel Bowman, and also A. O.
Lovejoy in his essay "Kant and the English Platonists" (in
Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William
James, New York, 1908).
18. (Note to p. 43.) For an analysis of Aristotle's logic
and the history of its use cf. Ueberweg, System der Logik,
Bonn, 1857, par. 16 ; Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der
griechisch-romischen Philosophic, Berlin, Vol. II, Pt. II
(1853), Sect. Ill, pp. 148ff; Zeller, Die Philosophie der
Griechen, Leipsic, Vol. II, Pt. II (3d ed., 1879), pp. 67ff;
Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Leipsic, Vol. I
(1855), Sect. IV; Vol. II (1861). Sects. XIII-XIV: Vol.
Ill (1867), Sect. XVII.
9 In a private letter.
NOTES TO "ORGAN UM VETUS ET NOVUM. 199
19. (Note to p. 48.) Burthogge refers here to Cicero's
discussion, in the second book of his Academica (inscribed
Lucullus in the first edition), of the role of sense-perception
in knowledge. The chief characters in the dialogue are
Lucullus and Cicero himself. Cicero, as spokesman of the
Academy, upholds the view that the senses are wholly un
trustworthy, and offers in support of his position the old
illustration of the oar in water and the colors on a pigeon's
neck. Lucullus, on the other hand, while he admits that the
senses can not under all circumstances be trusted, holds that
there is the "very greatest truth in the senses, if they are
in sound and healthy order, and if everything is removed
which could impede or hinder them." Or, as Burthogge
interprets Lucullus, not everything that is perceived through
sense is true, but only that which is clearly and distinctly
perceived.
20. (Note to p. 52.) Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury
(1583-1648) was the author of the first purely metaphysical
treatise written by an Englishman. The De Veritate (pub
lished first in Latin, Paris, 1624, England, 1633, and in
French translation 1639, and criticized by Locke in his
Essay, Bk. I, Ch. Ill, pars. 15-19), is his most important
philosophical work, embodying not only a methodology for
the investigation of truth, but a theory of knowledge and a
scheme of natural religion as well. Truth, according to Lord
Herbert, is the agreement between faculty and object. For
every object in the world there is a corresponding faculty
in the mind. And each faculty reacts only to its own object.
The faculties of the mind, though infinite in number, may
be reduced to four general classes : (1) natural instinct ; (2)
internal sense or conscience, by which good and evil are dis
tinguished ; (3) external sense; (4) reason. Of these four,
"natural instinct" is the most reliable and reason the least
reliable in determining truth. (Cf. Spinoza's theory of truth,
Ethics, Pt. II. According to Spinoza, the true idea is the
2OO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
idea which "agrees with its ideal" or "is adequate." And
of the three types of knowledge, opinion, reason and in
tuition, only the last two are efficacious in determining true
ideas. Prop. XL, Note II— Prop. XLIII.)
For the facts of his life and for an introduction to Lord
Herbert, the gallant English nobleman, soldier and diplo
matist, the reader is referred to his autobiography. In his
own opinion his contributions to literature and philosophy,
his only real claim to fame, were merely incidental to a
career filled with valiant deeds and hairbreadth escapes.
Bibliographies of his historical and philosophical works will
be found in the Encyclopedia Britannica, llth ed., and in
the Dictionary of National Biography.
21. (Note to p. 55.) Burthogge here, of course, refers
to the theory, then current, of innate ideas — the theory so
sharply criticized twelve years later by Locke. (Cf. Essay,
Bk. I; also p. xxiii of this book.) It is interesting to note
that Burthogge, though he implies that the doctrine of innate
ideas arose from a conviction that we have certain universal
concepts which we could not have got through the senses,
had another account also, of their origin. The theory of
innate ideas, he suggests, was the invention of those who,
while admitting the fallibility of the senses, were yet un
willing to deny the possibility of knowledge. Innate ideas
were thus hit upon as the deus ex machina, to be relied
upon to lend assistance to knowledge on all occasions where
the senses proved incompetent.
22. (Note to p. 55.) Modern scholars have decided that
the author of the Celestial Hierarchy is not Dionysius the
convert of Paul, but a pseudo-Dionysius writing in the
fourth or fifth century. (For arguments against this view
cf. Parker, The Celestial and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of
Dionysius, the Areopagite, London, 1894, Introduction.) The
works of the pseudo-Areopagite (four in all: Celestial Hier-
NOTES TO "ORGANUM VETUS ET NOVUM." 2OI
archy, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Divine Xames and Mystic
Theology) were probably not known in the East until 533
A. D., and in the West they were not known, to any extent,
until the ninth century when Erigena made a Latin trans
lation of them. Borrowing from Judaism, from Christian
ity and from Oriental philosophy, but chiefly from neo-
Platonic philosophy, Dionysius combined his material into
a system which had an enormous influence not only on the
philosophy but on the art and literature of the Middle Ages
as well. In poetry his influence is seen in Dante, in Spenser
and in Milton ; in philosophy, in the works of Albertus
Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, so faithfully did
Aquinas reproduce the Dionysian conceptions that it has been
said that if the writings of Dionysius had been lost "they
could be almost reconstructed from the works of Aquinas."
A good summary of Dionysius's conception of the threefold
hierarchy of celestial beings through whom man rises to a
mystic experience of God, and a statement of the place of
Dionysius in the history of medieval thought, will be found
in R. M. Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, London, 1909,
Ch. VI. Cf. H. O. Taylor, Classical Heritage of the Middle
Ages, New York, 1911. For an English translation of the
Celestial Hierarchy and the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy cf.
Parker, op. cit.
23. (Note to p. 57.) Evidently Burthogge here refers
to Locke; and Locke (Essay, Bk. II, Ch. XXVII) defines
an animal as a "living organized body" (loc. cit., par. 8) ;
teaches that "the same successive body must, as well as the
same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man"
(ibid.) ; and, finally, contrasts both spirit (or soul) and
man with person (or self) which he conceives as "a think
ing intelligent being, that. .. .can consider itself as itself"
(ibid., par. 9).
24. (Note to p. 62.) Claudius Galen (130-200 A. D.),
the greatest of the ancient medical writers, was born at
2O2 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Pergamus, in Mysia. At the age of sixteen he began to
study medicine and later studied at Smyrna under the anato
mist and physician Pelops. About 160 he went to Rome
where he gained great reputation for his learning and suc
cess in the medical profession. During the years of a later
visit to Rome, at the invitation of the emperor Marcus
Aurelius, Galen greatly extended his already wide reputa
tion as a physician and wrote at this time most of his im
portant works. He is said to have written nearly five
hundred treatises on various subjects, including not only
medicine, but logic, ethics and grammar as well. Of the
original works on logic, only one remains: the treatise on
"Fallacies in dictione." Many points of logical theory are
discussed, however, in his medical and scientific writings.
A brief statement of the logical theories of Galen will be
found in Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, Vol. I, pp. 559-77.
Down to the seventeenth century the Arabian physicians,
and the European through the Arabian, borrowed largely
from Galen. And most of the descriptive terms in physiol
ogy, pathology and anatomy, now in use, were employed by
Galen in the sense in which they are now employed by mod
ern authors. Burthogge's reference is evidently to Galen's
seventeen books De Usu Part him Corporis Humani (cf.
Opera Omnia, ed. by D. Carolus Gottlob Kiihn, Leipsic.
Vols. ITI-IV, 1822). For a bibliography of the various
translations and editions of Galen's works and critical works
about them cf. Encyclopedia Britannica.
25. (Note to p. 64.) In the original this word is mis
printed: enqure.
II. NOTES TO "ESSAY UPON REASON."
26. (Note to p. 6.) The quotation is from the passage
(De Natura Deorum, I, 29, 80) on facial distinctions among
the gods: "Ecquos si non tarn strabones, at paetulos esse
NOTES TO "ESSAY UPON REASON." 203
arbitramur? ecquos naevum habere? ecquos silos, flaccos,
f rontones, capitones ; quae sunt in nobis ? an omnia emendata
in illis ? Detur id vobis. Num etiam una est omnium f acies ?
nam, si plures, aliam esse alia pulchriorem necesse est : igitur
aliquis non pulcherrumus deus. Si una omnium facies est,
florere in coelo Academiam necesse est. Si enim nihil inter
deum et deum differt, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla
perceptio."
27. (Note to p. 6.) Cf. Meditations, II, end: " it is
now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly
perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of the imagination,
but by the intellect alone.'"
28. (Note to p. 6.) Honoratus, or Honore, Fabri, S. J.
(1607-88), was a French writer and teacher. For fourteen
years he taught philosophy at the College de la Trinite at
Lyons. He was later called to Rome as grand penitencier,
and died there. The works of Fabri, many of which were
written pseudonymously (under at least six different pseu
donyms), include treatises on mathematics, logic and medi
cine, as well as on philosophy. Fabri has been called "the
pleader of lost causes." He is recognized as a great worker
but one whose loud promises were seldom fulfilled, and one
whose writings have to-day not even an historical signifi
cance. A bibliography of his works and an account of his
life will be found in Michaud's Biographic universelle : also
in Tocher's Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon.
29. (Note to p. 37.) The quotation is from the Leviathan.
Pt. I, Ch. IV, and reads: "... .words are wise men's coun
ter's, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money
of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a
Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if
but a man." (Cf. Concerning Body, Pt. I, Ch. II, "Of
Names.")
2O4 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
30. (Note to p. 57.) In the original this word is mis
printed: Enity.
31. (Note to p. 62.) The quotation is from the Aca-
demica, II, 10, 30. The chief speakers in the dialogue are
Lucullus and Cicero; the subject under discussion is sense.
Lucullus has argued against the untrustworthiness of the
senses, but for the sake of continuing the discussion, he
grants to the Academicians the invalidity of sense in refer
ence to knowledge and turns to a consideration of sense
in relation to the affections, desires and thought: "Sed
disputari poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura
fabricata esset primum animal omne, deinde hominem
maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quern ad modum primo
visa nos pellerent, deinde adpetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur,
turn ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim
ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est.
naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur."
32. (Note to p. 68.) In the original this word is mis
printed: perception.
33. (Note to p. 71.) This seems to be Bnrthogge's only
suggestion, in any of his philosophical writings, of the fact
that he was a physician.
34. (Note to p. 74.) For Plato's allegory of the cave
see Republic, Bk. VII, 514-18.
35. (Note to p. 91.) In the original this section is wrongly
numbered II.
36. (Note to pp. 94 et a/.) Up to this point Burthogge
has referred to external reality simply as "the Thing" or
"things without us," or as "grounds" or "cause" of sensa
tions (cf. Essay, Ch. Ill, Sect. 2, pp. 73-75). Here, how-
NOTES TO ESSAY UPON REASON. 2O5
ever, in discussing this reality not primarily in its relation
to knowledge but in and for itself, he names it substance.
Burthogge's conception of substance is Lockian rather than
Spinozistic. Self-subsistence, the essential character of
Spinoza's substance, is, according to Burthogge, not funda
mental, since it is involved in or derived from the main
character of being "subject of accidents." Burthogge agrees
with Locke in holding that substance is primarily the un
known substratum of sense-phenomena, "a supposed I know
not what to support those ideas we call accidents." (Cf.
Locke's Essay, Bk. II, Ch. XXIII.) The idea of substance
is then according to both, a "Relative Idea" only. Substance
is known only as that which is related to its accidents. What
it is absolutely and apart from those accidents can never be
known. (Cf. Notes 41 and 44.)
37. (Note to p. 103.) The quotation reads more fully.
"Nempe universa ex materia et ex Deo constant : Deus ista
temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur, et ducem.
Potentius autem est ac pretiosius est quod facit. quod est
Deus, quam materia, patiens Dei. Quern in hoc mundo
locum Deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus: quod est illic
materia, id nobis corpus est."
From Plato directly, but not improbably from Seneca's
borrowed Platonic conceptions as well, Burthogge derives
his conception of God as "pure mind," a substance utterly
different from matter. Burthogge does not, however (as
he himself points out, p. 112), follow Seneca in identifying
God with the Soul of the World.
38. (Note to pp. 103-04.) The quotation is from the
Lives of the Philosophers of Diogenes Laertius, Bk. VII,
Ch. I, Sect LXVIII, par. 134: AoKeZ 8' avrol? apXa<i tlval TW
oAwV SVO, TO TTOIOVV KO.I TO 7Ta(7^OV. To fjikv OVV 1tO.(J^OV ', C?VCU TTfV
O.TTOLOV ovcriav Trjv v\r)V TO oc TTOLOVV, TOV iv O.VTTJ Aoyov TOV 6f.ov.
TOVTOV yap 6Vra CLIOLOV Sta Tratrr/? eu>T7;«j orj/jiiovpyelv fKacrra.
2O6 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
39. (Note to p. 107.) Descartes does not, any more than
Burthogge, identify cogitation with mind, or extension with
matter. He merely holds, with Burthogge, that thinking is
the principal attribute of mind, and extension that of matter.
CCf. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Pt. I, LII-LIV.)
40. (Note to p. 108.) Burthogge probably had Hobbes in
mind, for the polemics of the seventeenth-century idealists
in England were almost sure to be hurled at Hobbes. A
genuine passion for the revival of the study of Plato was.
to be sure, the primary factor in the origin of the Cambridge
movement. But the desire to refute Hobbes certainly fur
nished an added impetus, without which the writings of the
Platonists would have lacked definite purpose. (Cf. Culver-
wel, Discourse of the Light of Nature, and Smith, Select
Discourses.}
Cudworth, and More only less violently, attacked the
"atheistic arguments" of Hobbes against the existence of
"spiritual substance." Although the materialism against
which Cudworth argues is the "atomic" materialism of the
ancient philosophers, Democritus and Epicurus, he has in
mind constantly his contemporary Hobbes. He scorns even
to mention his name, referring to him simply as "a modern
writer," or "a late writer," and sometimes as "a late pre
tender to Politics" and "the author of the Leviathan," who
has outdone his masters in the "sottishness" and "impu
dence" of his atheism. The fury of the Platonists against
Hobbes is easily understood. The denial of the existence of
spiritual substance was a teaching long made familiar to
them through the "Democritic and Epicurean Atheists,"
whose arguments, based on the "atomic" theory, appeared
to them futile and antiquated. But the denial of the soul's
existence on the ground that it can not be perceived by sense
was a new and startling teaching, and one which to the
Platonists was simply exasperating. Sense, according to
them, never could be the criterion of any truth, and least of
NOTES TO "ESSAY UPON REASON." 207
all of spiritual truth, yet here was "a modern atheistic
writer" boldly asserting that we must deny the existence of
"spiritual substance" because we can not perceive it through
sense.
For the attitude of the Cambridge Platonists toward
Hobbes cf. Cudworth. True Intellectual System of the Uni
verse, Ch. V, "A Confutation of Atheism." and More. A
Collection of Several Philosophical Writings, esp. Immortal
ity of the Soul. Cf. also Tulloch, Rational Theology and
Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Cen
tury, London, 1874. Vol. II.
41. (Note to p. 109.) Whether or not Spinoza's defini
tion of the human mind as the "idea of a thing actually
existing" (cf. Ethics, Pt. II. Prop. XI) be accepted, it must
be admitted that it is consistent with his system as a whole.
As thought and extension are but two attributes of one sub
stance, God. so the human mind and body are but two
aspects of a single individual. The statement that the mind
is the "idea of the body" means to Spinoza not only that it
is the idea coexistent with the body, but also that it is the
idea whose object is the body. (Cf. Ethics, Pt. II, Prop.
XXI. Note: also Prop. XV. Proof.)
42. (Note to pp. 109 et a/.) Malebranche teaches that we
know God immediately ; that we know ourselves "through
internal sense." and other selves, as well as "pure intelli
gences." through "conjecture" (Recherche de la verite, Bk.
Ill, Pt. II, Ch. VII) ; and, finally, that we have ideas of
things "in God," i. e.. that God by his will continually fur
nishes us with ideas of things. Yet Malebranche, though he
can not argue with Descartes that an extended material
world exists in order to explain our perception, none the less
holds that an extended material world exists. He therefore
protests against the identification of his teaching with that
of Spinoza, who makes the material world, with all its "des-
2O8 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
ordre" an aspect of the infinitely perfect Being, God. (Cf.
Entretiens sur la metaphysique , IX, Sect. II ; also CEuvres,
ed. by Simon, Vol. I, Introd., pp. 33f.)
43. (Note to pp. 112 et a/.) The first quotation is from
Naturales Quaestiones, I, Praefatio: "Quid est Deus? Mens
universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non
vides totum. Si demum magnitude sua illi redditur, qua
nihil majus excogitari potest, si solus est omnia, opus suum
et extra et intra tenet. Quid ergo interest inter naturam
Dei et nostram? Xostri melior pars animus est : in illo nulla
pars extra animum. Totus ratio est. ..."
The second quotation, from Ep. 65, reads : "Sed nos mine
primam et generalem causam quaerimus : haec simplex esse
debet ; nam et materia simplex est. Quaerimus. quae sit
causa, ratio scilicet f aciens : ista enim, quaecumque retulistis.
non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex
ea quae faciet."
Burthogge agrees with Seneca in holding that God is
not only necessary cause of the universe but efficient cause
as well. He denies, however, Seneca's teaching that God
is immanent cause. The Soul of the World, he admits, may
be the immanent cause, but God must be the transcendent
cause of the universe. (Cf. Note 37.)
44. (Note to pp. 116 et a/.) At least three conceptions
of the nature of substance were current in the seventeenth
century. These conceptions are not mutually exclusive, and
as a matter of fact two of the three are found in the teach
ing of most of the seventeenth-century philosophers. The
first is that which holds substance to be the self-dependent.
This conception is suggested, but not logically carried out,
by Descartes. (Cf. Principles of Philosophy, Pt. I, LI:
cf. also Hobbes's definition of substance as "any thing
that has existence or subsistence in itself in which
sense God is properly. .. .substance. .. .having subsistence
NOTES TO "ESSAY UPON REASON." 209
not only in himself, but from himself," in "An answer to
Bishop Bramhall." Works, Molesworth edition, Vol. IV, p.
308.) This doctrine is consistently developed by Spinoza
(Ethics, Pt. I, Defs. Ill and VI, and Props. XIV and XV).
The second conception is that taught by Locke, according to
which substance is the unknown, "a supposed I know not
what, to support those ideas we call accidents" (Essay, Bk.
II, Ch. XXIII, par. 15). According to the third conception,
substance is that which is subject of accidents. This last
view was the most wide-spread of the three. It was held
by Descartes and by Locke, as well as by the Cambridge
Platonists. The Cambridge Platonists, to be sure, do not
define substance as the subject of accidents, but their char
acterization of the different kinds of substance implies this
conception. Spinoza and Locke also hold that substance
is the subject of accidents, though neither regards this as
the fundamental character of substance. (Cf. Burthogge's
teaching about the nature of substance, Note 36.)
As regards the kinds of substance and the characters
which differentiate them, there are again three doctrines
which were current in the seventeenth century. By far the
most common was the dualistic. Descartes, Locke and the
Cambridge Platonists hold that there are two kinds of sub
stance: (1) spiritual, and (2) corporeal. According both
to Descartes and to Locke, the chief attribute of spiritual
substance is thought, but Locke also regards "a power of
action" as one of the "primary qualities or properties of
spirit" (Essay, Bk. II, Ch. XXIII, par. 30). The attribute
which distinguishes corporeal substance is extension, to
which Locke adds solidity, and the "power of being moved"
(op. cit., Ch. XXIII, par. 15). More teaches that all sub
stance is extended, but distinguishes between corporeal and
spiritual substance by characterizing the first as "impene
trable" and "discerpible," the second as "penetrable" and
"indiscerpible" (cf. Note 46). Cudworth regards "Life.
Cogitation and Understanding" as the "Peculiar Attributes
2IO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
and Charackteristicks of Substance Incorporeal," as con
trasted with "Sensless Matter" ( True Intellectual System of
the Universe, Bk. I, Ch. Ill, Sect. XXXV, pp. 145f). Hobbes
holds a materialistic view of substance. All substance, he
teaches, is corporeal ; substance is synonymous with body ;
to speak of incorporeal substance is meaningless. Spinoza,
finally, holds an absolutistic view of substance. Substance,
as he conceives it, is one,' but can not be identified either
with mind or with body. Extension and thought are, he
teaches, but two "attributes" or aspects of a single funda
mental substance which he calls God (Ethics, Pt. I, Props
XIV and XV).
45. (Note to pp. 117-18.) The reference is to Cicero's
De Natura Deorum, II, 32, 82. Lucilius concludes his re
sume of the various views held about nature, with that of
Epicurus. "Stint autem," he says, "qui omnia naturae no
mine appellent, ut Epicurus; qui ita dividet, omnium, quae
sint, naturam. esse corpora et inane quaeque his accidant."
46. (Note to p. 119.) For More's doctrine of substance
cf. especially Epistola Prima H. Mori ad R. Cartesium, also
Immortality of the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 2, Axiomes VIII-IX.
All substance, More held, whether corporeal or incorporeal,
is possessed of two characters: (1) extension, and (2) mo
tion. To deny that substance is extended is to deny, he said,
that it exists. Incorporeal substance, however, while shar
ing with corporeal substance the attribute of extension, is
distinguished from it by being "penetrable" and "indis-
cerpible." Corporeal substance, he held, is "impenetrable
and "discerpible." It is not unlikely that the Platonists as
a whole (though none but More includes this teaching in
his writings) held that incorporeal substance is extended.
It was the common belief in the seventeenth century that
spirits have bodies, extended but of a more ethereal nature
than human bodies. Burthogge's criticism that to hold that
NOPKS ro "OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. ' 211
incorporeal substance is extended is to make it either a
"vacuum" or "matter," could thus have been easily met, in
More's opinion. (Cf. Notes 36 and 44.)
47. (Note to p. 123.) It will be noted that this, the sixth
chapter, is wrongly numbered.
III. NOTES TO "OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD."
48. (Note to title-page.) The quotation is made from
the Octavius of Felix Marcus Minucius. one of the earliest
Christian apologists. The dialogue, which seems to be mod
eled on Cicero's DC Natura Dcorum, dates back to the
second or third century A. D. It first appeared in the
Adversus Gentes of Arnobius. The quoted words are sup
posedly spoken by the Christian Octavius who accuses pagan
writers of corrupting youth by fictitious tales of the origin
of the Greek gods. The passage reads: "His atque hujus
modi figmentis, et mendaciis dulcioribus corrumpuntur in-
genia puerorum et hisdem fabulis in haerentibus, adusque
summae aetatis robur adolescunt et in iisdem opinionibus
miseri consenescunt : cum sit veritas obvia sed requirenti-
bus" (Arnobii Disputationum adversus Gentes Libri Sep-
tem: M. Minucii Felicis Octavius, Paris, 1595, p. 353; cf.
Octavius, ed. by A. Baehrens, Ch. 23, par. 8).
49. (Note to title-page.) The quotation is from Eras
mus's "Hyperaspistes Diatribae adversus servum Martinii
Lutheri," Lib. II. (Cf. Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1706, Vol. X,
p. 1531.) "Et si poterat Augustinus," he says, "per vim
liberi arbitrii audire concionantem Ambrosium, legere libros
sacros, erogare stipem in pauperes, vacare precibus ac medi-
tationibus, confabulari cum piis hominibus, eosque rogare
ut Domino salutem ipsius suis precibus commendarent, quid
212 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
est cur sic exsibiletur opinio Scholasticorum, quae tradit
hominem per opera moraliter bona promereri de congruo
gratiam justificantem? Verborum umbris territamur, cum
in re nihil sit absurdi."
50. (Note to p. 4.) John Keill (1671-1721) was a
mathematician and astronomer, noted mainly for his expo
sition of the Newtonian principles and for his opposition
to the theory of "natural philosophy" upheld by Whiston
and Burnet. Keill received the M.A. degree, with "distinc
tion in mathematics and natural philosophy." from the Uni
versity of Edinburgh and in 1694 was "incorporated M.A."
at Oxford. Here he at once distinguished himself by his
lectures on Newton's Principia. His Examination of Dr.
Burnet' s Theory of the Earth, published 1698 (cf. Note 51),
increased his reputation, although the seriousness with which
he opposes the "Theory." using long trigonometrical proofs
to overthrow some fanciful detail of the "Hypothesis."
appears to the modern reader ridiculous. Burthogge's pro
test against Keill's presentation (in the Introduction of his
Examination) of Burthogge's Soul-of-the-World theory
seems rather ill-founded. Keill's account, so far as it goes,
is accurate, and Burthogge himself, in presenting his theory
anew, finds the metaphor of the "vast Organ" illuminating.
In 1701 Keill's Introductio ad Veram Physicam, considered
at that time his "best performance," was published. In 1712
he was elected Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford,
and in 1713 the degree of D.M. was conferred on him by
the University. The later years of his life were occupied
mainly in a defense (begun in 1705) of Newton as inventor
of fluxional calculus against the claims of Leibniz. For a
more detailed account of Keill's life. cf. Dictionary of Na
tional Biography. An interesting, though brief, estimate of
his personal character will be found in Thomas Hearne's
Remarks and Collections, edited by C. E. Doble, Oxford.
1885, Vol. VII. p. 273. (Cf. also scattered references ibid..
NOTES TO "OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 213
Vols. I-VI.) For a bibliography of Keill's works cf. the
British Museum Catalogue.
51. (Note to p. 4.) Thomas Burnet (1635P-1715) was
an English divine educated at Northallerton and at Clare
Hall, Cambridge, where in 1654 he became master. In 1658
he received the M. A. degree from Christ's College and in
1667 became senior proctor of the University. He was
chosen master of the Charterhouse in 1685. Later, Burnet
became "chaplain in ordinary and clerk of the closet of
William," but was removed in 1692 on account of the oppo
sition to his Archaeologia Philosophicae in which he treats
the Mosaical account of the fall of man as allegorical and
professes to reconcile his own "Theory of the Earth" with
the Mosaical account. Part I of Burnet's Theory was first
published in Latin in 1681 under the title Telluris Theoria
Sacra. An enlarged English version followed in 1684. The
second part of the Theory, together with a second edition
of the first, and an English translation of the whole ap
peared in 1689. The work passed through a number of
later editions, the seventh appearing in 1759.
Burnet's Theory of the Earth is a fanciful account of
the evolution of the world, originating in an attempt to
explain how it was possible for the Mosaical deluge to have
taken place. In his own words, it "is an Account of the
Original of the Earth, and of all the great and general
Changes that it hath already undergone, or is hence forwards
to undergo, till the Consummation of all things" (p. 3).
Burnet's science is crude even for his own time. His
"Hypothesis" is borrowed from Biblical sources and is bol
stered up by a vivid imagination. The present world, he
holds, is but the "ruins" of an antedeluvian "Paradisiacal"
world. The projections of the broken shell of that first
world form our mountains, and our seas are a part of the
great "abyss" uncovered by the break. As the first world
was destroyed by water, so it will be restored by fire in all
214 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
its "Paradisiacal" perfection. Like the Phoenix, he says, "it
will be consum'd in the last Fire : And from its Ashes
will arise another World."
Burnet's Theory, taken seriously in his own time, al
though it did not lack supporters (e. g., Whiston), met with
a good deal of opposition. Two of the most formidable
opponents were Erasmus Warren and John Keill (cf. Note
50). Burnet's "Answer" to Warren's Exceptions against
the Sacred Theory of the Earth and to Keill's Examination
of the Theory will be found appended to the fifth edition of
the Theory, London, 1722.
52. (Note to pp. 11 et a/.) Burthogge has correctly made
and interpreted these quotations.
53. (Note to p. 25.) Cf. August Heinrich Ritter and
Lndwig Preller, Historia Philosophiae Graecae, 7th ed..
Gotha, 1888, "Thales," pp. 6-11.
54. (Note to p. 26.) Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum,
Sicily (c. 570-554 B. C.), was notorious for his horrible
cruelty. According to tradition he was entrusted with the
building of the temple of Zeus and took advantage of his
position to make himself despot. Until the seventeenth
century it was generally believed that Phalaris was the
author of the Epistles which bear his name. Politian, in the
fifteenth century, had, to be sure, attributed the Epistles to
Lucian. Not, however, until 1690 when Sir William Temple
revived the interest in Phalaris by naming his Epistles one
of the greatest masterpieces of antiquity, was any serious
question of their genuineness raised. And by 1698, the year
in which Burthogge published his Soul of the World, the
controversy between Charles Boyle and Richard Bentley
over the authorship of the Epistles was at its height. In
the Preface of his new edition (1695) of the Epistles, Boyle
presents the various views regarding the authorship without
NOTES TO "OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD." 215
presuming to decide in favor of any. In 1697 Bentley's
Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris appeared, appended
to Wotton's Reflections on the Ancient and Modern Learn
ing. Bentley believed the Epistles to be spurious, arguing
mainly from the anachronisms to be found in them. Towns
are mentioned, for example, which were not in existence
until long after the time of Phalaris, and men are spoken of
who lived centuries later. Early in 1698 Boyle replied with
Doctor Bentley's Dissertation. .. .examined. And later in
the same year Bentley published a reply to Boyle in a second
enlarged edition of his Dissertation. A full account of the
controversy will be found in R. C. Jebb's Richard Bentley,
New York, [1882]. The epistle to which Burthogge makes
reference is numbered 103.
55. (Note to p. 28.) The Eugenius Philalethes referred
to is probably Thomas Vaughan (1621-66). twin-brother
of the poet Henry Vaughan. The pseudonym Philalethes
was fashionable in the seventeenth century and Anthony a
Wood names three others, all contemporary with Vaughan,
who use it. Yet, although it has been impossible to verify
the quotations, there are several considerations which make
it almost certain that Thomas Vaughan is the poet referred
to by Burthogge. For Thomas Vaughan more consistently
than any one else, wrote under the pseudonym Eugenius
Philalethes. Moreover, he wrote both English and Latin
verse and translated several of the Latin poets.
56.7 (Note to p. 31.) Leeuwenhoek, Antony van (1632-
1723). A Dutch naturalist and microscopist, perhaps best
known as the investigator who completed Harvey's work
on the circulation of the blood by the discovery in 1686 of
the capillary connection between arteries and veins. Leeu-
wenhoek's enthusiasm in the use of the newly invented
T For Notes 56 and 58-67 the editor is indebted to Dr. Alice Robert
son, formerly professor of zoology at Wellesley College.
2l6 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
microscope led him to experiment in grinding lenses, so that
he possessed the best microscopes of his day with powers
ranging from forty to two hundred and seventy diameters.
In 1675 he discovered the protozoa, the one-celled animals
so abundant in water containing decaying organic substance,
his so-called "peppered water." Twelve years later he dis
covered bacteria.
Belief in spontaneous generation had declined somewhat
during the seventeenth century. The experiments of Redi
(cf. Note 58) had confirmed the truth of Harvey's epigram,
"Omne vivum ex ovo." After the discovery of these one-
celled organisms, however, although spontaneous generation
could no longer be affirmed of the larger animals, belief in
its possibility was revived in regard to these minute animals.
And, indeed, it must be admitted that such a theory of gene
ration was not wholly unreasonable as long as the life
histories of protozoa and bacteria were unknown. For the
life and work of Leeuwenhoek the reader is referred to
W. A. Locy, Biology and Its Makers, New York, 1908,
pp. 77-88.
57. (Note to p. 31.) In the original this word is mis
printed : Animalcles.
58. (Note to p. 31.) Redi, Francesco (1626-97). An
Italian physician living at Arentine. In 1668 he first per
formed an experiment which, in the minds of scientists,
dispelled all doubt of the untenability of the theory of spon
taneous generation. The experiment was so simple that it
is astonishing that it had not been tried before. He set
three jars containing fresh meat in a place where all would
be subjected to the same environmental conditions. One
jar remained uncovered, a second was covered with parch
ment, a third with wire-netting. The first soon showed
signs of putrefaction accompanied with visible animal life.
The second also putrefied but no animal life was apparent.
NOTES TO "OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD.' 217
On the wire-netting covering the third jar flies had deposited
many eggs, but the putrefying meat in the jar gave no signs
of life. The conclusion was evident that the organisms
found in the first jar were not spontaneously generated,
but had hatched from eggs which flies had laid on the meat.
This experiment weakened the belief in spontaneous gene
ration revived by the discoveries of Leeuwenhoek. Cf.
Locy, Biology and Its Makers, pp. 277-82.
59. (Note to p. 32.) The larvae of insects that feed on
fermenting material instinctively seek darkness. Hence,
although such larvae (maggots) were found, as reported, at
the bottom of the fermenting mass, the eggs were probably
laid on the top, the larvae, after hatching, seeking the darker
places. It is not necessary, therefore, to assume that the
adult flies had to endure the high temperature of fermen
tation, since the eggs were laid before or at the beginning
of fermentation. The eggs, however, require a high degree
of heat in order to incubate and hatch rapidly, and the larvae
are adapted to endure this high temperature. Redi's ex
periments with meat, both shielded and unshielded from flies,
apply to any putrefying or fermenting masses, and the as
sumption of spontaneous generation in such cases as the
above is thus shown to be invalid.
60. (Note to p. 33.) The myth of birds arising from
barnacles is extremely old and wide-spread, dating back to
the twelfth century and extending from Britain to Ceylon.
Max Miiller has studied this myth and gives an interesting
and amusing account of his research in the second volume
of Science and Language (New York, 1891). pp. 659-82.
61. (Note to pp. 33 et a/.) Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-
1558) was an ardent believer in, and supporter of, the theory
of spontaneous generation. He is best known to-day as the
author of an unwarranted attack upon Cardano (cf. Note
2l8 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
62) in a brilliantly written Latin work entitled Exort eri
ca-rum Exerciicdlonum Liber XV de Subtilitate ad Hierony-
mum Cardanum, first published in 1557, and followed by
numerous later editions: 1576, 1592, 1612, 1634 and 1665.
At the time of this attack Scaliger was a physician of repute
living in the home of the Archbishop of Agen as his medical
adviser. Roused by envy at Cardano's success, and jealous
of the attentions he received on his triumphal return to
Milan, it is said that Scaliger aspired to be talked of as the
rival of Cardano. Much color is given to this belief when
it is remembered that Scaliger wrote his book three years
after the second edition of Cardano's work was printed,
without ever reading this second edition, in which Cardano
had laboriously expunged many erroneous statements. G.
Naude, who had no love for Cardano, says, writing of
Scaliger's attack : "Scaliger undertook this work not in the
interest of learning, but rather for disputation, and a com
parison of the works of the two men will show that Scaliger
committed more errors in his than he found in Cardano's."
According to this authority, Scaliger's purpose seemed to be
to deny all that Cardano affirmed and to affirm all that
Cardano denied. This quarrel seems to have been widely
known and the dogmatic nature of Scaliger's criticisms fully
appreciated, especially in the countries Cardano had so re
cently visited. In one of his Commonplace Books, Sir
Thomas Browne quaintly observes, "If Cardan saith a par
rot is a beautiful bird. Scaliger will set his wits on work
to prove it a deformed animal." Cardano kept his temper
admirably during the whole dispute. He published a short
and dignified reply, Actio prima in Calumniatorem, in which
the name of Scaliger never once occurs. His attitude of
dignified indifference won him approval by contrast to the
raging fury of his adversary.
62. (Note to pp. 33 et a/.) Cardano, Girolamo (1501-
1576). A notable and picturesque personality of the six-
NOTES TO "OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD.
teenth century. Possessed of a highly imaginative mind as
well as of a highly emotional nature, he was as a child
moody, misunderstood and neglected. In youth he early
showed unusual power of abstract thought and distinguished
himself in mathematics, dialectics and philosophy. Much
against the desire of his father, who wished him to follow
the profession of law, he entered the University of Padua
in 1520, bent on the study of medicine, and in 1524 received
his degree. An eager student, a voracious reader, greedy
for knowledge of all kinds, he grew to manhood self-asser
tive, irascible, disregarding the conventions of society, and
what was more important, neglecting the cultivation of the
rich and powerful. Few patients called on the services of
the young physician who started on his medical career of
fending his colleagues in Milan by the publication of a
book entitled De Malo Recentiorutn Medicorum Medendi
Usu. This book proved a great financial success but brought
the enmity of the medical profession. Turning to mathe
matics, a favorite study, he published works in arithmetic
and algebra which early carried his fame far beyond the
bounds of Italy. He not only raised algebra to a point it
had never before reached, but his name as a mathematician
became known throughout Europe and the success of his
mathematical writings was remarkable.
Between 1547 and 1551, holding a professorship in
Pavia, teaching besides several young men in company with
his own son, he brought out his great work, De Subtilitate.
(Later editions appeared in 1554, 1560, 1563 and 1582.)
In this treatise the author ambitiously wished to treat of the
cosmos. It is said that he produced the richest and at the
same time the most chaotic collection of the facts of natural
philosophy that had yet issued from the press. The book
displays amazing erudition and industry, for not only did
Cardano collect vast masses of information, but much of it
he verified by experiment. Thus he was one of the earliest
scientists to use the experimental method. In speaking of
22O PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
one of his discoveries in medicine he remarks, "In the matter
of invention Reason will be the leader, but Experiment the
Master." Cardano, paradoxically enough, was an earnest
student of astrology, even though the fact of his indulging
in this study was quoted by his enemies as reflecting on his
fair name as a physician. However, Cardano's medical fame
arose partly out of his literary effort in De Subtilitate, and
partly out of his knowledge of astrology and his power to
cast horoscopes.
In 1551, through the reading of De Subtilitate, which
inflamed him, it is said, with a desire to become acquainted
with everything Cardano had ever written, Cassanate, a
Franco-Spanish physician who was in attendance upon
Archbishop Hamilton of St. Andrews, invited Cardano to
meet the Archbishop in Paris in order to prescribe for the
prelate's asthma. Eventually Cardano went to Edinburgh
and there staid five weeks in attendance upon his illustrious
patient. The fame of Cardano spread rapidly and the nobil
ity of Scotland flocked to him paying him most liberally
for his advice. On leaving Scotland he was entreated to
visit England to give an opinion on the health of Edward
VI, and to cast his horoscope. His journey homeward was
a continuous ovation, and on his return to Milan he stood
the acknowledged head of his profession. He was flooded
with invitations from the wealthy and powerful, each de
siring his exclusive attention. All of these invitations, he
steadily refused, being satisfied to hold an honored place in
his favorite city, Milan.
His own words written on his return from this famous
journey reveal the spirit of the man : " .... I, who was born
poor, with a weakly body, in an age vexed almost inces
santly by wars and tumults, helped on by no family in
fluence, but forced to contend against the bitter opposition
of the College at Milan, contrived to overcome all the plots
woven against me, and open violence as well. All the
honours which a physician can possess I either enjoy, or
NOTES TO OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 221
have refused when they were offered to me. . . .What I have
written has been lauded ; in sooth, I have written of so many
things and at such length that a man could scarcely read
my works if he spent his life therewith. . . .1 have refused
always to flatter the great ; and over and beyond this I have
often set myself in active opposition to them. . . .1 have been
most fortunate as the discoverer of many and important
contributions to knowledge, as well as in the practice of
my art and in the results obtained : so much so that if my
fame in the first instance has raised up envy against me,
it has prevailed finally and extinguished all ill feeling."
Cardano, unlike his adversary Scaliger, opposed the doc
trine of spontaneous generation as held in his day, main
taining that the facts urged in support of this theory could
be better explained by natural than by supernatural processes.
For the life and work of Cardano cf. Henry Morley, Life
of Girolamo Cardano of Milan, 1822, and William George
Waters, Jerome Cardan', a Biographical Study. 1898. Cf.
also Encyclopaedia Britannica, llth ed.
63. (Note to p. 35.) Whether Lord Bacon believed that
plants may be spontaneously generated it is difficult to say.
As Burthogge quotes. Bacon mentions instances in which he
says that plants were produced without seeds. (For Bacon's
experiments cf. his Sylva Sylvarum: or a Natural History
in Ten Centuries, London, 1627. Burthogge's reference to
experiments in Century IV are wrongly numbered 228 and
339 instead of 328 and 329.) Considering Bacon as an
authority not to be questioned, our author reasonably infers
the possibility of animal production without eggs. However,
the instances cited can not be urged as evidence of spontane
ous generation. It is well known that ants, earthworms and
other burrowing animals disseminate seeds long distances
under the ground, and it is further known that seeds retain
their vitality for long periods of time, and may even with
stand unfavorable environments. The instances cited bv
222 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGK.
Bacon may, therefore, be accounted for by normal and
natural processes. As to the power of seeds to withstand
unnatural environment, it will be remembered that a few
ounces of mud, collected by Darwin from under the water
of a pond where no vegetation was visible, when brought
into his study and given suitable environment produced no
fewer than 537 plants. As evidence of the vitality of seeds,
Professor Cowles of the University of Chicago reports ex
periments in which dried seeds not less than twenty-five
years of age, have germinated, and refers to other ex
periments in which seeds have been shown to retain their
viability for 150 to 250 years.
64. (Note to p. 35.) No instance of a rain of frogs or
of other creatures can be accepted as proof of spontaneous
generation. Although some apparently authentic stories
are told of such occurrences, even these must be received
with incredulity. If true, the animals must have been trans
ported by the wind from some near-by body of water, and
it is not impossible perhaps that such transportation might
take place during or following a severe storm. This may
be especially true in tropical regions. The phenomenon of
the sudden appearance of a surprisingly large number of
animals, frogs or fish, is not uncommon after heavy rains
in the tropics. In these regions, during the dry season,
many kinds of aquatic animals are known to bury them
selves in the mud from three to twelve or sixteen inches,
and on the return of the rainy season to reappear with such
rapidity and in such multitudes that it is not surprising that
mythical stories have arisen. For an account of instances
of the belief that fishes fall during heavy showers and for
the probable explanation of the phenomenon cf. Edward
Terry's A Voyage to East India, London, 1777, p. 6; also
Sir J. E. Tennent's Ceylon, an Account of the Island, Phys
ical, Historical and Topographical, London, 1860, Vol. I,
pp. 21 Iff and Notes (A) and (B), pp. 226-27.
NOTES TO "OF THE SOUL OF THE WORLD. 223
65. (Note to p. 36.) The hibernation of toads, their
ability to do without food for long periods if temperature
conditions are relatively cool and constant, together with
the natural credulity of the ignorant, have contributed to
the longevity and persistence of this myth. Actual exper-
ment has shown that toads may live for over a year in sand
stone hermetically sealed and buried three feet in the ground
In more porous stone, such as limestone, they live a few
months longer. If permitted an almost infinitesimal amount
of food and air. in a cool place where escape is impossible,
they might live a much longer time, but not indefinitely.
For further details regarding the hibernation of toads and
tortoises the reader is referred to Hans Gadow's Amphibia
and Reptiles (Vol. VIII of The Cambridge Natural History,
London, 1901), esp. pp. 68. 347, 354. 363. 369. 376; also to
Sir J. E. Tennent's Ceylon, Vol. I. p. 218.
66. (Note to p. 36.) The horse-hair myth, like those of
the goose barnacle and toad-in-hole, is difficult to eradicate
since even to-day there are people who regard it with
credulity. The so-called "horse-hair" worm is threadlike,
five or six inches long, found in water-troughs, ditches and
pools of stagnant water and known to science as Gordius.
The life history of Gordius comprises three distinct stages:
two of them are larval and parasitic, the third is adult,
aquatic and free living. The eggs are laid in water and
hatch into minute larvae possessing an effective boring-
apparatus. Gordius larva bores its way into the body of
the larva of an insect, that of the Alder fly, and passes
into a resting-stage in its muscles or fat body. During
the next few months the Alder fly larva metamorphoses
into the adult fly, and Gordius larva then passes over into
its body. The Alder fly falls an easy prey to a certain
predacious beetle which haunts its habitat, and which thus
becomes the host for the second larval stage of Gordius.
Here it lives several months and after consuming a large
224 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
part or all of the internal organs of the beetle, it bores its
way out and becomes adult. If the beetle host has chanced
to fall into water or has been carried into water by the
wind, Gordius lives a free life as the "horse-hair" worm.
If, on the other hand, the beetle host falls on dry land, as
doubtless often happens, Gordius dies.
For the classification, anatomy and life history of Gor
dius the reader is referred to Arthur E. Shipley, Nemathel-
minthes & Chaetognatha (Vol. II of The Cambridge Nat
ural History, London, 1910).
67. (Note to p. 37.) Modern biological investigation has
shown that worms of various kinds may infest the organs
of persons living under unsanitary conditions, or eating
infested food not properly cooked. The hookworm infesta
tion of certain regions of this country, and the sporadic
cases of trichina in man are modern examples.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
THE WORKS OF BURTHOGGE.
NOTE : The appended lists of libraries in which each book may be
found are based on inquiries addressed to about fifty university and
city libraries in the United States. (The British Museum Library is
the only European library to which reference is made.) The follow
ing abbreviations have been used:
Amh. Amherst College Library.
Ath. Athenaeum Library, Boston.
B. M. British Museum.
C. U. Columbia University Library.
Chic. Chicago Public Library.
Cor. U. Cornell University Library.
H. U. Harvard University Library.
L. C. Library of Congress.
Lib. Co. Library Company, Philadelphia.
P. I. Peabody Institute, Baltimore.
U. P. University of Pennsylvania Library.
U. Theol. Union Theological Seminary Library.
Y. U. Yale University Library.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS.
1678 Organum Fetus 6" Novum, or a Discourse of Reason
and Truth; Wherein the Natural Loglck common to
Mankinde is briefly and plainly described.
London, Printed for Sam. Crouch, at the Princes
Arms a Corner-shop of Popeshead ally in Corn-
hil. Pp. 73. Ath., B. M., H. U., L. C, U. Theol.
228 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
1694 An Essay upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits.
London, Dunton. Pp. 280. Amh., B. M., Cor. U..
H.U., L.C.. Lib. Co., P. I.. U.P., Y. U.. U.
Theol.
1699 Of the Soul of the World; and of Particular Souls.
In a Letter to Mr. Lock, occasioned by Mr. Kelt's
Reflections upon an Essay lately published concerning/
Reason.
London, Printed for Daniel Brown at the Black
Swan and Bible, without Temple-Bar. Pp. 46.
B. M., C.U., H.U.; 1748 (in [Somers Tracts]
A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts,
Vol. II), C.U., H.U., U. Theol., Y.U.; 1809
(in Somers Tracts, Vol. XII), B. M. ; 1814 (in
Somers tracts, Vol. XII), Ath., C. U.. Chic.,
Cor. U.. L. C., Y. U.
II. WORKS ON RELIGIOUS SUBJECTS.
1670 Divine Goodness explicated and vindicated from the
Exceptions of the Atheist; wherein also the Consent
of the gravest Philosophers, with the holy and in
spired Penmen, in many of the most important Points
of Christian Doctrine is fully vindicated.1
London, 1671 (Pp. 133+) , H. U. ; 1672, B. M. (The
title in the editions of 1671 and 1672 reads : Taya-
Oov, or Divine Goodness, etc.)
1675 Causa Dei, or an Apology for God: Wherein the
Perpetuity of Infernal Torments is Evinced, and
Divine both Goodness and Justice (that notzvithstand-
ing} Defended. The Nature of Punishments in Gen
eral, and of Infernal ones in Particular Displayed.
The Evangelical Righteousness Explicated and Setled.
The Divinity of the Gentiles both as to things to be
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 229
Believed, and things to be Practiced, Adumbrated;
and the wayes whereby it was Communicated, plainly
Discover'd.
London, Imprinted for Lewis Punchard Bookseller
in Totnes in Devon. . . . Pp. 422. B. M., L. C.,
U. Theol.
1683 An Argument for Infants' Baptism, deducted from
the Analogy of Faith and Harmony of the Scriptures:
in which, in a Method wholly new, and upon Grounds
not commonly observed, both the Doctrine of Infant-
Baptism is fully asserted, and the Objections against
it are obviated*
London.
1685 Vindicia Pcedo-Baptismi: or, a Confirmation of an
Argument lately emitted for Infant-Baptism.*
London.
1687 Prudential Reasons for repealing the Penal Laws
against all Recusants, and for a general Toleration.2
London.
1691 ? The Nature of Church-Government, Freely Discussed
and set out. In Three Letters.
London. Pp. (4), 52. U. Theol.
1702 Christianity a Revealed Mystery: or, The Gracious
Purpose of God toward the Gentiles, set in a clear
Light, in some Reflections on Rom. viii. 28, 29, 30.
To which is added, A Brief Discourse concerning
Perseverance in Grace.
London. B. M. ; 1755, Ath., H. U.
1 Title taken from Athenae Oxonienses, Vol. IV, p. 581.
* The following note is added after the title in the Athenae Oxo
nienses : "There is no name set to it, only said in the title to have been
pen'd by a protestant person of quality."
230 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGK.
III. MEDICAL WORK.
1662 Disputatio de Lithiasi et Calculo.
Leyden. B. M.
OTHER WORKS TO WHICH REFERENCE IS MADE IN
THE INTRODUCTION.
Smith, John (1618-52),
Select Discourses.
London, 1660.
More, Henry (1614-87).
A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of
Dr. Henry More, Fellow of Christ's College in Cam
bridge. As Namely
Antidote against Atheism
Appendix to the said Antidote
TJ. , Enthusiasmus Triumphatus
] Letters to Des-Cartes &c.
| Immortality of the Soul
I Conjectura Cabbalistica
2d ed., London, 1662.
Culverwel, Nathaniel (d. 1651?),
An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of
Nature.
Oxford, 1669.
Cudworth. Ralph (1617-88),
The True Intellectual System of the Universe.
London, 1678.
Locke, John (1632-1704),
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
London, 1690. (Quotations from Bohn edition.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 231
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804),
Critique of Pure Reason.
1781, 1787. (Quotations are from Max Miiller's
translation, New York, 1896.)
Calkins, Mary Whiton,
The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4th rev. ed.
New York, 1917.
Lovejoy, Arthur O..
"Kant and the English Platonists," in Essays Philo
sophical and Psychological in Honor of William
James.
New York, 1908.
Lyon, Georges,
L'idealisme en Angleterre au XVII Je siecle.
Paris, 1888.
Ueberweg, Friedrich.
History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present
Time, tr. by G. S. Morris. Vol. II.
New York, 1892.
Wood, Anthony a (1632-95).
Athenae Oxonienses, an Exact History of all the
Writers and Bishops who have had their Education
in the University of Oxford, to which are added the
Fasti, Annals of the said University. A new edition,
with additions and a continuation by Philip Bliss.
Vol. IV.
London, 1820.
Dictionary of National Biography.
INDEX
INDEX OF PERSONS.
[This Index does not make reference to the Bibliography. 1
Agrippa, Cornelius, 193.
Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, 159, 202.
Apollinarius, 169.
Apronius, 149, 150.
Apuleius, 159.
Aquinas, 201, 203.
Aristotle, 30, 160, 193, 198, 203.
Arnobius, 211.
Arscot, 187.
Augustine, St., 135, 211.
Austin, St., 135.
Bacon, Francis, 166, 167, 22if.
Baehrens, A., 211.
Balbus, 148, 162.
Bartholinua, 168.
Basilides, 16, 191, 192.
Behmen, Jacob, 16, 17, 189.
Bentley, Richard, 2i4f.
Borellus, 168.
Bowman, Ethel, 198.
Boyle, Charles, 214!.
Brandis, C. A. B., 198.
Browne, Sir Thomas, 218.
Burnet, Thomas, 142, 212, 213, 214.
Calkins, M. W., xviii, xix, xx, 191,
'93. 194-
Cardano, Girolamo, 148, 149, 160, 165,
167, 2i7ff.
Cassanate, 220.
Chalmers, Alexander, 190, 191.
Chandler, 196.
Charleton, Walter, 196.
Cicero, 34, 36, 44, 59, 79, 114, 147,
148, 149, 150, 162, igg, 202, 203,
204, 210, 211.
Clement of Alexandria, 191.
Collier, Arthur, 198.
Cotta, 59, 147, 148.
Cowlcs, H. C., 222.
Cox, 164.
Cudworth, Ralph, xiii, xiv, xvii, xviii,
206, 207, 210.
Culverwel, Nathaniel, xiii, xv, 206.
Dfmte, 301.
Datwin, Charles, 222.
Democritus, 206.
Descartes, Rene, xvii, 55, 59, 105. 17 1,
189, 196, 206, 207, 208, 209.
Dionysius, convert of Paul, 200.
Oionysius, Pseudo-, 38, 200.
noble, C. E., 212.
Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherburjr,
35, 168, 199*-
Edward VI, of England, 220.
Epicurus, 23, 114, 197, 206, 210.
Erasmus, 139, 211.
Erigena, 200.
Fobri, H., 55, 59, 203.
Felix Marcus Minucius, see Minucius
Felix.
Fleming, William, 189.
Fludd, Robert, 16, 17, 69. 189, 190.
Gadow, Hans, 223.
Gage, 133.
Galen, Claudius, 42, 153, 201, 202.
Gardiner, F. L., 190.
Granger, James, 190.
Hamilton, Archbishop of St. An
drews, 220.
Harvey, 2isf.
Hearne, Thomas, 212.
236 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Helmont, J. B. van, 17, 196-
Henry VIII, of England, 46-
Herbert, Lord. See Edward, Lord
Herbert of Cherbury.
Hicks, R. D., 197-
Hilgenfeld, 191.
Hippolytus, 191.
Hitchins, 187.
Hobbes, Thomas, 65, 68, 113, 132,
142, 197, 203, 206, 207, 208, 210.
Holland, Philemon, 193.
Irenaeus, 191, 192.
James II, of England, xii.
Jebb, R. C, 215.
Jennings, H., 189, 190.
Jocher, C. G. J., 203.
Jones, R. M., 189, 192, 193, 194, 201.
Josephus, 8, 1 88.
Juncken, 164.
Kant, Immanuel, Burthogge's relation
to, xiii, xvff, xxii, 198.
Keill, John, 142, 143, 153, '55, '75.
212, 214.
King, C. W., 192.
Kramer, 192.
Krauth, C. P., 189.
Kiihn, D. C. G., 202.
Laertius, Diogenes, 103, 159, 205.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 212.
Leeuwenhoek, Antony van, 163, 2i$ff.
Lccke, John, Burthogge's relation to,
xi, xvff; 139, 141, 199, 200, 201,
205, 209.
Locy, W. A., 2i6f.
Lovejoy, A. O., xviif, 198.
Lucian, 214.
Lucilius, 114, 150, 210.
Lucretius, 158.
Lucullus, 34, 199, 204.
Lyon, Georges, xi.
Lyson, 187.
Magnus, Albertus, 201.
Maier, Michael, 190.
Malebranche, Nicolas, 107, 207.
Mansel, H. L., 192.
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. See
Antoninus.
Michaud, L. G., 203.
Miller, George, 169.
Milton, John, 201.
Minucius Felix, Marcus, 139, an.
More, Henry, xiii, xiv, xvii, 115, 118,
142, 192, 194, 206, 207, 209, 210,
211.
Morley, Henry, 221.
Muller, Max, 217.
Xaude, G., 218.
Nemesius, 163, 169.
Newton, 212.
Nicholas, Henry, 17, 192.
Paracelsus, 17, 193, 194, 195, 196.
Parker, 200, 201.
Pelops, 202.
Pennant, John, 168.
Phalaris, 160, 214, 215.
Philalethes, Eugenius, pseud. See
Vaughan, Thomas.
Plato, xiv, 88, 159, 204, 205, 206.
Pliny, the Younger, 133.
Plutarch, 159, 193.
Poiret, 169.
Politian, 214.
Prantl, 198, 202.
Preller, Ludwig, 214.
Pythagoras, 158, 160.
Raleigh, Sir. W., 133.
Redi, Francesco, 164, 216, 217.
Reichel, O. J., 197.
Ritter, A. H., 214.
Roberts, C. F., 194.
Robertson, Alice, 215.
Savery, 187.
Scaliger, Julius, 148, 149, 150, 160,
165, 167, 169, 171, 217, 218, 221.
Seneca, 102, 109, 113, 150, 151, 153,
159, 205, 208.
Sherlock, 136.
Shipley, A. E., 224.
Simocatto, 133.
Smith, John, xv, 206.
Sparrow, John, 189.
Spenser, Edmund, 201.
Spinoza, Baruch de, Substance as con
ceived by, 92f, 95, 97f, 205, 2ogf;
mind as conceived by, 107, 207;
God as conceived by, 108, ii3f,
208; truth as conceived by, iggf.
Stephen, Leslie, xi.
Stesichorus, 160.
INDEX.
237
Taliacotius, 174.
Taylor, H. O., 201.
Temple, Sir William, 214.
Tennent, Sir J. E., 22af.
Terry, Edward, 168, 222.
Tcrtullian, 191.
Thales, 3d, 159.
Trevill, Andrew, 5, 187.
Tulloch, John, 207.
Tulpius, 168.
Ueberweg, xi, xiii, 198.
Valentinus, 16, 190, 192.
Valla, Laurentiua, 136.
Vaughan, Henry, 215.
Vaughan, Thomas, 161, 215.
Virgil, 161.
Waite, A. E., 190.
Wallace, William, 197.
Warren, Erasmus, 214.
Waters, W. G., 221.
Whiston, William, 188, 212, 214.
William the Conqueror, 46.
William III, of England, xii.
Wolff, Christian, xviii.
Wood, Anthony a, xi, 190, 215.
Wotton, William, 215.
Zeller, Eduard, 197, 19!.
Zeno of Citium. mj, 159.
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
Accidents, Phenomenal nature of, 24, 60, 68, 75, 77, 796% 85, goff, 978, 106,
in, 112, 183, 205, 209; Spinoza's conception of, 92, 93, 95, 205, 209;
Locke's conception of, 205, 209; the Cambridge Platonists* conception of,
209. See Attributes.
Action (or Activity), the fundamental attribute of mind, io2f, io6f, 135, 142,
'43. MS, 163, 184. Sec Energy.
Affection, of apprehension, 19, 25, 27, 66; conceived as emotion, 23, 72, 1 10,
204; conscious sense affection, 57ff, 91, 127, 129.
Analogy, 12, 33, 38, 48, fi ; regarded as test of truth, 35, 43. See Congruity
and Harmony.
Angels, 132, 174.
Animals, Faculties of, 10, 134; souls of, i2$ft, i43f, 148, 150 iszf, i6if, 1728;
kinds of, 132; spontaneous generation of, i63ff; Locke's definition of,
201; sensations of, like those of man, 6of.
Anticipations, 28, 37, 39, 40, 71. Sec Innate ideas.
Apparitions (appearances), 84, 93; (spectra or spirits), i32ff. See Appearance.
Appearance, contrasted with "grounds" or reality, 12, 24, 28f, 4if, 47, 76, 77,
82, 85, 87, 88, 93, ill, 155, 180, 198. Sec Phenomena and Apparitions.
Apprehension, an act of the understanding or reason, joff, I7ff, 65, 69, 74; th«
object of, i8f, 66, 7of, 75, 80; clearness and distinctness, the affections of,
19, 24, 2$f, 66; conditions of clearness and distinctness in, 27ff; not a
criterion of truth, 33ff, 40.
Aphorism, xx, xxiii.
Assent, an act of judgment, u, 30, 32, 37; as related to truth, 33f, 36, 37, 41,
4Sf, 48; as related to falsity, 48.
Attention, necessary for conception or understanding, 29, <>i. 64.
Attributes, of God, 24, ii2f, 114, J97f, 207, 210; of things, 26; phenomenal
nature of, 84, 112; as related to substance, 98, 183, 209; Spinoza's con
ception of, 95, 113, 207, 210; thought and extension conceived as at
tributes, 206, 207, 210. See Accidents.
Barnacle myth, 165, 217, 223.
Being, Objective or cogitable, 14, 33. 80, 82, 94, 183; formal or real, 13, 14, 80,
82, 94, 183, cf. 99f, ii3f; mind and matter as related to, »2off. See
Existence.
Body, 99, i68f, 170, 197, 201, 203; as related to mind or soul, 107, 118, issf.
i28ff, 134, i42ff, i52ff, iS7ff, 207, cf. 123, 125, 148, 166, 211 ; as related
to external objects, i26ff; Hobbe's identification of substance with, 210.
Breath, identified with soul, i47ff, is6ff.
240 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Cambridge Platonists, The, xiii ff, 194, 2o6f, 209, 210; Burthogge's relation to,
xiii ff; Soul of the world as conceived by, xiv ; human souls as conceived by,
xiv; nature of truth as conceived by, xv; materialism opposed by, zo6f;
substance as conceived by, zogf.
Cause, 34, 72, 76, 107, 109, 114, n8f, 135, 146, 171, 173; a notion of the mind,
T3. 75. 84, 85, 91, 92, 94, 180; of sensations and notions, regarded as
things, 87, 181, 204; Principles conceived as uncaused causes, loif, 184;
God conceived as primary, 197, 208.
Clear and distinct perception, see Perception.
Clearness, an affection of apprehension, 19, 24, 27, 28, 66. See Perception, clear
and distinct.
Cogitables (or Cogitable beings), 13, 14, Bgfi.
Cogitation, 68, n8f, 128; includes sensation and intellection, 12, 13, 18, ssff,
6if, 76, 77, 81, 8sff, 92, 123; as related to mind, losff, 206; gives knowl
edge of phenomena only, 12, 77, 180, 183.
Cogitative Faculties, see Faculties.
Coherence, see Congruity.
Colour, xvi, 112, i2off; related to eye as meaning is to understanding, nff,
15, 18, 24, 32, 34, 58, 67f, 71, 74f, 77, 838?, 88, gaff.
Conception, 16, 29, 65, 80, 97, 100, 146; role of, in knowledge, 12, I3f, 25, 26.
S7ff, 67, 70, 74, 77f, 82, 117, 181.
Conduct, Role of Reason in, 188.
Congruity, between the object and the understanding, 15, 36, 42, 182; cf. 174.
J7S; objective congruity as test of truth, 4iff, 182. See Aanalogy and
Harmony.
Conscience, 48, 188.
Consciousness, Relation of, to knowledge. s8ff.
Consistence, see Congrttity.
Continuum, 29, 198.
Creation, of souls, i7off.
Deity, 5, 23. See God.
Discerption, conceived as attribute of material substance, 170, 173, by More.
209, 210.
Dissent, an act of judgment, 30, 32, 41, 45.
Distinctness, an affection of apprehension, 19. 2sff, 66. See Perception, clear
and distinct.
Duration, 124, 125; eternity conceived as permanent duration, 124.
Effect, conceived as a notion of the mind, 13, 73, 84, 85, 90, 91, 92, 94, 180.
cf. 45, 72, 87, 10 1, 173.
Energy, Vital, distinguished from mechanical, xv, i2$f, 130, 131, 143, 163.
See Action.
English Platonists, see Cambridge Platonists.
Enthusiasm, i6f, 69, 112, 190, 193, 194.
Entity, of sense, 13; of reason or understanding, 13, 75, 80, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92,
1 80.
Epistemology, see Knowledge.
Errour, 6, 8, 24, 25, 26, 28, 34, 35, 37, 45, 48, 49. See Falsity.
Essence, 80, 117.
Evil, a notion of the mind, 13, 81; distinguished from good by reason, 188.
Existence, 80, 96, 169, 197, 206, 207; objective, 13, 75, 180; real, 75, 84, 93,
99, 100, 122, 209. See Being.
Experience, Role of, in knowledge, Burthogge's teaching compared with that
of Locke, xvii, xx f.
INDEX. 241
Extension, conceived as attribute of matter, 95f, 99, 100, 105, io6£, 116, 206,
209; Spinoza's conception of, 95, 207, 210; substance conceived as, 99;
God conceived as, 108, by More, nsff, 209.
Eye, The, 15, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 145, 172; related to seeing
as the understanding is to meaning, nflF, 37, 60, 63, 66, 72, 74f, 87, 88;
an organ of sense, 64, 76, 83, 84, 123, 129.
Faculties, 15, ao, 26, 31, 36, 42, 77, 82, 93, 94, 102, 104, 105, 107, 119, 129, 134,
i3S. 146, 149, 152, 153, 182; of sense (i. e., perceptive), 10, 12, 13, 56,
. 76, 77, 180; of reason (i. e., conceptive and cogitative), 10, 12, 13, 14,
S6f, 76, 86, 91, 1 80, 199. See Powers.
Faith, opposed to reason, 10, 21, 47, 48. See Light, of Faith.
Falsity, 13, 32ff, 37, 41, 43ff, 48, 69, 182. See Errour.
Familists, 16, 17, I92f, 194.
Form (or Notion), of truth, 35, 37, 40, 182, 188.
Formal (or formally), n, 12, 13, 14, 80, 82, 94, 183; Burthogge's use of the term,
189.
Gnostics, 1 6, igif.
God, 7, 99, 103, 192, 201; nature of, 8, 19, 28, 47, 48, 94, 102, io8ff, 118, 120,
I23ff, 134, 135, 143, I46f, is6ff, 169, 171, I74f, 181, 184, 187, 195, 205;
Burthogge's teaching about, compared with that of Cambridge Platonisti.
xiv; according to Malebranche, 107, 108, naf, to Spinoza, 108, ii3ff,
2o7f, 209, to More, nsff, to Hobbes, i97f, 209, to Seneca, 208; revelation
of, igff, 28, 194; purpose of, 2:, 23; conceived as unknown, 24, mf,
197, as source of truth, 33.
Good, conceived as a notion, 13, 81, as the "will of a Superior," 188.
Goodness, an attribute of God, 19, 108, nsf, 198.
Gordius, see Horse-hair myth.
Grounds, reality, or things-in-themselves, conceived as "grounds" or cause of
Notions, 14, 18, 80, 85, 87, 93, 180, of sentiments, 17, 19, 88, 93. in,
lai ; reason, the "ground" of judgment, 30, 31, objective harmony, of
assent. 33, 34, 41, falsity, of dissent, 41; of truth, 36, 40.
Harmony, External, the test of truth, xxiii f, 13, 41 ff, 162, 182; of things to
our faculties, conceived as test of truth, 3$f, 42, 199. See Congrutty.
Horse-hair myth, :68, 223f.
Idealism, of seventeenth century, xiiiff; of eighteenth century, xv ff.
Ideas (or Notions), the objects of understanding, 18, 62ff, 73, 78, 90, 146, 179,
196; derived from sensation, 39; original, in the mind of God, 33; role
of, in knowledge, S7f, 74, 181, 205, 207; innate, xviii, xxiii, 200. Ideas
of substance, 92, 305; mind and matter, 92, 96ff, 107; cogitation and
extension, 106, 116; God, 108, 112; accidents, 209. See Notions.
Image, 13, 14, 35, 39, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 73, 77, 84. 87, 88, 129, 146, 175,
179, 1 80, 181, 182. See Phenomena and Representation.
Imagination, 12, 13, 14, 17, 39, 76, 96, 117, 175; a Conceptive Cogitative Power,
55. 57*; a Mental and Spiritual Power, 6if; conceived as internal sen
sation, 55, 62f, 119; acts of, 65; role in knowledge, 77; inadequacy of,
for knowledge, according to Descartes, 203.
Impressions, of sense, 12, I7f, 24, 26, 34, 39, 60, 62, 63, 76, 87, 88, 119, 127,
128, 146, 181; see Representation and Image; of the mind, 34, 35, 59,
119; see Notions.
Innate Ideas (or Innate Notions or Native Notions), xviii, xxiii, 70, 71, »8t,
182, 188, 200. See Anticipations and Notions.
242 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Instinct, warding off of blow not an instinct but habit, 7iff; conscience con
ceived as, 188; "natural instinct," a faculty of the mind, 199.
Intellect, 11, 33, 42, 203. See Mind.
Intellection, 55, 57, 76, 130, 146. See Reasoning.
Intuition, as criterion of truth, xv, xxiii; God sees universe in single, 124;
conceived as a type of knowledge, by Spinoza, igpf.
Jews, 7, 147, 152, 188.
Judgment, an act of reason or understanding, n, 20, zgff, 37, 44, 45, 65, 69,
163, 182; of sense, 20.
Knowledge, 6, 7, 26, 33, 40, 43, 48, 66, 73, 156; Burthogge's doctrine of, com
pared with that of Kant and Locke, xv ff: role of notions in, 18, 80, 82,
90, i79ff; role of sense in, 20, 47, 576", 61, i79ff, 198, 200, 204; reason
and, 55; inadequacy of human, I2f, 67, 76, 80, 8aff, 1 10, nif, ig8, 205,
221, cf. 106; faculties of knowledge or understanding, 10, 12, 14, s6ff
76f, 179; relative of truth to, 182; Spinoza's true types of, 200.
Life, derived from motion in the soul, i3off, 145; God, the original principle
of, iS7f; of the universe, 163, 175; conceived by Cudworth as attribute
of incorporeal substance, 209-210.
Light, of Revelation or Faith, i9ff, 24f, 196, cf. 10; of Nature or Reason, igfi,
a+t, 188, 196; intellectual, 19; of Discourse, 27; innate notions conceived
as light of understanding, 37ff; necessary for vision, 74, 83, 84, 88, I52f,
for sensitive actions, 163; God, conceived as source of, i2off, 134; nature
of propagation of, 170.
Logic, a method of reasoning, 3off, 44; subject of, 66.
Matter, 191, 196, 211; nature of, 24, 91, 96f, io2ff, 111, 113, nsff, 120(1.
i«8, 131, 169, 170, 172, 175, iSsf, 205, 306, 210; "mechanik and material"
powers of, 61; as related to mind, io8ff, 118, i26f, 163.
Meaning, the immediate object of the mind, nff, isf, 27, 64, 66, 68. See
Sense.
Metaphysics, Subject of, 66. See Philosophy.
Mind, 27ff, 44ff, 59, 60, 198, 199, 210; nature of, 9f, 55, 61, 64, 65, 91, g6f,
100, io2ff, 184, 206; faculties of, 12; apprehension, an act of, n, 19;
notions of, I2ff, 24, 32ff, 38ff, 70, 73, ?sf, 78, 8of, 85, 90, 92, 146, 179$?;
pure mind (i. e., God), nof, njf, n6f, i22ff, 184, 205; in matter,
i i8ff, I2sf, iS9ff, 184; Spinoza's conception of, 207.
Mcsaical Spirit, xiv, no, 118, i28ff, i43ff. See Spirit, of the universe.
Motion, 17, 36; a reality, 24, 103, 104, in; conceived as related to mind and
matter, 72, n8f, i22ff, I27f, i3of, 163, by More, 210; source of, 143;
conceived as related to soul, 145; necessary for spontaneous generation,
1 66, 168; self -perpetuating. 1(191.
Muggletonians, 194.
Mysticism, of Rosicrucians, i8gf; of Gnostics, 191; of Familists, i92f; of Hel-
mont, 196.
Nature, Light of, igff; innate notions conceived as gift of, 37ff, 72; harmony
in, 42f, 162; key to, 48; life of, 104, 175, cf. 156, 164; activity of, 122;
relation of God to, 114, 135, 146, 171; animals a part of, 152, 174: Epi-
curus's conception of, 197, 210.
Nor mat a, 13, 14. See Notions.
INDEX. 243
Notions, Burthogge's teaching about, compared with that of Kant, xvi (I; kinds
of, gl, 18, 21, 28, 73f, 89, 92; role of, in knowledge, i2ff, 22fT, 27, 29,
33, 62, 67, 73, 75, 77, 79, 83, 105, 179, 181; dependent upon sense, 17,
18, 20, 82, 179, 180; as objects of apprehension, 19, 25, 66, 70; innate,
-\viii, xxiii, 38ff, 701, i8if, 188; of reason or understanding, 58, 62f, 70,
75. 78f, 90. 181; subjective nature of, 14, 68, ?4ff, 8of, 84ff, 92, 93ff,
105, 1 80, 198; of sense, 79, 85, 92; things conceived as cause of, 45, 87,
89, 93, 181. Notions of truth, xxiii f, 35, 37, 41, 44f, 48f, 182, 188;
entity, xvi, 75, 85, 90, 180; substance, xvi, 75, 77, 80, 82f, 84, 85, 90,
9-2, 93*. 95. 96ff, 100, 180, 182, 183, as conceived by Spinoza, 95; acci
dent, xvi, 75, 77, 80, 82f, 85, 90, 92, 93, 94, as conceived by Spinoza,
95; •whole and fart, xvi, 13, 39, 75, 84, 85, 90; cause and effect, xvi, 13,
75, 84, 85, 90, 92, 94, 180; quality, 77, 82f, 84, 93, 94; action, 77; subject.
So; adjunct, 80; thing, 89, 90, 180; reality, 90; time, 92, 124; place, 92;
relations, 13, 93, 94; measuse, 94; God, no, ii2ff, 198; eternity, 124;
self-subsistence, 183; good and evil, 13.
Object, of knowledge, 182, Burthogge's teaching about compared with that of
Kant and Locke, xv ff, phenomenal nature of, I2ff, 57, 74, 77, 84f, 180,
198, complex nature of, 179, when judged as true, 182, 188, 199; of
apprehension, cogitation or understanding, nf, i8f, 27f, 31, 36, 40, 44,
61, 66, 70, 88, 179; "meaning," dependent upon congruity of, with the
faculties, 15, 36, 182; regarded as external, 13, 18, 24, 57, 59, 60, 62,
75, 80, 97, 125, 127, 129, 144, 180, 181, and cause of sensations and
notions, 18, 21, 76, 80, 86f, 119, 121, 145, 146; of sense or perception,
20, 32, 34, 57, 59, 60, 69, 128, 180; basis for judgment of congruity
between ideas and, according to Descartes, 196.
Objective, as opposed to formal, 13, 74, 84, 90, 91, 92, 94: Burthogge's use 01
the term, 189.
Passivity, an attribute of principiates, loaf, of matter, 102, 105, 106, 184.
Perception, of the understanding, 18, 68, 75; clear and distinct, 34f, 37, 68,
196, cf. 199; faculties of, 56; as related to knowledge, 57, 82f, 179, 199.
cf. 60, 106; of sense, 71, 741", 127, ijsf, 172, 179, 199, 207.
Phenomena, opposed to realities or things-in-themselves, xix ff, 12, 34, 29, 49.
68, 77, 88, 133, 180, 184, 198, 205; of Nature, 156, 162, 163, 169, 172,
«73> 174, 175- See Appearance and Apparitions.
Philosophy, Fludd's "Mosaick Philosophy," 16; enthusiasts in, 17; cause ot
errors in, 26; authority for, I59ff.
Platonists, The. See Cambridge Platonists.
Powers, Cogitative and conceptive, 13, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 82, 87, 123, 135, 180;
mental and spiritual, 55, 57, 61; of the soul, 149; mechanick and
material, 55, 57, 61. 169; perceptive, appetitive and motive, 104, 153.
See Faculties.
Principle, see Vital principle.
Principles, 159, 181; innate notions of the mind, 37ff, cf. 188; uncaused sub
stances, 96, 101 ff, 107, 119, 122, 124, 184.
Principiates, Nature of, 96, 101, 184.
Proportion, as test of truth, 4 if, 44f. See Congruity and Harmony.
Quakers, 189, 192, 194.
Ratiocination, Nature of, 38; kinds of, 48.
Reality, opposed to phenomena, i2ff, 17, 24, 28f, 38, 76, 8off, 88f, 91, 93, iO4f.
no, 182, 183, 198, 204f; a notion, 90.
244 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF BURTHOGGE.
Reason, 5, 13, 37, 42, 46, 48, so, 86, 141, 142, 189, 199, 200, 202, 220; nature
of, gf, 30, 49, ssff, 6off, 6sf, 72, 109, 117, 179, 180, 188; notions or
ideas of, 18, 75, 80, 179, 181; light of, igff, 188; kinds of, 3if.
Reasoning, 28, 33, 40, 98, 153; nature of, 30, 32, 44, 45, ssff, 81, 182; methods
°f. 3i. 43f, 48f; impertinent, a cause of error, 6, 8f.
Religion, 7, 9, 25, 115; as related to reason, 48; in England in the i7th cen
tury, xii, xv; Christian, 2off; Abraxas religion, 191; natural, 199.
Remembrance, sensible and intellectual, 63, 64.
Representation, 12, 22, 27, 63, 76, 77, in, 184. See Appearance and Phe
nomena.
Revelation as related to sense, xvi, 143, ijsff, and reason, xvi, 10, igff, 48,
143. 'S3ff.
Rosicrucians, 69, i89f.
Science, Unitary nature of, 43 ; 47.
Sensation, of sense, 18, 57, 76, 123, 130, 146, 173; nature of, 6off, 127, 181,
204; of understanding (internal or "sublimated"), 55, 63, 180; role of,
in knowledge, 59. See Sense.
Sense, External, 19, 42, 90, 92, 94, 101, 104. 107, 130, 134, i7if, 199, 203,
nature of, 55, S7ff, role of, in knowledge, 20, 39, 47, 60, 76, 79, 83f,
89, 111, i79ff, 199, 200, 204, 2o6f, object of, 13, 17, 24, 58, 69, 77fF,
146, i79f, Burthogge's teaching about, compared with that of Kant and
Locke, xvi ff ; intellectual or internal, 32, 35, 78, 92, 119, 188, 199; or
"meaning," 9, nff, 2sff, 36, 64, 66, 68, 70. See Sensation and Senti
ment.
Sentiment, of sense, 12, 13, i7ff, 58, 62, 7of, 7sf, 77ff, 82ff, 85, 87, 89, 92,
93f, in, 146, 180; of understanding, 66, 71, 78, 79, 80, 82ff, 146, 180.
See Sense.
Soul, of World, 126, i28ff, 1.14, uiff, 152, 158, isgff, 163, 164, 169, 173, 175,
180, 205, 208, 212, 214, Burthogge's teaching about, compared with that
of Cambridge Platonists, xiv f ; particular souls, iS2f, 156, 163, 180,
human, 133. Miff, 147, 156, 158, 169, 172, I74f. 201, 206, as related to
body, 38, I2$f, i28f, 152; perceptions of, 127; of animals, 142, 156,
172; as related to life, 145, i47ff; of plants, 156, Burthogge's teaching
about, compared with that of Cambridge Platonists, xiv f ; creation of.
i7of. See Spirit.
Spirit, 38, 133, 134, 173, 189, 191, 193, 194; demoniacal, cause of enthusiasm,
16; of passion, 8; nature of 99f, 134 148, 163, 170, 209, 211; of God,
19, 103, logf, 115, 118, 123, 146, is6f, 174, 175; abstract, 123, 125, 132:
of the universe xiv, 118, ia6, i28ff, I43ff, 158, 161: of man, 126, 201:
of animals, 126, 131, 166: mechanical, 132. See Soul.
Spontaneous generation, of animals, i63ff, 216, 217, 221, 222.
Stoics, 102, 148, 197.
Subject, of accidents. Substance conceived as, 81. 85, 95, 97ff. 106, 107, 183.
205, 209.
Substance, a Notion, xvi, 75, 77, 79, 80 ff, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94. 9S. '80, i82f;
conceived as subject of accidents, 81, 85, 95, 97ff, 106, 107, 183, 205.
209; Spinoza's conception of, criticized, 92f, 95, 98, 101, 108, ii3f; kinds
of, 96, 99, 101, 104, 105, 134, 136, 184; in itself unknown, 97, 106,
i82f; universe conceived as corporeal substance by Hobbes, 197.
Thing, n, 73, 80, 146, 157, 161, 162, 169, 182, 207; kinds of, 89, 9H a*
known 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 24, 26, 27, 30, 3 iff, 4iff, 75, ?8. 8off, 88, goff,
97ff, mf, n6f, 123. i8of: spiritual, 22, 48; conceived as a notion, 79.
80, 90, 91; conceived as a cause of notions, 45, 87, 89, 93, 181.
INDEX. 245
Things-in-themsclves, n, 13, 45, 67, 89; Burthogge's doctrine of, compared
with that of Kant, xviii ff ; unknown, 12, 74, 77, 83, 84, 97, inf, 180,
i83f, 198; ground, or cause of knowledge, 85, 87f, 93, 130, 179, 181.
204; formal existence of, 189.
Thought, or conception, 61, 65, 70, 74, 81, too, 105, 106, 116, 183, 204, 206,
207, 209, 210.
Time, a notion, 92, 124; God conceived as independent of, 125.
Truth, 5, 6, 24, 49, 50, 88; interpretation of Burthogge's doctrine of, xiv,
xv, xxiii f ; as related to reason or mind, 9, n, 32, 36, 44ff; relation of
sense to, 20, 47, 199; definition of, 33, 181; criterion of, 20, 34ff, 4off,
182, 188, 207.
Understanding, Function of, in knowledge, i3f, :8, 43, 58, 60, 63^ 66, 7sff,
90, 93ff, 97f, 179, Burthogge's teaching about, compared with that
of Kant, xvi ff; function of, in knowledge of truth, 6, 32, 36f, 40; na
ture of, loff, 19, 21, agf, 55, 6iff, 65, 74, 78, 82, 116, 119, 146, 160,
174, 210; inadequacy of, for knowledge of reality, 6, 70, 75ff, 83, 85,
89; innate notions of, 71; of God, 23, no.
Universe, God not to be identified with, 113; Vital Principle or Spirit of, 1288,
143, 158, conceived as Spirit of God, 158.
Unknown substance, or thing, 12, 97, 106, iSaf, 209; Burthogge's teaching about,
compared with that of Kant, xviii ff.
Upstart Sect, 17, 194.
Verity, 6, u, 13, 32, 33, 36. See Truth.
Vital principle, or soul, 125, 128, 129, i3if, 134, 135, 142, 148, 152, 153, 156,
iS7» i63f, 175. See Soul.
Words, as carriers of "meaning," I4ff, 18, 26f, 6sfT, 73f, 203.
World, 24, 38, 132; ratiocination, the power of interpreting the, 48; God not
to be identified with, 113, 205; Soul of, 113, 131, 1426% 179. '84, 211.
b 1201 .87
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Burthogge, Richard,
1638?-ca. 1700.
The ph i 1 osoph i ca 1
writings of Richard
AEL-6903 (mcsk)
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